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ABSTRACT
A Collection of Essays on Electric Grid Operations: Optimizing Energy Storage and
Enhancing the Eect of Social Comparisons
by
Santhosh Suresh
Co-Chairs: Assistant Professor Owen Wu and Professor Roman Kapuscinski
Every year, a signicant portion of the energy the U.S. electric grid consumes is wasted
through transmission, heat losses, and inecient technology, translating into signicant costs
to individual consumers and businesses. Improving the eciency of the electric grid is one of
the easiest and most cost eective ways to combat climate change, clean the air we breathe,
improve the competitiveness of our businesses and reduce energy costs for consumers. Gov-
ernments across the world are focusing on ways to achieve it. This dissertation explores
various ways of improving the grid operations related to energy storage. Storage allows for
smoothing production and hence avoiding the costly peaking plants. However, scalable en-
ergy storage technology, such as Lead Acid Batteries or Pumped Storage units are expensive
and have signicant conversion losses in both the storing and withdrawing processes. The
rst two essays in the dissertation consider energy storage.
The rst essay considers the problem of locating storage facilities in an electric grid. Due
to transmission losses, congestion and reliability issues, the location of storage technology on
the grid aects its economic value. We consider a trade-o between locating storage closer
to the generation unit, increasing exibility of the storage unit, or closer to the demand
hub, reducing transmission losses and study how changes in system parameters will aect
this trade-o. We derive a structure for the optimal operating policy and conclude that
xi
current system parameters greatly favour locating of Energy Storage investments closer to
the demand hub, due to lesser transmission losses, and minimal benet of pooling.
The second essay considers the choice of storage technology. There exist a number of
storage technologies diering in investment costs per unit capacity and conversion eciencies.
One of the critical trade-os is between investing in technology with greater conversion
eciency, incurring greater xed costs or investing in technology with low eciency, incurring
lower xed cost but greater variable costs. We study the system parameters under which
dierent types of technology are most suitable. We also show that under some situations
investing in a portfolio of technologies may perform better than choosing a single technology.
However, we observe that the benet of divesting in multiple technologies is decreasing in
the number of technologies used.
The third essay deals with behavioural energy eciency. Opower, a technology company
has recently shown that comparing energy consumptions of households to their peers can
motivate consumers to signicantly reduce their energy usage through peer pressure. Their
Home Energy Reports (HER) program has been documented to reduce up to 3% in energy
consumption of consumers across the spectrum and this has resulted in a growing eld of
energy conservation known as behavioural energy eciency. We model the eects of these
social incentives against more standard investment incentives. We observe that, including
both types of incentives dramatically reduces demand consumption when compared to the
sum of the reduction by applying each of the incentives separately, in some situations.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Operating the North American electric grid is a complex business involving tens of thou-
sands of nodes spread across the entire continent. Each instant, operators have to make
thousands of trade-os deciding the location, quantity and quality of power that is being
generated, transmitted and consumed, subject to several physical and economic constraints.
The annual revenue of the electric grid runs in billions of dollars, making ecient operation
of the grid, of paramount economic importance. In this dissertation, we discuss some ways
to improve the operation of the electric grid, both at the supply and consumption end of the
grid.
At the supply side of the grid, use of Energy storage technologies can substantially reduce
the cost of power generation. This is due to the convexity of the energy generation costs, i.e.,
during high demand periods, the marginal cost of energy is higher, owing to the use of more
expensive but exible peaking units. Hence, energy storage allows for smoothing of power
generation, storing energy during inexpensive low demand periods for later use. Chapters
II and III discuss the problems related to Energy Storage Investment and Operation. In
chapter II, we discuss the problem of locating Energy Storage Technologies on the grid,
specically, the trade-o between locating storage closer to the consumer end or closer to
the central generation end of the grid. In chapter III, we consider the issue of choosing the
right portfolio of storage technologies, given the many options available, such as Lead Acid
Batteries, Pumped Storage Units, Nickel Hydride batteries etc.
At the consumption end of the grid, Chapter IV explores the potential of motivating
consumers to consume less energy because of social comparisons and by incentivizing them
1
to invest in more energy ecient equipment. We compare the potential of both these types
of incentives. In particular, we consider whether the two treatments are complements or
substitutes, in terms of reducing energy consumption.
We conclude this dissertation in Chapter V by summarizing our contributions and dis-
cussing future research opportunities in this area.
2
CHAPTER II
Operations and Investment of Energy Storage in the
Presence of Transmission Losses
2.1. Introduction
It is well known in OM practice and theory, that inventory provides a wide range of
benets. It helps meet uncertain demand as well as smooth predictable cyclical patterns
in demand, allows for batching where economies of scale in procurement exist, allows to
take advantage of quantity discounts and protects against long lead times. Not unlike other
industries, in the omnipresent electricity industry, storage technology also has several ben-
ets, including enhancement of sustainability, reliability and utilization of generation and
transmission assets (Rastler and Kamath 2005). The value of electric storage has increased
due to signicant technical improvements (de Morsella 2011, Rastler 2010) and the poten-
tial of energy storage has been established by several independent studies (Eyer and Corey
2010, Chu and Majumdar 2012, Greenberger 2011). Makansi (2004) argues that the benet
of storage will likely increase because of increasing use of intermittent renewable sources of
energy.
Despite the high potential benets of energy storage (Akhil et al. 2013), only about 3% of
the energy served in the US is cycled through energy storage, as opposed to 10-15% in Europe
and Japan (Gyuk 2003). To improve energy storage usage, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act allocated nearly $650 million to energy storage technologies and related
smart-grid technologies. These projects will naturally raise questions about the best use
of storage technologies and their locational benets. Due to transmission losses (Energy
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Information Administration 2009) and congestion issues (due to limited capacities, see Rivier
and Perez-Arriaga 1993), the allocation of storage on the grid is a non-trivial problem.
Homan et al. (2010) point out the need for modeling tools to answer this question. Sbiliris
and Dedoussis (2013) and Gayme and Topcu (2013) use examples to show that intelligent
location of storage can signicantly impact the value of storage. Nourai (2007) discuss and
numerically evaluate the investment projects of American Electric Power (AEP), where they
consider whether to localize storage investments for each community or centralize storage
investments at the grid level. We address exactly the same question, but their analysis is
computational, while we model this problem analytically.
While the problem of optimal location is fairly complicated, we consider the fundamental
trade-o between locating storage closer to the generating station (centrally) or closer to the
the usage point (locally). Pooling of storage capacity is benecial when there is uncertainty
in the destination of stored energy, which arises from variability in demands across nodes
in the grid. Hence, pooling reduces transmission losses on average. Interestingly, centrally
located storage capacity must also \store" the transmission losses, which means that local
storage achieves greater ecacy of storage capacity. In a parsimonious model, we consider the
trade-o of pooling vs. localizing.1 Using stochastic dynamic programming, we identify the
structure of the optimal policy of operating the grid during each period. We then compare
investment strategies, given the optimal operating policy and identify the features of the
system that favor pooling versus localizing of storage capacity.
In a traditional operations sense, the greater the variability, the greater the benets of
centralized storage capacity. In our study, however, we observe that increasing variability
increases the value of storage, which causes higher ecacy of the localized invested capacity
to smooth production. We investigate how the increasing penetration of the intermittent
renewable sources aects the storage location problem. The high wind generation during
low demand periods results in temporary surplus of energy, increasing the benet of storage
capacity. Furthermore, the presence of local generation (due to distributed sources of energy,
such as wind farms) increases the benet of localizing storage by enabling a cycle of locally
1Throughout the paper, the words pooling and centralizing of storage capacity are used interchangeably.
Similarly, the words localizing and decentralizing are used interchangeably.
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storing and using energy.
We discuss how the optimal pooling and localizing strategies are aected by system
parameters such as the cost of storage capacity, storage conversion eciency, transmission
eciency, and demand distribution parameters. We nd that an increase in the cost of
storage increases the tendency towards localizing. Also, the benets of localizing increase
when the average load increases. The impact of storage eciency depends, however on where
the energy is generated. Under greater occurrence of local generation, increased storage
eciency implies more localizing.
Contrary to the current practice, we nd that, under current system parameters, it is
overwhelmingly more benecial to localize storage capacity investments, mostly due to the
following two reasons. Firstly, the minimum of demand at a local node tends to be high
enough, so that local storage can primarily be used to satisfy local demand, decreasing
potential for remote transmission. Secondly, the greater ecacy of localizing is benecial
due to the high price of storage capacity today ( $1000-2000/KWh).
2.2. Literature Review
Since the objective of this paper is to analyze the value of storage siting and sizing in
energy markets, a few streams of literature are relevant. We rst discuss literature pertaining
to evaluation of energy storage without transmission constraints or losses, i.e., single-node
energy storage systems. Then, we discuss energy storage literature in the context of grid
operations, i.e., with transmission factors. We then discuss a related resource-allocation
problem: Distributed Generation (DG). Finally, we compare energy storage to the traditional
OM context of capacitated systems.
2.2.1 Single-Node Energy Storage Systems
Several papers provide insights on the evaluation of a single-storage facility, co-located
with renewable energy and/or directly serving customer demand. We wish to extend these
insights by considering an electric network with more nodes and transmission losses, and
focusing on storage location.
The evaluation of the economic value of energy storage is of extreme importance and
single-node is the natural step in this direction. See Mokrian and Stephen (2006) for a
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comprehensive review of methodology related to evaluation of the economic benet of energy
storage due to arbitrage, when operating in a market with exogenous prices. Several more
recent papers extend this stream of literature of revenue maximizing storage owner. Korpaas
et al. (2003), Castronuovo and Lopes (2004), Brunetto and Tina (2007), attempt this problem
as a deterministic optimization problem given a particular sample path over a nite horizon
and then averaging the results over the sample paths. Bitar et al. (2010), Bitar et al. (2011),
Kim and Powell (2011) consider a stochastic generalization of this problem. They derive
closed form expressions for the value of storage under certain special cases of the energy
price and wind distributions, to help evaluate storage investments.
Harsha and Dahleh (2011), Granado et al. (2012), Van De Ven et al. (2011) extend the
literature by considering the objective of players who are obligated to serve the consumer
demand, while maximizing revenue from a wind farm combined with storage. These papers
are dierent from the previous group in that, here, they are obligated to satisfy demand.
However, all of the above papers have an exogenous price process, while we endogenize
the price to the generation costs. Brown et al. (2008) consider a version of the storage
investment problem with additionally, a conventional generation unit, with deterministic
production cost in one-node setting. Our focus is dierent, we concentrate on the trade-o
between locating storage at central and local sites, which requires multi-node setting. We
borrow and generalize some assumptions from the single node literature.
2.2.2 Operation of Storage on the Electric Grid
In order to understand where to locate resources on the grid, it is necessary to rst
understand how they would be optimally operated given locations are already chosen.
The traditional approach to solve grid operations is to apply Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
models, which include all the decisions to be made for each node of the grid, keeping in mind
the energy ow constraints, generation constraints, and transmission constraints (See Cain
et al. (2012) for a full summary on OPF). The presence of energy storage facilities on the
grid provides additional benets for operations, but makes solving the problem more dicult,
since energy can be generated and stored to potentially serve future demand. Due to diculty
of solving a system with storage units, Kraning et al. (2011) show that the optimization
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of a portfolio of storage technologies in order to minimize total system investment and
operating costs in the grid can be approximated to a convex optimization problem. Similar
convexications of Power Flow problems can be seen in Low (2014), Sojoudi and Lavaei
(2013).
Our focus is understanding the trade-os and generating insights. We therefore consider a
stylized model with three nodes (two demand hubs and one generation node), to demonstrate
the trade-os between localizing and centralizing of storage capacity. Several papers model
operation of grids with energy storage on related specialized structures of grids: Single-
bus systems (Su and El Gamal 2011, Zhou et al. 2011, Chandy et al. 2010, Denholm and
Sioshansi 2009), are common. We add to this literature by proving structural properties
of the parameter-dependent grid operation policy in our stylized model with two demand
hubs. Other papers consider lossless 1-D and 2-D grids (Kanoria et al. 2011) and IEEE
benchmark network systems (Gayme and Topcu 2013) with deterministic demand to show
that storage attens the generation prole. We use stochastic demands in our stylized
model with transmission losses and extend some of these patterns in the operating policy.
Our insights additionally extend to the investment problem.
2.2.3 Location of Storage on the Electric Grid
The problem of locating energy storage on the grid is complicated due to multiple lo-
cations, as well as losses and limited capacities along transmission lines. A general compu-
tational framework to optimize energy storage on the grid has been designed recently and
studied through simulations in Sjodin et al. (2012), Bose et al. (2012) using tools similar
to the Optimal Power Flow. Sjodin et al. (2012) use the approximate Direct Current OPF
(Purchala et al. 2005, Pandya and Joshi 2008), while Bose et al. (2012) use the relaxation of
the Alternating Current OPF (Bai et al. 2008, Bai and Wei 2009) on IEEE benchmark sys-
tems based on semi-denite programming (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, Wolcowicz et al.
2000). In contrast to these papers, our focus is on understanding the trade-os in a stylized
network model to derive insights on the investment policy, rather than exact solutions.
Some papers consider the location of storage in single bus systems (Denholm and Sioshansi
2009, Zhou et al. 2011). Denholm and Sioshansi (2009) compare the benets of deploying
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storage capacity at the wind farm or the load center connected via a transmission line. They
show that locating storage technology close to the wind farms is benecial and results in
utilization of transmission capacities. Zhou et al. (2011) consider the problem of operating
a storage facility on a wind farm connected through a transmission line to a load center.
Both of these papers assume a single storage facility and an exogenous price process, which
is independent of the energy stored. In an independent but related work, Thrampoulidis et
al. (2013) consider a generic network model to derive insights on storage investment in a
network. They prove that it is never optimal to co-locate storage capacity with a generator
which is connected to the grid via a sole transmission line. These results are consistent with
our model, but our focus is on multiple demand nodes. Also, we model the impact of storage
on energy prices implicitly, through convex costs, instead of exogenous prices. Our model
shows that the intuition of locating storage closer to the point of \variability", i.e., the wind
farm or demand hubs in the models in these papers, continues to hold in many settings.
Recent implementation of energy storage projects considered at American Electric Power
(AEP), Nourai (2007) have similar lessons. They concluded that localized storage (`Com-
munity Energy Storage') has greater benets to the grid, then central storage. We conrm
their observations based on theoretical framework, that is dierent from other streams of
work. We formally compare localizing with pooling. Our model suggests that localizing of
storage increases the ecacy of storage assets by making better use of storage.
2.2.4 Location of Distributed Generation Resources on the Grid
A related eld of resource allocation on the grid is that Distributed Grid (DG) location.
DG resource allocation problems present similar trade-os as storage location in electrical
networks with transmission issues, as the objective is to invest in resources that reduce
generation costs, while still minimizing energy losses. In their seminal paper, Ackermann
et al. (2001) dene Distributed Generation as electric power generation within distribution
networks or on the customer side of the network. Building on Ackermann et al. (2001),
El Khattam et al. (2004) investigate optimal investment in DG resources across the grid.
Madarshahian et al. (2009) consider the trade-o between customer interruption cost and
distributed generation cost and provide some heuristics for optimal DG investment. Ro-
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driguez et al. (2010) review the literature of DG optimization problems accounting for the
multiple objectives that DG systems often carry. This research is geared towards providing
computational methodologies for the industry, that can solve the distributed storage invest-
ment problem in the grid. Additionally, Wang and Nehrir (2004), Acharya et al. (2006) etc.
compare several analytical approaches to nding the optimal DG investment in simplied
bus networks. Additionally, Atwa et al. (2010) show that Mixed Integer Linear Programs
can be used to nd an investment solution with huge performance improvement. While these
papers focus on comparing performance of methodologies, we focus on the insights of the
optimal investment policy, for the storage problem. We observe a unifying trend between the
investment of Distributed Generation capacities and decentralized Storage capacities: They
both tend to achieve greater value when invested away from the conventional generation
units.
2.2.5 Related work in Traditional Operations Management
Our model includes the elements of storage capacity and losses, as well as transmission
of energy, topics studied in traditional OM concepts of Inventory Control, Warehousing and
Transhipment.
The electric energy storage optimization problem is similar to a classical multi-period in-
ventory problem with stochastic demand. However, most of the inventory literature assumes
linear production costs, whereas in energy markets production costs are highly convex. A
treatment of the traditional inventory model with convex production costs can be found in
Karlin (1960). The paper however does not consider storage capacity or possibility of multiple
nodes. Several elements of energy storage models are dierent from OM models: produc-
tion cost is non-linear, all demand has to be satised and sequence of demand/production
tends to be dierent. Also, the nature of storage costs is signicantly dierent, with con-
version losses. Our paper provides another inventory control model, with convex generation
costs and non-linear holding costs and provides a structure to the optimal operating policy,
contributing to the Inventory Control literature.
Our research is also related to the warehousing and the commodity trading literature.
Cahn (1948) introduces the problem that aims to identify optimal purchasing, storage and
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sales decisions of a stock given a warehouse with a xed capacity. Bellman (1956) formulates
this as a dynamic program, and Dreyfus (1957) provides analytic solutions for deterministic
prices and shows that the optimal solutions at each stage are to either ll-up the warehouse,
or empty it, or do nothing. Charnes et al. (1966) show that for the case of positive stochastic
prices the optimal trading decisions remain the same. Rempala (1994) and Secomandi (2010)
extend this work to incorporate a limit to the injection and withdrawal and more recently,
Zhou et al. (2012) to the case of negative prices as well. Faghih et al. (2011) address this
problem in the energy storage context where storage is used for arbitrage. For independently
distributed prices in each period and a storage with a perfect round-trip eciency, they derive
explicit formulae for the optimal thresholds (closed form or recursive). Our paper treats
prices as endogenous by modelling the convex production costs, and we observe that in this
system, the threshold structure of `ll up' or `empty' does not apply, as storing energy aects
the marginal cost of energy in each period. In a related context, Netessine (2006) considers
the problem of endogenously pricing inventory with limited storage capacity constraint.
While they provide insights on the pricing decision, prices are set by the production costs in
our model and we have multiple storage units, while they have just one.
Another related traditional OM concept is transhipment. A more traditional analysis
of inventory management under transshipment can be seen in Hu et al. (2008) where they
discuss the co-ordination transhipment prices of a two location production/inventory model.
In energy markets, the transmission losses impose a dierent cost structure, correspond-
ingly, operating policy is dierent. The impact of transmission constraints on energy prices
is analyzed in Lee et al. (2011), where congestion pricing plays an important role in modu-
lating demand. We complement this research by considering storage and transmission in a
centralized setting.
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2.3. Model
2.3.1 Storage and Transmission
We consider a storage investment problem on a simple tree network that consists of
one central generation facility (node G) and two demand centers (leaf nodes A and B).
Transmission lines G-A and G-B connect the generation facility and the demand centers. Let
T def= f1; 2; : : : ; Tg denote an operating horizon. In a period preceding the operating horizon
(labeled as period 0), storage investment is decided at each node and storage facilities are
built. Once built, the storage size is xed throughout the operating horizon T . An operating
period t 2 T represents a few hours, while period 0 is much longer.
Assumption II.1 (Storage). (i) Each storage facility can be lled up or emptied within one
operating period. (ii) Energy loss during storage operation is linear in the amount of energy
stored or released.
Part (i) is not restrictive, as many storage technologies allow fully charging or discharging
within a few hours (Denholm et al. 2010, KEMA 2012). Part (ii) approximates the reality well
(Ibrahim et al. 2008) and is a standard assumption in most engineering and OM literature
(Denholm and Sioshansi 2009, Zhou et al. 2012). Most storage losses occur during energy
conversion processes (storing or releasing); keeping energy in the storage for one period has
negligible losses.
We denote storage size by S = (SA; SB; SG), where Si  0 is the storage size at node i.
Denote by st = (s
A
t ; s
B
t ; s
G
t ) the storage level (also referred to as inventory level) at the
beginning of period t, where st 2 A def= fs : 0  s  Sg; t 2 T .
Let  2 (0; 1] denote the one-way eciency of the storage; the round-trip eciency is
2. That is, reducing sit by one unit releases  units of energy, and raising s
i
t by one unit
requires  1 units of energy. Thus, the energy ow associated with an inventory change of
sit = s
i
t+1   sit is
 (s
i
t)
def
=
8<:  1sit; if sit  0;sit; if sit < 0; (2.1)
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where  (s
i
t) > 0 is the energy inow into storage, and  (s
i
t) < 0 is the energy outow.
The assumption of the same eciency in both ways brings notational and analytical
convenience, but does not cause any loss of generality, because if the storing eciency 1
diers from the releasing eciency 2, we can use  =
p
12 and scale the storage size
and storage levels accordingly. We do not consider constraints on the speed of charging and
discharging energy storage in this paper. See Wu et al. (2012) for a recent discussion on the
impact of charging and discharging rates on the value of energy storage.
Our analysis focuses on storage operations in the presence of transmission losses. To
clearly analyze the tradeos, we assume that transmission capacity is not constrained. Lin-
ear transmission loss is a good approximation for most transmission lines with moderate
utilization, under destressed conditions (Gomez-Exposito et al. 2000).
Assumption II.2 (Transmission). (i) The transmission lines have sucient capacity, i.e.,
capacity constraints are non-binding in all periods. (ii) Energy loss during transmission is
linear in the amount of energy transmitted.
Let  2 (0; 1] denote the eciency of the transmission lines G-A and G-B in either
direction, i.e., transmitting one unit of energy leads to 1   units of transmission loss. Let
uit denote the transmitted energy measured at leaf node i 2 fA;Bg in period t. To indicate
the direction of transmission, we use uit > 0 for the energy transmitted from G to leaf node
i and uit < 0 for the reverse ow (from leaf node i to G). The corresponding transmission
ow measured at G can be written as
 (u
i
t)
def
=
8<:  1uit; if uit  0;uit; if uit < 0: (2.2)
2.3.2 Balancing Demand and Supply
Let dt = (d
A
t ; d
B
t )  0 denote the demand for electricity in period t, where dit is the
demand at leaf node i. We assume the demand process fdt : t 2 T g is Markovian. We
assume dt is realized at the beginning of period t and must be satised in period t.
We refer to the tree network with generation and storage facilities as an electricity sys-
tem. A system operator makes production and inventory decisions in every period. At the
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beginning of period t, the system operator observes the period-starting storage level st and
demand dt, and decides the period-ending storage level st+1, which is the next period's start-
ing storage level. The inventory change and demand determine the transmission ows and
central generation, as detailed below and illustrated in Figure 2.1.
At the leaf nodes, the ow balance constraint is
uit = d
i
t +  (s
i
t); i = A;B: (2.3)
Then, (2.2) and (2.3) imply together that the transmitted energy measured atG is
P
i=A;B
 (u
i
t) =P
i=A;B
 
 
dit+ (s
i
t)

. Flow balance at G implies that the central facility's production quan-
tity, denoted as qt, is a function of dt and inventory change st = st+1   st:
qt = q(st;dt)
def
=  (s
G
t ) +
P
i=A;B
 
 
dit +  (s
i
t)

: (2.4)
Because  () and  () are convex and increasing functions, q(st;dt) is convex and in-
creasing in st. As the central facility produces q(st;dt) to balance the energy ows at
node G, the system operator must choose storage level st+1 such that q(st;dt)  0.
Let c(qt) denote the cost of producing qt in period t at the central facility at G. The
production satises the following assumption.
Assumption II.3 (Production). (i) c(qt) is convex and increasing in qt for qt  0, and
c(0) = 0; (ii) In every period t, central production qt can be adjusted to any non-negative
level at negligible adjustment cost.
2.3.3 Problem Formulation
We aim to decide the storage investment strategy and the corresponding operating policy
that satises the demand at the minimum cost. To evaluate a storage investment decision S,
let Vt(st;dt;S), t  1, denote the minimum expected discounted operating cost from period
t onward when the state is (st;dt), and let  2 (0; 1] be the discount factor. The opti-
mal operating policy for given storage S is determined by the following stochastic dynamic
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Figure 2.1: Network Model and Key Variables
Storage level in period :
begin:          end:
Storage level in period :
begin:          end:
Energy flow 
direction when the 
associated term > 0
G
A
Storage level in period :
begin:          end:
Demand: B
Central generation:
Demand:
program:
Vt(st;dt;S) = min
st+1

c
 
q(st+1   st;dt)

+ Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1;S)
	
; t 2 T ; (2.5)
s.t. st+1 2 A; q(st+1   st;dt)  0; (2.6)
where Et denotes the expectation with respect to future demand dt+1, conditioned on dt.
The terminal condition is VT+1(sT+1; :;S) = 0.
The storage facilities are installed in period 0; no additional investment or divestment can
be made during the operating horizon. The storage investment decision trades o between
the upfront investment cost and the ongoing operating cost. The investment of jSj def=
SA + SB + SG units of storage capacity incurs an upfront investment cost of p jSj, charged
at the end of period 0, where p is the investment cost per unit of storage capacity (we
consider a single storage technology in this paper). We assume storage facilities are full
after installation: s1 = S. Thus, at the end of period 0, the investment and operating cost
combined is p jSj+ V1(S;d1;S). Because the investment decision S is made at the beginning
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of period 0, we dene V (S)
def
= E0V1(S;d1;S) and B(S)
def
= V (0) V (S) p jSj, which is the
net benet of S, i.e., the operating cost reduction brought by the storage net the investment
cost. Then, the optimal investment is determined by
max
S0
B(S): (2.7)
This problem is to make the storage siting and sizing decisions on a simple tree network,
taking into account the storage and transmission losses and the convex production cost. Our
model can be extended to include a xed cost or other general cost structures, but we believe
that focusing on the linear investment cost helps us understand the basic tradeos in storage
investment decisions.
2.4. Optimal Operating Policy for Given Storage Investment
This section derives the structural properties of the optimal operating policy under given
storage size S  0. Because S is xed for t 2 T , we write Vt(st;dt;S) as Vt(st;dt) and write
the optimal decision for (2.5)-(2.6) as st+1(st;dt) in this section.
2.4.1 Basic Properties and Problem Decomposition
We rst derive some properties of the operating cost function Vt(st;dt). Intuitively,
stored energy has an operating-cost reduction eect. Lemma II.4 conrms this intuition and
further shows that this eect declines when the storage level increases. (Throughout this
paper, monotone and convex properties are not in strict sense, unless otherwise noted.)
Lemma II.4. Vt(st;dt) is decreasing and convex in st for any dt and t 2 T .
Note that constraint (2.6) denes a non-convex feasible region for st+1, and thus, the
proof of Lemma II.4 is not obvious. All proofs are included in the online supplement.
The next lemma shows that energy from any storage facility would not be withdrawn
only to store it in another location. Intuitively, because transmission capacity is non-binding
(Assumption II.2), there is no benet from moving stored energy only to incur transmission
and storage losses.
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Lemma II.5. (i) Let st;est 2 A, and st   est = ( ; 2; 0) or (2;  ; 0) for some  > 0.
Then, Vt(est;dt)  Vt(st;dt) for any dt and t 2 T .
(ii) Let st;est 2 A, and st  est = ( ; 0; ) or (0;  ; ) or (; 0;  ) or (0; ;  ) for
some  > 0. Then, Vt(est;dt)  Vt(st;dt) for any dt and t 2 T .
To analyze the structures of the optimal policy, we decompose the problem in (2.5)-(2.6)
into a master problem and a subproblem.
 The master problem decides the production level qt,
Vt(st;dt) = min
qt

c(qt) + Wt(qt; st;dt) : qt 2 Q(st;dt)
	
: (2.8)
 While the subproblem nds the optimal use of qt by deciding the inventory levels:
Wt(qt; st;dt) = min
st+1

Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

: st+1 2 A(qt)
	
; qt 2 Q(st;dt); (2.9)
where st+1 is chosen from an iso-production surface A(qt), dened as
A(qt) def=

st+1 2 A : q(st+1   st;dt) = qt
	
; (2.10)
and qt is chosen fromQ(st;dt) def=

qt; qt

, where qt = q(S st;dt) is the maximum production
in period t, which satises the demand and lls up the storage at all three nodes, and
qt =
 
q( st;dt)
+
is the minimum production, which satises the remaining demand after
inventory from all three nodes is used to meet as much demand as possible. (Throughout
the paper, x+ = maxfx; 0g.) For brevity of notations, we do not explicitly express the
dependence of A(qt), qt, and qt on (st;dt).
Let st+1(qt; st;dt) denote an optimal solution to the subproblem (2.9). Solving (2.9) leads
to the minimum expected cost-to-go function Wt(qt; st;dt) that is well-behaved.
Lemma II.6. Wt(qt; st;dt) is convex and decreasing in qt for any given (st;dt) and t 2 T .
The master problem (2.8) decides the optimal production, trading o between the pro-
duction cost c(qt) and the minimum expected cost-to-go function Wt(qt; st;dt). Because
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Wt(qt; st;dt) and c(qt) are convex in qt (Lemma II.6 and Assumption II.3), the master prob-
lem (2.8) is a one-dimensional convex optimization problem. Therefore, the rest of the
analysis in this section is devoted to describing the structures of st+1(qt; st;dt), the solution
to the subproblem (2.9).
2.4.2 Structures of the Optimal Inventory Policy
The key construct for describing the optimal solution st+1(qt; st;dt) is a balance curve,
denoted as

b(z; sG; dt) : z 2 [0; SA+SB]
	
. A balance curve assumes the inventory in node
G is xed at sG 2 [0; SG]. For each total leaf inventory level z 2 [0; SA+SB], b(z; sG; dt)
prescribes an allocation of z among the leaf nodes A and B so that the future expected
operating cost is minimized:
b(z; sG; dt) 2 argmin
st+12A

Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

: sAt+1+s
B
t+1=z; s
G
t+1=s
G
	
: (2.11)
We characterize the structural properties of the optimal solution st+1(qt; st;dt) using
the balance curve, with explicit formulae when possible. We will show that for   ,
st+1(qt; st;dt) lies on the balance curve if (loosely speaking) the production level qt allows
st+1(qt; st;dt) to reach the balance curve; otherwise, s

t+1(qt; st;dt) will be as close to the
balance curve as possible. These structural properties bring computational benets and also
reveal insights on storage management. To clearly illustrate these structures, we rst present
a special case with symmetric demand across the leaf nodes and SG= 0 (Theorem II.8). We
then relax the constraint SG= 0. In Theorem II.9 we further relax the symmetry and show
that the policy structure remains the same. In Theorem II.11 we consider the case with
 < .
For a given leaf node, we refer to the storage at this leaf node as local (L) storage, and
the storage at the other leaf node as remote (R) storage. The storage at node G is referred
to as central storage.
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2.4.2.1 Special Case with Symmetric Leaf Nodes and   
The leaf nodes are said to be symmetric in period t if they have the same storage size,
SA = SB, and the demand distributions for future periods satisfy
PfdA  x; dB  y j dtg = PfdA  y; dB  x j dtg; 8  = t+1; : : : ; T; 8 x; 8 y: (2.12)
When the leaf nodes are symmetric in period t, allocating inventory evenly across the
leaf nodes minimizes the future expected operating cost in (2.11). Lemma II.7 conrms this
intuition.
Lemma II.7. If SA = SB and (2.12) holds in period t, then the balance curve is b(z; sG; dt) = 
z=2; z=2; sG

for all z 2 [0; SA + SB].
Next, we characterize the optimal decision st+1(qt; st;dt). A component of the optimal
decision is represented by a curve B(x;y; z), where x;y 2 A, xA  yA, xB  yB, and
xG= yG. The curve B(x;y; z) connects x and y within the rectangle formed by x and y,
staying as close to the balance curve b(z; xG; dt) as possible. Figure 2.2 illustrates the curve
B(x;y; z). The curve's parameter z 2 [xA+ xB; yA+ yB] is the total leaf storage level.
Figure 2.2: Examples of B(x;y; z) under symmetric leaf nodes
Balance curve
45° 45° 45°
Line with 
Formally, for the case of symmetric leaf nodes, B(x;y; z) is dened as follows:
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B(x;y; z)
def
=
8>>><>>>:
1fxAxBg
 
z   xB; xB; xG+ 1fxA>xBg xA; z   xA; xG; if z 2 [xA+xB; z1); 
z=2; z=2; xG

; if z 2 [z1; z2];
1fyAyBg
 
z   yB; yB; xG+ 1fyA<yBg(yA; z   yA; xG; if z 2 (z2; yA+yB];
(2.13)
where 1fg is the indicator function and z1 = (xA_xB )^ yA+(xA_xB )^ yB and z2 = (yA y^B)_xA
+(yA^yB)_xB, where a_b = minfa; bg and a^b = maxfa; bg.
We focus on the case of    for now, i.e., storing energy incurs more energy loss than
transmitting energy from the central to the leaf nodes. Thus, intuitively, it is preferred to
use the central generation qt to meet as much demand as possible. If qt is insucient to
cover the entire demand, stored energy is then released; if qt is more than enough to meet
the demand, the excess energy is stored. The following analysis formalizes this intuition and
prescribes the optimal inventory policy.
Theorem II.8 below focuses on the case of SG = 0. We rst give a graphical representation
of the theorem in Figure 2.3. As qt increases from qt to qt, the optimal period-ending inventory
st+1(qt; st;dt) moves from st to S along the bold curve. The following structures are true for
st+1(qt; st;dt) for any qt, and thus also true for s

t+1(st;dt), the solution for (2.5)-(2.6):
 Either store energy in both leaf nodes and end up (weakly) above the period-starting
inventory st, or withdraw energy from both leaf nodes and end up (weakly) below st.
 When storing energy, keep the inventory levels as close to the balance curve as possible,
i.e., the segment of the curve between st and S can be described by B(x;y; z).
 When withdrawing energy to meet the demand, withdraw from local storage rst and
stay as close to the balance curve as possible (i.e., part of the curve below st can also be
described byB(x;y; z)), and then withdraw energy from the remote storage if necessary.
To precisely describe the above structure, we dene some critical production and inven-
tory levels. Let qot = (d
A
t + d
B
t )= denote the production that meets the demand in period
t without changing inventory levels. For a given state (st;dt), (d
i
t   sit)+ is the remaining
demand at leaf node i after being served by local storage, and thus, the production needed to
serve this remaining demand is qt =
P
i=A;B
(dit sit)+=, where the single under-bar represents
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Figure 2.3: Optimal inventory st+1(qt; st;dt): Case of   , symmetric leaf nodes (SA = SB
and (2.12) holds), and SG = 0
The graph illustrates the situation when dAt < s
A
t and d
B
t >
sBt .
that only local storage is used to satisfy demand. The corresponding remaining storage level
is st =
 
(sAt   dAt =)+; (sBt   dBt =)+; sGt

.
We denote by st the inventory level after the demand is served by the stored energy, in
the sequence of local, central, and remote location (hence the triple under-bars). For the case
of SG = 0, we have st =
  
sAt   d
A
t

   dBt

  sBt
+
=2
+
;
 
sBt   d
B
t

   dAt

  sAt
+
=2
+
; 0

; the
expression for the general case will be given later. After the demand is served by the stored
energy, the remaining demand is served by production qt, which is exactly the minimum
production dened after (2.10).
Theorem II.8. When   , SG = 0, and leaf nodes are symmetric (SA = SB and (2.12)
holds), for given state (st;dt) and feasible production quantity qt 2 Q(st;dt), an optimal
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inventory decision st+1 is as follows:
st+1(qt; st;dt) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
[withdraw L fully, R partially]:
st   (st   st)(qt   qt)=(qt   qt); if qt  qt  qt;
[withdraw partially from L]:
B
 
st; st; s
A
t + s
B
t   (qot   qt)=

; if qt < qt  qot ;
[store at both leaf nodes]:
B
 
st;St; s
A
t + s
B
t + (qt   qot )

; if qot < qt  qt:
(2.14a)
(2.14b)
(2.14c)
Theorem II.8 prescribes that when qt < q
o
t , it is optimal to use qt to serve as much
as demand as possible and serve the remaining demand by withdrawing stored energy. In
(2.14a), \withdraw fully from L" refers to withdrawing down to st, i.e., using local storage
to serve as much demand as possible. \Withdraw partially from L" in (2.14b) refers to
withdrawing to a level higher than st. When qt > q
o
t , it is optimal to use qt to meet the
demand entirely and store the excess energy according to (2.14c). In all cases, we try to use
the current supply, qt, to satisfy the demand, and resolve the supply-demand mismatch by
using storage.
We now extend the structures of the optimal policy to the case of SG > 0, as illustrated
in Figure 2.4. Same as the case of SG = 0, the optimal period-ending inventory st+1(qt; st;dt)
is either (weakly) above or below the period-starting inventory st. The sequence in which
energy is stored or withdrawn now involves the central storage:
 When storing energy, rst store at the central storage until full (moving from st to st =
(sAt ; s
B
t ; S
G) in Figure 2.4), and then store in the leaf nodes, keeping inventory as close
to the balance curve as possible (following B(st;S; z), the curve connecting st and S in
Figure 2.4). The production quantities corresponding to st and S are qt = q
o
t +(S
G sGt )=
and qt, respectively.
 When withdrawing energy, withdraw rst from local storage (following B(st; st; z)), then
from central storage (moving from st to st), and nally from remote node (moving from
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st to st), where the critical inventory levels are expressed below:
st =
 
sAt   d
A
t

+
;
 
sBt   d
B
t

+
; sGt

;
st =
 
sAt   d
A
t

+
;
 
sBt   d
B
t

+
;

sGt  
 dAt

  sAt
+
=    dBt

  sBt
+
=
+
;
st =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
0; 0;

sGt  
 dAt

  sAt + d
B
t

  sBt

=
+
; if sAt  d
A
t

; sBt  d
B
t

; 
0;

sBt   d
B
t

   dAt

  sAt   sGt 
+
=2
+
;

sGt  
 dAt

  sAt

=
+
; if sAt  d
A
t

; sBt >
dBt

; 
sAt   d
A
t

   dBt

  sBt   sGt 
+
=2
+
; 0;

sGt  
 dBt

  sBt

=
+
; if sAt >
dAt

; sBt  d
B
t

; 
sAt   d
A
t

; sBt   d
B
t

; sG

; if sAt >
dAt

; sBt >
dBt

:
The corresponding production quantities are qt, qt =
 
qt   sGt 
+
, and qt, respectively.
Figure 2.4: Example of st+1(qt; st;dt): Case of   , symmetric leaf nodes, and SG > 0
The structures illustrated in Figure 2.4 for symmetric leaf nodes turn out to be optimal
in general as long as   . This generalization is detailed next and the structures will be
formally stated in Theorem II.9. The above critical inventory levels, st, st, and st, remain
the same in the general case.
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2.4.2.2 Case with General Demand Distribution and   
For general demand distribution, the balance curve b(z; sGt+1;dt) dened in (2.11) may
be non-linear. Same as before, for x;y 2 A with xA yA, xB yB, and xG= yG, the curve
B(x;y; z) connects x and y within the rectangle formed by x and y, staying as close to the
balance curve b(z; xG; dt) as possible. Formally,
B(x;y; z)
def
= b(z;xG;dt) + (1; 1; 0) l(z); z 2 [xA+ xB; yA+ yB]; (2.15)
where l(z) = argmin
`
f j ` j : x  b(z;xG;dt) + (`; `; 0)  yg. In particular, if x 
b(z; xG;dt)  y, then l(z) = 0. If b(z; sG;dt) =
 
z=2; z=2; sG

, then (2.15) becomes (2.13).
Figure 2.5 illustrates b(z; sGt+1;dt) and B(x;y; z).
Figure 2.5: Examples of b(z; sG;dt) and B(x;y; z)
Balance curve Line with 
The next theorem extends the structures illustrated in Figure 2.4 to the general case,
using the general denition of B(x;y; z) in (2.15).
Theorem II.9. When   , given state (st;dt) and feasible production quantity qt 2
Q(st;dt), an optimal inventory decision st+1 can be expressed as follows:
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st+1(qt; st;dt) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
[withdraw L,G fully, R partially]:
st   (st   st)(qt   qt)=(qt   qt); if qt  qt  qt;
[withdraw L fully, G partially]: 
(sAt   dAt =)+; (sBt   dBt =)+; sGt   (qt   qt)=

; if qt < qt  qt;
[withdraw partially from L]:
B
 
st; st; s
A
t + s
B
t   (qot   qt)=

; if qt < qt  qot ;
[store partially at G]: 
sAt ; s
B
t ; s
G
t + (q   qot )

; if qot < qt < qt;
[store to full at G, partially at leaves]:
B
 
st;S; s
A
t + s
B
t + (qt   qt)

; if qt  qt  qt:
(2.16a)
(2.16b)
(2.16c)
(2.16d)
(2.16e)
Theorem II.9 characterizes the optimal policy as follows:
1) Use current generation qt to serve the demand.
2) If qt > q
o
t , store the excess energy rst at the central storage (expressed in (2.16d)),
and then store in the leaf storage, following the balance curve b(z;SG;dt) as closely as
possible (expressed in (2.16e)).
3) If qt < q
o
t , use the stored energy to serve the remaining demand: First withdraw energy
stored locally, following the balance curve b(z; sG;dt) as closely as possible (expressed
in (2.16c)), then (if needed) withdraw from the central storage (expressed in (2.16b)),
and nally, (if needed) use the remote storage (expressed in (2.16a)).
Intuitively, demand in a period can be met by two types of energy: Stored energy gen-
erated in previous periods and current-period generation qt. Because    (i.e., storage is
less ecient than transmission), using the current supply qt to meet demand is preferred to
using the stored energy. The mismatch between current supply and demand is resolved by
storing or withdrawing energy.
When storing energy, it is optimal to ll up the central storage before storing at the
leaf nodes. Intuitively, central inventory provides more operational exibility with the same
storage eciency. When withdrawing energy to serve the remaining demand, using the closer
storage rst minimizes the transmission losses and thus is more economical.
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2.4.2.3 Case with  > 
When storage is more ecient than transmission ( > ), it may not always be benecial
to use current-period generation qt to satisfy as much demand as possible. As the following
example demonstrates, even if qt can meet the current demand, it may be superior to use
some stored energy.
Example II.10. Consider a system with  = 1,  = 2=3, and suciently high storage
space. Suppose we are at the beginning of period T   1 and observe demand dT 1 = (2; 0)
and storage level sT 1 = (2; 0; 0). The nal-period demand dT is expected to be either (0; 2)
or (2; 0) with equal probabilities. We x qT 1 = q
o
T 1 = 3 in this example.
Theorem II.9 suggests using qT 1 to meet as much demand as possible. Because qT 1 =
2 = dAT 1, qT 1 exactly meets the demand, and inventory is unchanged: sT = sT 1 = (2; 0; 0).
Then, in the nal period, if dT = (0; 2), we must produce a positive amount (qT = 5=3) to
meet part of the demand at node B; the remaining demand is met from energy transmitted
from remote node A.
Consider an alternative decision in period T   1: Store qT 1 = 3 at the central node
G and use the local storage sAT 1 = 2 to meet the local demand d
A
T 1 = 2. Consequently,
sT = (0; 0; 3). Then, the stored energy s
G
T can serve 2 units of demand in the nal period
regardless whether demand is (0; 2) or (2; 0). Hence, production cost is zero in period T ,
which implies that this alternative decision is optimal for period T   1 under the given qT 1.
The above example demonstrates that the policy in Theorem II.9 may not be optimal
when  > ; the optimal policy may involve serving demand by local storage and simultane-
ously storing energy at the central node. Such operations are formalized in Theorem II.11 and
the formalization requires another critical inventory level: qt
def
= qt+(S
G sGt )=. Recall qt is
the production required to satisfy the demand after the local storage is used to meet as much
local demand as possible. If we produce more than qt to ll up the central storage, then the
total production is qt. The resulting inventory level is st =
 
(sAt  dAt =)+; (sBt  dBt =)+; SG

.
Theorem II.11. When  > , given state (st;dt) and feasible production quantity qt 2
Q(st;dt), an optimal inventory decision st+1 can be expressed as follows.
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(i) If storage operations are perfectly ecient,  <  = 1,
st+1(qt; st;dt) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
[same as (2.16a) and (2.16b)] if qt  qt  qt;
[withdraw fully from L, store partially at G]: 
(sAt   dAt )+; (sBt   dBt )+; sGt + qt   qt

; if qt < qt  qt;
[store to full at G, store or withdraw at leaves]:
B
 
st; S; s
A
t + s
B
t + (qt   qt)

; if qt < qt  qt:
(2.17a)
(2.17b)
(2.17c)
(ii) If storage operations are more ecient than transmission, but not perfectly ecient,
 <  < 1,
st+1(qt; st;dt) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
[same as (2.16a) and (2.16b)] if qt  qt  qt;
[withdraw partially from L, store partially at G]:
st+1 2 Ft; if qt < qt  qt;
[withdraw or store at L, store at G]:
st+1 2 Ft [ Et; if qt < qt  qt;
[store to full at G, store or withdraw at leaves]:
st+1 2 Et; if qt < qt  qt:
(2.18a)
(2.18b)
(2.18c)
(2.18d)
where the face Ft and edges Et are dened as
Ft
def
=

st+1 2 A(qt) : sGt+1  sGt ; sit+12

(sit   dit=)+; sit

; i = A;B
	
;
Et
def
=

st+1 2 A(qt) : sGt+1 = SG; sit+12

(sit   dit=)+; Si

; i = A;B
	
:
As illustrated in Example II.10 and proved in Theorem II.11, when  >  the current-
period demand is not always satised from current-period generation to the extent possible,
which is in contrast with Theorem II.9. This distinction between the cases of    and
 >  is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
For qt 2 (qt; qt), when  = 1, (2.17b) in Theorem II.11 shows that it is optimal to use
local inventory to serve as much local demand as possible and transmit only qt to serve the
remaining demand. The excess production qt   qt is stored at G. This inventory decision
is shown as st+1( = 1) in Figure 2.6(a). Compared to s

t+1 in Theorem II.9 (marked as
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Figure 2.6: Optimal Policy Structure Examples
(a) qt < qt < minfqot ; qtg
Equations (2.16c), (2.17b), (2.18b)
(b) maxfqot ; qtg < qt < qt
Equations (2.16d), (2.17c), (2.18c)
F
t
F
t
E
t
The piecewise linear surface represents the set of feasible st+1 for given qt, i.e., the iso-production
surface A(qt) dened in (2.10). Each edge of the surface is in one of the following planes:
sit+1= s
i
t, s
i
t+1= s
i
t   dit=, i = A;B, and sGt+1= sGt . In panel (a), st is above A(qt) as qt < qot
(production falls short of meeting all demands). In panel (b), st is below A(qt) as qt > qot (there
is excess energy after meeting the demand).
st+1(  ) in Figure 2.6(a)), this strategy eectively reduces local inventory and raises the
central inventory, providing more operational exibility for future periods. When  <  < 1,
storage losses become part of the tradeos and (2.18b) in Theorem II.11 states that st+1
belongs to Ft, a triangular face shown in Figure 2.6(a). The precise value of s

t+1 depends
on the demand distribution.
For qt > qt, when  = 1, (2.17c) shows that the central storage is lled up and the
remaining energy is sent to the leaf nodes. The remaining energy can be split with some
exibility, bringing inventory level to the balance curve.2 When  <  < 1, storage losses
need to be taken into account and st+1 is in Ft [ Et shown in Figure 2.6(b), with location
depending on the demand distribution. Note that one vertex of the face Ft is exactly the
optimal decision in Theorem II.9, shown as st+1(  ) in Figure 2.6(b).
2Depending on the future demand distribution, the optimal decision may involve sending no energy to
a leaf node, or sending some energy to partially serve the demand, or sending more than the demand and
storing the excess energy at a leaf node.
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When qt > qt, Ft no longer exists and thus s

t+1 2 Et. When qt further increases such
that qt  qt def= qt +maxfSA   sAt ; SB   sBt g=(), Et will reduce to only one line segment,
which includes only the action of storing energy at both leaf nodes. In such case, the optimal
decision falls on the balance curve and coincides with (2.16e) in Theorem II.9.
We summarize the optimal policy structures from Theorems II.9 and II.11 in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Optimal Policy Structures Under Given Central Production q
Note: qt  qot and qt < qot are possible.
Efficiency: Storage ≤ Transmission (α ≤ β ) Efficiency: Storage > Transmission (α > β )
Use q to satisfy 
demand entirely
Store rest of q in central storage (G) until 
full, and then store in leaf storage
Same as α ≤ β
Use part of q to fill up central storage (G); 
use rest of q to serve demand and to 
store in leaf storage
Satisfy remaining
demand using 
local storage (L)
Store rest of q in central storage (G) Use part of q to serve demand; store rest 
of q in central storage (G) first, and then 
in leaf storage
Use q to serve 
as much demand 
as possible
Satisfy remaining demand using local 
storage (L) Use part of q to serve demand; store rest 
of q in central storage (G)
Satisfy remaining demand using local 
storage (L), and then central storage (G)
Same as α ≤ βSatisfy remaining demand using local 
storage (L), then central storage (G), and 
then remote storage (R)
In Appendix 2.8, we extend the insights of Theorem II.11 to the case with Distributed
Generation. Here, when Distributed Intermittent Generaion exceeds demands at leaf nodes,
the net surplus of energy at the local leaf node may be transmitted to the remote leaf node
to satisfy demand before withdrawing from any storage, when   2, else, the ordering of
the use of sources of energy and locations for storage of energy would depend on the demand
distributions. However, the basic intuition of withdrawing from the closest storage source
and storing rst at the central storage remains in this extension.
2.5. Optimal Investment Decisions
In this section, we consider the storage investment problem in (2.7): max
S0
B(S)  V (0) 
V (S) p jSj, where V (S) = E0V1(S;d1;S), p > 0 is the cost per unit of storage capacity, and
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jSj = SA + SB + SG. Our objective is to understand how various factors aect investment
decisions, in particular the trade-o between localizing and pooling of storage investment.
We analyze the eects of both demand factors (Section 2.5.1) and storage parameters (Section
2.5.2) on investment decisions.
We rst present the basic properties of V (S).
Lemma II.12. V (S) is decreasing and convex in S; B(S) is concave in S.
Lemma II.13. (i) Let S = (SA; SB; SG) and Sg =
 
0; 0; SG+ 1(SA+SB)

. If dAt ; d
B
t  0,
8 t 2 T , then V (Sg)  V (S).
(ii) Let S = (SA; SB; SG) and Sl = (S
A + SG; SB + SG; 0). Then, V (Sl)  V (S).
To compare the benets of storage investment at dierent locations, we dene a pooled
investment as investment at node G only, and localized or distributed investment as invest-
ment at the leaf node(s) only. Lemma II.13 shows that, for any investment decision S, there
exist a pooled investment decision Sg and a localized investment decision Sl that yield a
lower expected operating cost but a higher investment cost. (To see why investment cost is
higher, note that jSj  jSgj because  2 (0; 1), and that jSj  jSlj if   1=2, which is true
for most systems.)
We dene the optimal pooled and localized investment decisions as follows:
Sg 2 argmax

B(S) : SA = SB = 0; SG  0	; (2.19)
Sl 2 argmax

B(S) : SA  0; SB  0; SG = 0	: (2.20)
The optimal investment S 2 argmaxB(S) : S  0	 may coincide with Sg or Sl , or
may involve investing at both node G and leaf nodes, which we refer to as mixed investment.
2.5.1 Impact of Demand Factors
We rst identify demand characteristics for which localized investment is advantageous
over pooled investment. These characteristics include positively correlated demand across
leaf nodes, high minimum demand, and distributed generation that exceeds local demand.
Before going into depth, we introduce a useful way of thinking the economic value of
storage in our context. If storage is located right at the demand node, one unit of energy
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released from the storage can serve one unit of demand, whereas if energy needs to be
transmitted to serve the demand, one unit of energy released from the storage can serve 
units of demand for central-to-leaf transmission or only 2 units of demand for leaf-to-leaf
transmission. When part of the energy released from the storage is lost during transmission,
the economic value of storage is reduced.
Spacial Correlation of Demands
The eect of demand correlation is best visible when demands are perfectly correlated.
Under this condition, localized investment decision is optimal.
Theorem II.14. If dAt = k d
B
t for some constant k > 0 and for all t 2 T , then the optimal
localized investment Sl is an optimal investment for problem (2.7).
Note that electricity systems are dierent from other logistic systems in that energy
production and transmission have zero lead-time. Thus, the result in Theorem II.14 is not
driven by lead-time related reasons, as in the classic inventory theory. The driving force is
the transmission losses, as explained below.
Multiple leaf nodes with perfectly correlated demands can be treated as a single demand
node. Obviously, for a system with node G and only one demand node, investing at node G
is never optimal, because a smaller investment, SG, at the demand node provides the same
operational benet as investing SG as node G. If investing in storage at node G, (1   )
fraction of the energy released from G is lost during transmission to the leaf nodes.
Minimum Demand
When demands are not perfectly correlated, localized investment may still be optimal as
long as storing energy locally does not reduce the economic value of the storage.
Localizing storage may reduce its economic value when leaf-to-leaf transmission is part of
the optimal operating policy (see Theorems II.9 and II.11), resulting in transmission losses
of 1  2 fraction of energy. A sucient condition for leaf-to-leaf transmission not to occur
is that the minimum demand is suciently high. Specically, if dimin > S
i
l , for i = A;B,
where dimin is the minimum demand at node i and S
i
l is given by (2.20), then locally stored
energy can always serve the local demand instead of the remote demand. (Under Sl and
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dimin > S
i
l , it can be veried that qt = qt = qt. Thus, the case of using remote storage in
Table 2.1 does not arise.)
The result is formalized in Theorem II.16, whose proof relies on Lemma II.15.
Lemma II.15. (i) If eS = S+ (; 0;  ) for some  > 0, and eSA <  1dAmin, then V (S) =
V (eS).
(ii) If eS = S+ (;  ; 0) for some  > 0, and eSA <  1dAmin, then V (eS)  V (S).
Theorem II.16. If the optimal localized investment Sl satises S
i
l < 
 1dimin for i = A;B,
then it is an optimal investment for the problem (2.7), and any other investment with SG > 0
is suboptimal.
According to Theorem II.16, we may rst identify the optimal localized investment, Sl ,
and conrm its global optimality if it satises the condition in Theorem II.16.
Distributed Generation
When the amount of local generation exceeds the local demand (i.e., net demand of a
leaf node is negative), localized storage investment allows the local generation to be stored
and consumed without any transmission. In contrast, with pooled storage, storing local
generation at node G and withdrawing energy from node G would incur transmission losses
in both ways.
Example II.17 (Eects of minimum demand and distributed generation). Suppose demand
has three levels: l (low), m (medium), and h (high), with l  m  h. Suppose d2k 1 = (m;h)
or (h;m) with equal probabilities and d2k = (l; l), for k = 1; 2; : : : : We consider an innite
operating horizon with discount factor  = 0:99, and assume a quadratic production cost
c(q) = q2 and  2 (0:5; 1).
Because B(S) is concave in S and demands are symmetric across leaf nodes, we can
restrict our attention to symmetric investment decisions: SA = SB. We derive the optimal
policy and investment decisions explicitly in Appendix 2.9.
To facilitate comparing the pooled and localized investment decisions, we dene the benet
ratios: g
def
= B(Sg)=B(S
) and l
def
= B(Sl )=B(S
): Clearly, g; l 2 [0; 1]. If g = 1, pooled
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Figure 2.7: Impact of minimum demand and distributed generation:  =  = 0:9,m = l+10,
h = l + 60, p = 400.
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investment is optimal. If l = 1, localized investment is optimal. If g < 1 and l < 1, then
a mixed investment is optimal.
In Figure 2.7, we vary the minimum demand l 2 [ 15; 15] and keep m = l + 10 and
h = l + 60, i.e., we shift all three demand levels in parallel.
When the minimum demand l is positive and not too low, l = 1, i.e., the localized
investment is optimal. When l decreases to around zero and slightly negative, localization
increasingly deviates away from the optimal investment, and the pooled investment may out-
perform the localized investment. When l becomes more negative, i.e., distributed generation
increases, localized investment returns to be preferred to pooled investment.
This example illustrates the insight that localized investment is a favorable choice under
high minimum demand or signicant distributed generation.
The discussions thus far suggest that if the optimal investment involves investing at node
G, then demands must not be highly correlated across nodes, minimum demand should
be small enough, and distributed generation should not result in frequent, large negative
demand.
Next, we discuss the benets of investing in storage at node G. First, storage at node G
reduces the need for leaf-to-leaf transmission. Energy stored at node G can serve demand at
either leaf node without incurring leaf-to-leaf transmission losses. Second, storage at node
G may avoid investing in storage capacity dedicated to each leaf node. Both are illustrated
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in the following example.
Example II.18 (Benets of pooled investment). We analyze the same setting as in Exam-
ple II.17 with dierent parameter values: l = m = 0 and h = 10, i.e., demand alternates
between (0; 0) and (0; 10) or (10; 0).
As shown in Figure 2.8(a), for the entire range of p values considered in this example,
the pooled investment is optimal (g = 1), but the reason for the optimality is dierent at
dierent values of p, revealed in Figure 2.8(b).
Figure 2.8: Benets of pooled investment:  =  = 0:8, l = m = 0, h = 10.
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Figure 2.8(b) shows the total capacity invested under the pooled and localized decisions.
At high p, under the localized investment Sl , the optimal operating policy is to ll the storage
when demand is (0; 0), and empty the storage to meet the demand (0; 10) or (10; 0), incurring
leaf-to-leaf transmission losses, which signicantly reduces the economic value of storage. The
pooled investment increases the operational exibility by transmitting energy from G to only
the node with high demand and avoiding leaf-to-leaf transmission.
At low p, the optimal localized investment is to invest storage capacity dedicated to each
leaf node: The optimal operating policy is to ll the storage when demand is (0; 0), but only
withdraw locally stored energy to serve the demand. Dedicated storage investment for each
leaf node results in excessive amount of storage capacity, seen in Figure 2.8(b) for the range
when p < 178. Although leaf-to-leaf transmission is avoided, the storage capacity is under-
utilized. A pooled storage doubles the storage capacity utilization in this case, and is the
optimal investment.
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In the above example, pooled investment is optimal, but in general when the minimum
demand is positive, the next theorem asserts that investment at node G alone cannot be
optimal, i.e., mixed investment is optimal.
Theorem II.19. Let S be an optimal solution to (2.7). If SG > 0, then we have SA 
 1dAmin and S
B   1dBmin.
Proof. For given S with SG > 0, suppose SA <  1dAmin. Let eS = S+(; 0;  ), where
 = minfSG; ( 1dAmin   SA)=2g. Note that eSA <  1dAmin. Then, by Lemma II.15(i),
we have V (S) = V (eS). Because jSj > jeSj, we have B(S) < B(eS), contradicting to the
optimality of S.
2.5.2 Impact of Storage Parameters
Storage technologies evolve with improvement in eciency and reduced cost. In this
section, we analyze the eects storage cost and eciency on the optimal investment.
Impact of the per-unit cost of storage capacity p
In this subsection, we emphasize the dependence on p by writing the optimal investment
as S(p). We rst observe some basic properties of S(p).
Lemma II.20. (i) The optimal net benet B(S(p)) decreases in p; (ii) The optimal total
investment jS(p)j decreases in p.
Lemma II.20 indicates that as the cost of storage declines, more storage capacity is
desirable for the system. The analysis in x2.5.1 suggests that localized investment Sl (p) is
optimal in many demand situations. In such case, reduced storage cost will in favor of more
investment at the demand nodes.
Even if localized investment is not optimal, Theorem II.21 below reveals that the localized
investment Sl (p) is asymptotically optimal as p! 0. This asymptotic optimality also holds
for the pooled investment Sg(p) if demand is non-negative at each node.
Theorem II.21. (i) lim
p!0

B(S(p)) B(Sl (p))

= 0,
(ii) If dAt ; d
B
t  0, t 2 T , then lim
p!0

B(S(p)) B(Sg(p))

= 0.
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Intuitively, at very low p, we could invest in dedicated local storage capacity that is large
enough to eliminate the need for leaf-to-leaf transmission.
When pooling is part of the optimal investment, reduced storage cost also stimulates
pooled investment, as illustrated in the following example.
Example II.22. We set the minimum demand l = 0 in Example 2 and vary p in a wide
range. The results are shown in Figure 2.9. At high storage cost, it is costly to use part
of the storage capacity to store the energy that will eventually be lost during transmission.
Hence, localized investment is optimal, and the localized investment increases as storage cost
p declines, shown in Figure 2.9(b) for large p.
As storage cost decreases, the benets of pooling as explained in x2.5.1 rise and the
localized investment is no longer optimal (seen from l < 1 in Figure 2.9(a)). The optimal
investment is mixed, as shown in Figure 2.9(b). Note that as the p decreases, g increases
and SG also increases in the optimal investment. Finally, as p ! 0, both localized and
pooled investments converge to be optimal (l ! 1 and g ! 1), consistent with Theorem
II.21.
Figure 2.9: Impact of cost of storage p:  =  = 0:9, l = 0, m = 10, h = 60
(a) (b)
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We rst discuss some monotonicities in the optimal decisions and values with respect to
these parameters. We observe that as  increases, B(S) is increasing, for given S and as 
increases, the cost of the system is decreasing.
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Theorem II.23. (i) B(S) is increasing in , for given S. (ii) V (S) is monotonically de-
creasing in , for given S. (iii) Given p > 0, if  < 1=2, and S is an optimal solution to
(2.7), then SG = 0.
Next, we consider the eect of  on storage investment. As storage becomes more ef-
cient, on the one hand, the same amount of capacity provides a higher economic value,
hence stimulating more investment. On the other hand, with more ecient storage provide
better production smoothing, the marginal cost of production at the peak-demand period
may reduce signicantly, which in turn reduces the need for storage to smooth production.
Our numerical experiments nd that both of these eects exist and the optimal optimal
investment may increase or decrease in storage eciency.
Furthermore, as storage becomes more ecient, less storage capacity is used to store
the energy that eventually becomes lost during transmission. Hence, the benet of pooled
investment increases. This eect is demonstrated in the following example.
Example II.24. We set the minimum demand l = 0 in Example 2 and vary  2 [0:6; 1].
Figure 4.9 reveals that as storage becomes more ecient, the optimal investment changes
from localized investment to mixed investment, and within the mixture, SG increases while
local investment decreases as  increases. The total storage investment increases.
Figure 2.10: Impact of storage eciency :  = 0:9, l = 0, m = 10, h = 60, p = 400
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l
g
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
l, g
S A SB
SG
0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
5
10
15
20
25
S
In short, we nd that declining storage cost denitely encourages storage investment, but
improved storage eciency does not necessarily stimulate storage investment. Storage cost
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reduction and eciency improvement also tend to increase the benet of pooled investment,
although in most demand situations localization is still the optimal investment.
2.6. Numerical Analysis
The goal of this section is to investigate the nature of the optimal investment decision
under a moderately realistic demand setting, for a three node model. Theorem II.11 part (i)
provides an explicit solution for st+1 given qt, and part (ii) reduces the search space for s

t+1.
These allow for ecient computational study.
2.6.1 Model Parameters and Simulation Details
The round-trip storage eciency ranges in practice between 80% and 96% (ES-Select
2012). The transmission losses range from about 1% to 15% of energy produced (Energy
Information Administration 2009). This implies ranges of 2 = 0:80  0:96, and  = 0:85 
0:99.
Aggregate production cost of the grid is often approximated as quadratic in the total
energy produced in a given period (Bessembinder and Lemmon 2006). We assume the cost
function as follows, satisfying Assumption II.3:
c(q) = 0:2 q2 + 20q (2.21)
The evolutions of load and wind power exhibit predictable patterns and random uctu-
ations. Let Lt =

LAt ; L
B
t

and lt =

lAt ; l
B
t

be the predictable and random components of
the load at time t at leaf nodes A and B. Let Wt =

WAt ; W
B
t

and wt =

wAt ; w
B
t

denote
the predictable and random components of wind power. The net demand equals the load
net the wind power:

dAt ; d
B
t

= (Lt + lt)  (Wt +wt):
The predictable components fLtg and fWtg are deterministic processes whose values are
known prior to time zero. The stochastic processes fltg and fwtg represent the deviations
from the deterministic levels and evolve according to preset probability distributions.
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We consider a cycle of T = 8 periods. For given investment in storage capacities, denoted
by S, we employ an innite-horizon average-cost model assuming every cycle faces the same
distribution of demands. In the second stage of the optimization, we search for optimal
investment capacity S that minimizes the total investment and operating costs.
We consider a stylized model for demand, to illustrate a realistic pattern of demands.
The objective of this model is to demonstrate the pattern of optimal investments under
realistic settings. Consider 8 periods per day (of 3 hrs each), with each period representing
3 hours. Predictable components of load and wind are cyclic over these 8 periods.
Table 2.2: Predictable Components of Load and Wind
Time (hour of the day) 0-3 3-6 6-9 9-12 12-15 15-18 18-21 21-24 Average
Net Load LAt  WAt (= LBt  WBt ) (MWh) 12 14 25 36 40 36 25 14 25
Demand is deterministic, while wind is stochastic wt = w
0
t , where w
0
t is given by,
wt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
( 12; 12); p = 0:01;
( 12;+12); p = 0:15;
(+12; 12); p = 0:15;
(+12;+12); p = 0:69;
(2.22)
and  is a proxy for the penetration of wind energy into the grid. We vary  from 0.5-
0.85, corresponding to a penetration of 0-28%. Thus, without using storage, the maximum
possible production in a period is 104 MWh, with marginal cost of $61.6 per Mwh (3.14).
The average net demand per period is 50 MWh (excluding wt), with a marginal cost of $40
per MWh.
We use the same output metrics, l; g as in Section 2.5.
2.6.2 Computational results
For the system with described parameters, we observe that l = 1 (i.e., localizing is
optimal) across the entire range of values of , , p considered (Figure 2.11). The primary
reason is the high minimum demand during periods of storage withdrawal. However, increas-
ing wind penetration (which acts as a proxy for wind variability) increases g, because of
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increasing variability. We observe this for the wt per (2.22) and for wt with same individual
node demand distribution, but varying correlation. In other words, the eect is the same for
the impact of variability independent of correlation between the variabilities of the two leaf
nodes. Similar to other OM literature (Eppen 1979), we observe that increasing correlation
reduces the benets of pooling.
50%
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Centralizing
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Relative benefit of investment policy
Figure 2.11: Impact of wind penetration on the investment policies, with p =
1033$/KWh;  = 0:85;  = 0:84.
2.7. Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we have derived the structure of the optimal operating policy for an electric
grid system with convex generation costs, stochastic demand, nite energy storage capacity,
storage and transmission losses. The goal of this paper was to understand the trade-os
between localizing or centralizing storage capacity investments.
Our overarching conclusion is that under current system parameters, localizing of stor-
age investments is preferable primarily because of high minimum demand during withdrawal
periods (Theorem II.16), which allows to take full advantage of the greater ecacy of localiz-
ing. Nourai (2007) showed that, in AEP's storage experiment, localized storage investments,
referred to as Community Energy Storage, created greater value to the grid than centralized
storage for a number of reasons. These reasons included reliability, re risks and easing
of congestion in transmission lines. Our model provides a theoretical justication of their
39
observations from their energy storage experiment, in terms of investment costs, storage
eciency and transmission losses.
To further understand the trade-o of localizing vs. centralizing, we studied the impact
of changes in various system parameters on the storage location decision. We observe that
minimum demand close to zero, or negative correlation of demands can cause pooling. We
also note that expensive storage capacity, increased penetration of wind energy increase
preference for localizing. The impact of storage eciency on storage location trade-os
seems to depend on the demand distribution.
While our analysis shows that localizing is often optimal in our 3-node model, we question
the scenario when there may be more than 2 leaf nodes in the system, as is often the case
in the real grid. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the benet of pooling does not
increase signicantly with n unless the minimum demand is low. In future work, we believe
the impact of pooling may be considered in larger grid systems.
Finally, we discuss some of the challenges involved in implementing community energy
storage investments across the grid. Firstly, there are challenges involved in building the
infrastructure to control multiple storage investments across the grid, in real time, reecting
the latest information. Secondly, implementing community storage will inuence revenue
streams of storage owners and other market players. New market settlement schemes would
be required to make sure no market participant prefers to invest storage dierently from the
co-ordinated investment strategy that improves overall system eciency.
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2.8. Appendix: Extension to Distributed Intermittent Generation
In this section, we extend the analysis to include distributed intermittent generation, such
as wind and solar power, at the leaf nodes. Unlike the generation at node G, intermittent
generation does not use any fuel and, thus, incurs negligible operating cost. Its output,
depends on factors such as wind speed or solar radiation. If the maximum output is always
below the demand at the corresponding leaf node, the analysis in the previous section can
be directly applied, with dit representing the net demand (demand minus the intermittent
generation). In this section, we consider a more general case, where intermittent generation
may exceed the demand, resulting in a negative net demand dit < 0.
2.8.1 Problem Formulation and Optimal Curtailment Decision
Because intermittent generation has negligible operating cost, it is desirable to store the
excess generation for future use. However, if total remaining storage space (in local, central
and remote nodes) is insucient to store the excess generation, some intermittent generation
must be curtailed (e.g., rotating solar panels or pitching the blades of a wind power generator
to reduce its output). Despite negative demand and non-zero probability of curtailment, our
formulation remains unchanged, except for the following modications.
We allow dt, to include the distributed intermittent generation, i.e., the net demand d
i
t
may be negative at a given node i. Denition (3.2) is unchanged: q(st;dt) =
P
i=A;B
 
 
dit +
 (s
i
t)

+  (s
G
t ); but note that when d
i
t < 0, then q(S   st;dt) < 0 is possible, which
means storage is lled up but excess energy still exists. We, therefore, extend the denition
of the cost function:
c(q)
def
= 0; for q < 0: (2.23)
q < 0 corresponds to curtailment, and q > 0 is the generation.
Theorem II.25. Vt(st;dt) satises the following recursive equation:
Vt(st;dt) = min
st+12A

c(q(st+1  st;dt)) + Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)
	
; t = 1; 2; : : : ; T: (2.24)
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There exists an optimal solution st+1 to (2.24) and the corresponding production, inventory,
and curtailment decisions satisfy the following properties:
(i) If q(S   st;dt)  0, then q(st+1  st;dt)  0, and it is optimal not to curtail distributed
generation.
(ii) If q(S   st;dt) < 0, then st+1 = S, and it is optimal not to produce at node G, curtail
distributed generation by  1
q(S  st;dt).
Theorem II.25 establishes a dynamic program for the problem with curtailment and
formalizes the intuition that storing distributed generation is preferred to curtailing it.
2.8.2 Optimal Storage and Transmission Operations
The dynamic program in (2.24) is almost identical to (2.5), except that c(q) is extended
per (2.23) and q(st+1  st;dt) can take negative values. With the absence of non-negativity
constraint (2.6), we can verify that Lemmas II.4, II.5, and II.6 continue to hold. Furthermore,
Theorems II.9 and II.11 continue to apply whenever dit  0, i = A;B. Theorem II.25 provides
the optimal decision if curtailment is necessary (i.e., net local generation exceeds available
storage space, or q(S st;dt) < 0 ). Below we analyze the remaining case, when intermittent
generation exceeds the demand at one or both leaf nodes, but no curtailment takes place.
When distributed generation exceeds demand at both leaf nodes, intuitively, it is desirable
to store the excess generation at the nearest location. We formalize this after Theorem
II.26. The interesting case is when the intermittent generation exceeds demand at one leaf
node. Without loss of generality, let dAt  0 and dBt < 0. jdBt j can be stored at B or
transmitted to node A to meet dAt . In contrast to Theorem II.9, which suggests that leaf-to-
leaf transmission is the least desirable option when net demand at both nodes is positive, it
may be cost-eective to use jdBt j to serve dAt even before using local inventory sAt .
As an example, consider the case when the storage eciency is below the leaf-to-leaf
transmission eciency, i.e.,   2. Then using jdBt j to serve dAt is more cost-eective than
withdrawing from local storage sAt . If  > 
2, dAt may be satised by a combination of
remote generation jdBt j, and local inventory sAt , and central production, depending on future
demand distribution.3 We divide our example into two cases: when    and  > , if
3For example, if future demand at B is expected to be high, storing jdBt j at node B may be desirable;
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  , storage eciency is below leaf to central transmission eciency, and hence, jdBt j is
used before withdrawing from sGt . Else, the priority between jdBt j and sGt would depend on
the demand distribution.
Theorem II.26 captures the intuition from the above example: while withdrawing energy,
if   2, to satisfy demand at A, it is optimal to use the DG at B, local stored energy at
A, G, B in that order. If storing energy, DG in B is rst stored at B, then excess energy is
lled up in G and the leaf nodes, similar to Theorem II.9. If 2 <   , the only dierence
is that DG at B and locally stored energy at A may be both used simultaneously to satisfy
demand at A, but DG at B is still used before stored energy at G. Finally, if  < , the
preference between DG at B and stored energy at G would also depend on the demand
distribution.
We now specify some notation relevant for this case: Let oBt = (jdBt j   (SB   sBt )=)+
represent the overage or `spill over' available at G after lling up the storage at B using local
generation . We let rAt = (o
B
t   (SG  sGt )=)+ denote the remaining energy after node B's
spill over is used to ll up G, measured at node A. Hence, (rAt  dAt )+ is the energy available at
node A from excess spill over of remote generation, netting local demand. Thus, the storage
levels at B, G, and A, achieved by storing the spill overs, constrained by capacity are,
sBt = minfsBt + jdBt j; SBg, sGt = minfsGt + oBt ; SGg, and sAt = minfsAt + (rAt   dAt )+; SAg
respectively. Note that demand at node A is essentially reduced by rAt , i.e.,
dAt = (d
A
t   rAt )+
is the perceived demand, while dBt = 0. Let st = (s
A
t ; s
B
t ; s
G
t ) and
dt = ( d
A
t ;
dBt ) be the
equivalent state achieved.
Further, we redene the critical production quantities dened in Section 2.4.2 to refer to
the state (st; dt), after storing spill overs,
qt
def
=
P
i=A;B
dit= + (S
G  sGt )=; qt def= qt +maxfSA  sAt ; SB  sBt g=(): (2.25)
We further reinterpret some of the critical production quantities dened earlier and in-
otherwise, using jdBt j to meet dAt may be cost-eective. In either case, central production qt is used before
jdBt j is used.
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troduce two more critical quantities:
eqt def= (dAt =   jdBt j)+; qt def=  eqt   sAt =+; qt def=  qt   sGt +; (2.26)
qot
def
=
 
dAt =   oBt
+
; qt
def
= ( dAt   sAt )+=; qt def= qt + (SG   sGt )=: (2.27)
eqt is the minimum production quantity to meet demand without using any storage. qt
is the energy required to satisfy demand at A after using distributed generation at B and
local storage at A. qt is the minimum production quantity required to meet demand at
A without using remote storage. qot is the energy needed to satisfy demand at A along
with spill over from B. qt is the energy needed to satisfy demand at A after using local
storage and remaining spill over rAt . Note that qt  qt  qt; eqt  qot ; qt  qt  qt as
 dBt  oBt  rBt . With the same interpretation as before, the critical states are st = 
sAt   (dAt + dBt 2)+=
+
;

sBt  
 dAt +dBt 2

  sAt   sGt 
+
=2
+
;

sGt  
 dAt +dBt 2

  sAt

=
+
,
st =
 
sAt   (dAt + dBt 2)+=
+
; sBt ;

sGt  
 dAt +dBt 2

  sAt

=
+
, st = (s
A
t ; s
B
t ; S
G).
Theorem II.26. Consider state (st;dt) such that d
A
t > 0 and d
B
t < 0. For given feasible
production quantity qt, the optimal inventory decision s

t+1 are as follows:
4
(i) If storage operations are not more ecient than transmission,   :
4For this theorem, we replace L;R with A;B respectively as the demand is only at node A. The notations
are reversed when demand is at node B.
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
[withdraw fully from A, DG at B,G, partially from R]:
st+1 =
 
0; sBt   (qt   qt)=2; 0

; if qt  qt  qt;
[withdraw fully from A and DG at B, partially from G ]:
st+1 =
 
0; sBt ; s
G
t   (qt   qt)=

; if qt < qt  qt;
If   2;
[use DG from B rst, then withdraw from A]:
st+1 =
 
sAt   (eqt   qt)=; sBt ; sGt ; if qt  qt  eqt;
st+1 =
 
sAt ; s
B
t + (qt   eqt)=; sGt ; if eqt < qt  qot ;
Else if, 2 <   2;
[use DG from B partially, withdraw partially from A]:
st+1 2 LAB(qt); if qt  qt  qot ;
[store DG at B, store partially at G]:
st+1 =
 
sAt ; s
B
t ; S
G   (qt   qt)

; if qot < qt  qt;
[store to full at G, partially at leaf nodes]:
B
 
st;St; s
A
t + s
B
t + (qt   qt)

; if qt < qt  qt:
(2.28a)
(2.28b)
(2.28c)
(2.28d)
(2.28e)
(2.28f)
(2.28g)
where
LAB(qt)
def
=

s 2 A(q) : sG = sGt ; sA 2 [(sAt   dAt =)+; sAt ]; sB 2 [sBt ; sBt ]
	
:
(ii) If storage operations are more ecient than transmission,  <   1:
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
[same as (2.28a)] if qt < qt  qt;
[withdraw fully from A, partially from G and DG at B:]
st+1 2 LBG(qt); if qt  qt  qt;
[withdraw partially from A, G and DG at B:]
st+1 2 LBG(qt) [ LAB(qt); if qt < qt  qt;
[store DG at B, store at G:]
st+1 2 LAB(qt) [ LAG(qt) [ LAB(qt); if qt < qt  qt;
[store to full at G, store DG:]
st+1 2 E0 if qt < qt  qt:
(2.29a)
(2.29b)
(2.29c)
(2.29d)
(2.29e)
where
LBG(qt)
def
=

s 2 A(qt) : sA = 0; sB 2 [sBt ; sBt ]; sG 2 [0; sGt ]
	
;
LAG(qt)
def
=

s 2 A(qt) : sB = sBt ; sA 2 [(sAt   dAt =)+; sAt ]; sG 2 [sGt ; SG]
	
;
LAB(qt)
def
=

s 2 A(qt) : sG = SG; sA 2 [(sAt   dAt =)+; sAt ]; sB 2 [sBt ; SB]
	
;
E0
def
=

st+1 2 A(qt) : sGt+1 = SG; sit+12

(sit   dit=)+; Si

; i = A;B
	
:
When  = 1, there is no dierence between current period generation and stored energy
in terms of costs. Hence, the optimal policy is given directly by Theorem II.11 for the
equivalent state (st; dt).
When dit  0, i = A;B, note that qot = qt = maxf0; q( st;dt)g = 0 is the energy needed
to satisfy `demand' without depleting storage. Recall the intuition that the optimal policy is
to store each location's intermittent generation and central production at the closest possible
node respectively, moving to the next closest location when storage is full, regardless of the
relative values of  and . Any excess generation is curtailed and no storage releases energy,
i.e., st is the optimal policy for q = q
o
t . For any production q 2 (qot ; qt], the optimal policy is
per Theorem II.9 for the equivalent state (st; dt) where the critical production quantities are
dened per (2.25). To include for spill overs from both nodes, we generalize the notation,
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sit = minfsit + ( dit + rit)+; Sig, sGt = minfsGt + 
P
i=A;B
oit; S
Gg, dit = (dit   rit)+ for nodes
i = A;B where rBt ; o
A
t are dened similarly.
In summary, Theorem II.26 describes the structure of the optimal policy for a system with
intermittent generation when there's negative demand at one node. Using similar notation,
we extend the discussion to the case with negative demand at both nodes. While many of
the insights from the previous theorems are retained, we also observe that it may sometimes
be optimal to transmit negative demand to the remote node to satisfy demand.
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2.9. Appendix: Discussion of Example II.17
Because B(S) is concave in S and demands are symmetric across leaf nodes, we can
restrict our attention to symmetric investment decisions: S = (SL; SL; SG), where SL is the
storage capacity at each leaf node. Under the optimal investment S, the corresponding
operating policy has the following properties. First, when dt = (l; l), the entire storage
capacity S is lled up. Second, when dt = (m;h) or (h;m) and  > 0:5, the entire storage
S is emptied to serve the demand. Obviously, if inventory remains in node G or in both
leaf nodes, then some storage capacity is never used and the investment cannot be optimal.
Furthermore, if the optimal policy empties storage at G and the high-demand node but leaves
sL > 0 at the medium-demand node, then an alternative investment eS with eSG = SG+sL=
and eSL = SL   sL has a lower investment cost (jSj   jeSj = sL(2  1=) > 0 as  > 0:5) and
the same operating cost when storage is emptied to serve demand (m;h) or (h;m).5
Hence, we restriction our attention to the policies under which in a high-demand pe-
riod, the entire stored energy is used to serve demand and the system produces q1 = 
D   (SL + SG + 2SL) =, and in a low-demand period, the system produces q2 =
2SL=() + SG= to ll up all storage. Since the system produces q1 and q2 alternately,
the long-run discounted production cost is V (SL; SG)
def
=
c(q1) +  c(q2)
1  2 . The investment
problem in (2.7) is equivalent to min
SL0; SG0
p(SG + 2SL) + V (SL; SG).
This convex optimization can be solved using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The
solution is characterized by three critical prices: p1 > p2 > p3 > 0, where
p1 =
D(1 + 2)
2(1  2) ; p2 =
4D(1 + )
(1  2) (4(1  )(1 + 2) + 4) ; p3 =
2D(1 + )
(1  2) (4(1  ) + 2) :
5When demand is (m;h) or (h;m), under the alternative investment eS, when demand is (m;h) or (h;m),
we empty all storage and the production is q =  eSG + (h   eSL)= +  (m   eSL) =  SG + (h  
SL)= +  (m   (SL   sL)), which is exactly the production under the original policy. Hence, energy
generation under the alternative investment remains the same.
48
The optimal investment decision is
S =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; if p  p1;
(A1(p1   p); A1(p1   p); 0) = Sl ; if p2  p < p1;
(A2(p  p3); A2(p  p3); A3(p2   p)); if p3 < p < p2; 
0; 0; (p3   p)A4 + A5

= Sg; if 0 < p  p3;
(2.30)
where, A1 =
22(1 2)
4(1+2)2+4
; A2 =
(1 2)(4(1 )+2)
22(1 )(1+)2 ; A3 =
(1 2)(4(1 )(1+2)+4)
22(1 )(1+)2 ; A4 =
2(1 2)
2(4+)
; A5 =
D3(1 )
(4(1 )+2)
2.10. Appendix: Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Lemma II.4: The statement of the lemma holds for period T because VT (; ) = 0.
Suppose Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is decreasing and convex in st+1 for any dt+1.
For any dt, the objective function in (2.5) is dened on a non-convex set f(st; st+1) 2
A  A : q(st+1   st;dt)  0g. We introduce the following auxiliary function, which is an
extension of the objective function in (2.5) to a larger convex set:
ft(st+1; st;dt)
def
= c
 
[q(st+1   st;dt)]+

+ Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

; for (st+1; st) 2 AA:
For state (st;dt), let s

t+1 be an optimal decision found by (2.5)-(2.6). Consider anyest  st. If st+1 is feasible for state (est;dt), i.e., q(st+1 est;dt)  0, then
Vt(est;dt)  ft(st+1;est;dt)  ft(st+1; st;dt) = Vt(st;dt):
If q(st+1 est;dt) < 0 (infeasible), then using q(S est;dt)  0 and applying the intermediate
value theorem, we can nd a feasible decision est+1 with st+1  est+1  S and q(est+1 est;dt) =
0. Thus,
Vt(est;dt)  EtVt+1(est+1;dt+1)  EtVt+1(st+1;dt+1)  ft(st+1; st;dt) = Vt(st;dt);
where the second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and est+1  st+1. Using
49
the intermediate value theorem, we can also show that min
st+12A
ft(st+1; st;dt) = Vt(st;dt).
Note that c
 
[q(s;dt)]
+

is a composition of convex increasing functions, and thus it is
convex in s. From the induction hypothesis, Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

is convex in st+1. There-
fore, ft(st+1; st;dt) is jointly convex in (st+1; st) on closed convex set A  A. Then, using
the theorem on convexity preservation under minimization from Heyman and Sobel (1984,
p. 525), we conclude that Vt(st;dt) = min
st+12A
ft(st+1; st;dt) is convex in st.
Proof of Lemma II.5: (i) Suppose the statement in part (i) holds for period t + 1 (it
clearly holds for T since VT (; ) = 0). In this proof, we omit subscript t when no confusion
arises.
For period t, we consider states (s;d) and (es;d), with s = es+( ; 2; 0) for some  > 0.
Let st+1 be the optimal decision for state (s;d), and denote s = s

t+1 s and q = q(s;d).
We now construct a feasible decision for state (es;d). Consider three cases:
Case 1: es+s 2 A. In this case, a feasible decision for (es;d) is to produce q and change
inventory to est+1 = es +s. Then, est+1 = st+1   ( ; 2; 0), and the induction hypothesis
leads to:
Vt(es;d)  c(q) + EtVt+1(est+1;dt+1)  c(q) + EtVt+1(st+1;dt+1) = Vt(s;d):
Case 2: es+s 62 A. This condition means es+s = es+st+1 s = st+1 ( ; 2; 0) 62 A,
which can be written as sAt+1 +  > S
A or sBt+1   2 < 0 or both inequalities hold.
To identify a feasible inventory decision for (es;d), we consider est+1 = st+1  ( e; 2e; 0),
where e = minSA   sAt+1; sBt+1=2	. Dene es = est+1 es and eq = q(es;d). There are two
subcases: eq < 0 and eq  0. If eq < 0, then applying the intermediate value theorem, we can
nd a feasible decision es0t+1 with est+1  es0t+1  S and q(es0t+1  es;d) = 0. Then,
Vt(es;d)  EtVt+1(es0t+1;dt+1)  EtVt+1(est+1;dt+1)  EtVt+1(st+1;dt+1)  Vt(s;d);
where the second inequality uses Lemma II.4 and the third inequality is due to the induction
hypothesis.
If eq  0, then the feasible decision is est+1 = st+1   ( e; 2e; 0) with e dened above.
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If we can show eq  q, then the feasibility of est+1 and the induction hypothesis lead to the
intended result:
Vt(es;d)  c(eq) + EtVt+1(est+1;dt+1)  c(q) + EtVt+1(st+1;dt+1) = Vt(s;d): (2.31)
The rest of the proof shows eq  q. The choice of e gives esAt+1 = SA or esBt+1 = 0, which
leads to
esA = esAt+1   esA  0 or esB = esBt+1   esB  0: (2.32)
Furthermore, e < . Let " =    e. Then, by denitions, we have
s es = st+1  est+1   s+es = ( e; 2e; 0)  ( ; 2; 0) = (";  2"; 0): (2.33)
That is, sA = esA + ", sB = esB   2", and sG = esG. Using the denition in (3.2),
we have
q   eq =   dA +  (sA)    dA +  (esA)    dB +  (esB)    dB +  (sB)
  (esA + ")   (esA)   1 (esB)   (esB   2")   ; (2.34)
where the inequality is because  (u) increases in u with a slope of either  or 
 1. Now
consider the cases under the two conditions derived in (3.28):
 If esA  0, then   =  1"  1 (esB)  (esB 2")   1"  1 12" =
0:
 If esB  0, then   =  (esA + ")   (esA)   12"  "  " = 0:
Hence, q  eq and the result in (3.27) holds.
(ii) For the case s   es = ( ; 0; ), the proof follows the same lines as in part (i), except
that the inventory increases at node G instead of node B. The other cases can be proved
similarly.
Proof of Lemma II.6: Because q(st+1   st;dt) increases in st+1 and Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) de-
creases in st+1 (Lemma II.4), the subproblem in (2.9) is equivalent to the following problem
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with an inequality constraint:
Wt(qt; st;dt) = min
st+12A

Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

: q(st+1   st;dt)  qt
	
: (2.35)
Because the feasible set in (2.35) expands as qt increases, Wt(qt; st;dt) decreases in qt.
To prove convexity, note that the set Y def= f(qt; st+1) : qt 2 Q(st;dt); st+1 2 A; q(st+1 
st;dt)  qtg is a closed convex set. From Lemma II.4, the objective Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

in (2.35) is convex in st+1, and thus, it is also convex on the set Y . Using the theorem
on convexity preservation under minimization from Heyman and Sobel (1984, p. 525), we
conclude Wt(qt; st;dt) is convex in qt.
Proof of Lemma II.7: Under (2.12) and SA = SB, the expected cost-to-go function
is symmetric with respect to sAt+1 and s
B
t+1. That is, Et

Vt+1
 
(sAt+1; s
B
t+1; s
G
t+1);dt+1

=
Et

Vt+1
 
(sBt+1; s
A
t+1; s
G
t+1);dt+1

:
For any sA; sB 2 [0; SA] satisfying sA + sB = z, we have
Et

Vt+1
 
(sA; sB; sG);dt+1

=
1
2

Et

Vt+1
 
(sA; sB; sG);dt+1

+ Et

Vt+1
 
(sB; sA; sG);dt+1

 Et

Vt+1
 
(z=2; z=2; sG);dt+1

;
where the inequality is due to the convexity of Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) with respect to st+1 (Lemma II.4).
Hence,
 
z=2; z=2; sG

is a minimizer to the problem: min
st+12A

Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

: sAt+1+s
B
t+1=
z; sGt+1=s
G
	
: Therefore, b(z; sG; dt) =
 
z=2; z=2; sG

:
Proof of Theorem II.8: As SG = 0 and SA = SB, the feasible inventory set A is the square
region shown in Figure 2.12. Also shown in the gure is the piecewise-linear iso-production
curve A(qt):
A(qt) =
n
st+1 2 A :
P
i=A;B
 
 
dit +  (s
i
t+1   sit)

= qt
o
: (2.36)
In (2.35), for any given qt, we minimize a convex function over a convex set. Thus, to
prove the solution prescribed in Theorem II.8 is optimal for (2.35) and hence for (2.9), we
only need to show that it achieves a local minimum on the set A(qt). Below, we show that
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the objective value increases when st+1 deviates from the prescribed s

t+1; the deviation is
along A(qt).
Figure 2.12: Optimal st+1(qt; st;dt) and the deviation from it along A(qt), for various qt
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e3
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s
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t
Figure 2.12 shows four possible directions to move along A(qt). Moving along e0 increases
the objective value by the denition of the balance curve (2.11). It follows directly from
Lemma II.5(i) that the objective increases along e3 = ( 1; 2). The objective increases
along e1 because
Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)  Vt+1(st+1 + ( ; 2; 0);dt+1)  Vt+1(st+1 + ( ; 2; 0);dt+1); (2.37)
where the rst inequality is due to Lemma II.5(i) and the second inequality follows from
   and the monotonicity in Lemma II.4. The proof for e2 is similar.
Although the above proof is for one case of the optimal decision st+1(qt; st;dt), the proofs
for other cases are similar. A general proof for the general case with SG > 0 and asymmetric
leaf nodes will be presented in the proof for Theorem II.9.
Proofs of Theorems II.9 and II.11: Overview and Preliminaries
These two theorems provide structural properties for the optimal solution to (2.9), which is
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equivalent to (2.35), where we minimize a convex function over a convex set. Thus, to prove
a solution is optimal for (2.35) and hence for (2.9), we only need to show that it achieves a
local minimum in (2.9).
Using the denition from (3.2), the set of feasible actions for (2.9) is
A(qt) =
n
st+1 2 A :
P
i=A;B
 
 
dit +  (s
i
t+1   sit)

+  (s
G
t+1   sGt ) = q
o
; (2.38)
where  (s
G
t+1   sGt ) is piecewise linear in sGt+1 with slopes  and  1 (slope changes at
sGt+1 = s
G
t ), and  
 
dit +  (s
i
t+1   sit)

is piecewise linear in sit+1 with slopes , 
 1, and
 1 1 (slope changes at sit+1 = s
i
t  dit= and sit+1 = sit), for i = A;B. If sit  dit=  0, the
segment with slope  does not exist. The iso-production surface A(qt) is thus a piecewise
linear surface in A.
To prove local minimum, we show that the objective value Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

in (2.9)
increases as st+1 deviates from the prescribed s

t+1 (or the set containing s

t+1). We prove
this using two steps:
Step 1. Find all faces of A(qt) that intersect the prescribed st+1 (or the set containing
st+1), and identify the edges formed by these faces.
Step 2. Prove that the objective value Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

increases when st+1 moves
away from st+1 (or the set containing s

t+1) in the direction parallel to any of the edges
identied in Step 1. (We in fact prove a stronger result that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases for
any realization of dt+1.)
Steps 1 and 2 lead to the optimality of the prescribed st+1, because from s

t+1 (or the set
containing st+1) we can reach any st+1 in any face identied in Step 1 by taking at most two
moves parallel to the edges of the face; both moves increase the objective value, as shown in
Step 2.
Instead of repeating Step 1 for every case, we rst identify all possible faces and edges of
A(qt). We use k to index the faces of A(qt). Face k satises (2.38), which can be expressed
as
ak st+1  aAk sAt+1 + aBk sBt+1 + aGk sGt+1 = bk; for st+1 2 face k;
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where aAk and a
B
k have three possible values (, 
 1, and  1 1) and aGk is either  or
 1. These values are exactly the slopes discussed after (2.38).
For the part of A(qt) with sGt+1 > sGt (storing energy at G), we have aGk =  1, while aAk
and aBk have 9 combinations, as shown in Figure 2.13(a). Thus, this part of A(qt) can have
up to 9 faces, which are labeled in clockwise order, with a center face 0. Figure 2.13(a) also
illustrates the contours of A(qt) when it contains all nine faces (each contour line represents
a xed sGt+1 level, with lower-left being the highest s
G
t+1). In general, A(qt) contains only a
subset of these faces.
The other part of A(qt) with sGt+1 < sGt consists of faces with aGk = . These faces are
shown in Figure 2.13(b) and labeled in the same order. Note that the lower-left area cannot
be part of A(qt) because sGt+1 < sGt implies that
P
i=A;B
 
 
dit +  (s
i
t+1   sit)

> 0 due to
(2.38).
The boundary between the above two parts of A(qt) has sGt+1 = sGt (meaning no storage
operations at G), which can be formally written as
H(qt)
def
=
n
(sAt+1; s
B
t+1; s
G
t ) 2 A(qt) :
P
i=A;B
 
 
dit +  (s
i
t+1   sit)

= qt
o
: (2.39)
When H(qt) is non-empty, each segment of H(qt) is an edge formed by faces k and k
0, for
some k. The projection of H(qt) onto (s
A
t+1; s
B
t+1) plane is exactly a contour line.
Let eij denote a direction parallel to the edge formed by faces i and j, shown as arrows
in Figure 2.13. For any two adjacent faces i and j, their coecient vectors ai and aj dier
in only one element, which gives a simple method to derive eij. Use e45 as an example.
Comparing a4 and a5, we see a
B
4 = a
B
5 =  and a
G
4 = a
G
5 = 
 1. Thus, within faces 4 and
5, if we hold sAt+1 constant and reduce s
B
t+1 by 
 1, then sGt+1 must increase by . Thus,
e45 = (0;   1; ) or scaled to (0;  1; 2). We scale eij such that it contains  1 as an
element, which facilitates physical interpretation for the direction.
Having identied all possible faces and edges of A(qt), we next prove a lemma on how
the value function change along these directions. (Each direction is parallel to an edge; see
Figure 2.13.)
Lemma II.27. For any dt+1, we have
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(i) Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases as st+1 moves along e550 ; e770.
(ii) Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases as st+1 moves along e12; e18; e23; e34; e0030 ; e0070 ; e0010 ; e0050 ; e4050 ; e7080.
(iii) Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases as st+1 moves along e45; e56; e67; e78; e1020 ; e1080 ; e2030 ; e3040 ; e440 ; e880.
(iv) If   , then Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases as st+1 moves along e01; e03; e05; e07; e110 ; e330.
Proof of Lemma II.27: Parts (i) and (ii) follow directly from Lemma II.5(i) and (ii),
respectively. The proofs for parts (iii) and (iv) are similar to (2.37) in the proof for Theo-
rem II.8; the proofs rely on Lemmas II.4 and II.5, and use   1 for proving part (iii) and
   for proving part (iv).
Each case of Theorems II.9 and II.11 involves a subset of the faces and edges from
Figure 2.13. We next prove the theorems based on Lemma II.27.
Proof of Theorem II.9: For qt 2 [qt; qt), the theorem states that the remote storage is
used. If using sBt to serve d
A
t , we must have s
B
t >
dBt

and sAt + s
G
t  <
dAt

. In this case, the
theorem implies that sGt+1 = s
A
t+1 = 0 and s
B
t+1 < s
B
t   dBt =. The solution st+1 is on face 50
as illustrated in Figure 2.14(a). Because Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along directions e550 and
e4050 (Lemma II.27(i), (ii)), s

t+1 is locally optimal. The proof for the case of using s
A
t to
serve dBt is similar. Additionally, for qt = qt, although remote storage is not used, we have
st+1 = st and the proof is essentially the same.
There are a few degenerative cases to consider: If sGt = 0, then s

t+1 is on face 5 instead
of 50, but it is still locally optimal as Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along e45 (Lemma II.27(iii)).
If dAt = 0, then s

t+1 is on face 4
0, but still locally optimal as Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along
e440 (Lemma II.27(iii)). If qt = qt, A(qt) shrinks to a point st, which is the only choice for
st+1.
In proving the remaining portion of the theorem, all degenerative cases (i.e., when some
faces don't exist) can be similarly proven, but due to the length of the proof we omit the
details.
For qt 2 (qt; qt), per theorem, sGt+1 < sGt and either (sAt+1; sBt+1) = (0; sBt   dBt =) or
(sAt+1; s
B
t+1) = (s
A
t  dAt =; 0). For case of (sAt+1; sBt+1) = (0; sBt  dBt =), st+1 is on the intersec-
tion of faces 00 and 50, shown in Figure 2.14(b). It is locally optimal because Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)
increases as st+1 moves along e0050 , e4050 , and e0070 . The proof is parallel for the case of
56
(sAt+1; s
B
t+1) = (s
A
t   dAt =; 0).
For qt 2 (qt; qot ), per theorem, st+1 is on B(st; st; z), implying sGt+1 = sGt and sit+1 2
[(sit   dit=)+; sit]. Hence, st+1 lies on the edge formed by faces 0 and 00, shown in Figure
2.14(c)-(d) as the dashed line segment. By the denition of B(st; st; z), s

t+1 minimizes
Et[Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)] within this line segment. To show that s

t+1 is a local minimizer for
Et[Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)] within A(qt) we only need to show that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases as st+1
moves along the directions shown in Figure 2.14(c)-(d), but this follows immediately from
Lemma II.27. Additionally, for q = qt, the line segment in Figure 2.14(c) shrinks to the
point intersecting face 6, and along the additional directions e56 and e67, Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)
still increases. Similarly, for q = qot , the line segment in Figure 2.14(d) shrinks to the point
intersecting face 20, and along the additional directions e1020 and e2030 , Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) still
increases.
For qt 2 (qot ; qt), per theorem, st+1 =
 
sAt ; s
B
t ; s
G
t + (q   qot )

, which is exactly the
intersection of faces 0, 1 , 2, and 3. Lemma II.27 asserts that Vt+1(st;dt) increases along
directions e01, e12, e23, and e03, which ensures the local optimality of s

t+1.
For qt 2 (qt; qt), per theorem, st+1 is on B(st;S; z), implying sGt+1 = SG and sit+1  sit,
i = A;B. Hence, st+1 is on the top edge (the edge with s
G
t+1 = S
G) of face 2. The proof for
this case as well the case of qt = qt is similar to the proof for qt 2 (qt; qot ).
Proof of Theorem II.11: Regardless of the relation of  and , the surface A(qt) has
the structures shown in Figure 2.13. Thus, we use the same graphs to illustrate the optimal
decisions. Further, the proof for the case of qt 2 [qt; qt] remains same as Theorem II.9 because
Vt+1(st;dt) increases along all directions when qt 2 [qt; qt] irrespective of the relative value
of  and .
In Theorem II.9, the condition    (thus 2=  ) is crucial for Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) to
increase along e01 = e05 = ( 1; 0; 2=) or e03 = e07 = (0;  1; 2=); see Figure 2.13.
When  > , however, this result may not hold. In fact, if  = 1, these directions become
(scaled by ):
e01 = e05 = ( ; 0; 1) and e03 = e07 = (0;  ; 1); if  = 1: (2.40)
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Lemma II.5 conrms that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) decreases when st+1 moves in the directions in
(2.40).
When  <  < 1, the objective value may increase or decrease as st+1 moves along the
directions in (2.40). Thus, we need to search more extensively than the cases of    and
 <  = 1.
Equations (2.17b) and (2.18b): Case of qt < qt  qt, illustrated in Figure 2.15(a).
In Figure 2.15(a), the dashed line contains st+1 when    (see Figure 2.6(a)). However,
when  <  = 1, moving along e05 and e07 further reduces Vt+1(st+1;dt+1). Thus, s

t+1 is
the intersection of faces 0, 5, 6, and 7. That is, st+1 =
 
(sAt   dAt )+; (sBt   dBt )+; sGt + qt  qt

.
When  <  < 1, the solution st+1 is in face 0, dened as Ft in the theorem. The exact
location depends on the demand distribution.
Equations (2.17c) and (2.18c): Case of qt < qt < qt, illustrated in Figure 2.15(b)
and (c).
As qt increases, the entire surface A(qt) rises. As qt > qt, face 6 no longer exists (cf.
Figure 2.15(a)) and we have the situation in Figure 2.15(b). The dashed line contains st+1
if   . When  <  = 1, moving along e01 and e03 reduces the objective value, and thus
st+1 is on the top edge of face 0 (i.e., the edge with s
G
t+1 = S
G). If  <  < 1, then st+1 is
in face 0.
As qt increases even further, faces 5 and 7 no longer exist and the situation is illustrated
in Figure 2.15(c). We need to consider not only the top edge of face 0, but also the top edges
of faces 1 and 3, because moving along e110 or e330 may reduce the objective value. These
three edges form the set Et dened in the theorem. We do not need to consider the entire
faces 1 and 3 because the objective value increases as st+1 moves into faces 1 or 3 along
directions e12 or e23.
Therefore, when  <  < 1, the solution st+1 belongs to Ft [ Et. When  <  = 1,
st+1 belongs to Et, which becomes a straight line segment because e110 = ( 1; 1; 0) and
e330 = (1; 1; 0). Minimizing Et[Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)] within this line segment gives B(x;y; z)
per (2.15), which is the result in (2.17c) in Theorem II.11.
Equations (2.17c) and (2.18d): Case of qt  qt < qt, illustrated in Figure 2.15(d).
When qt  qt, the surface A(qt) rises such that face 0 does not exist, illustrated in Fig-
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ure 2.15(d). Thus, st+1 is on the top edges of faces 1, 2, and 3, which is the set Et in the
theorem. Further, when  = 1, Et is a straight line segment and thus s

t+1 can be expressed
using B(x;y; z).
59
Proof of Theorem II.26:
The proof of Theorem II.26 follows exactly along the lines of Theorems II.9 and II.11.
We rst identify all faces of A(qt) and edges, as in Figure 2.16 (cf. Figure 2.13). Here, aAk
and aBk have three possible values (, 
 1, and  1 1), and aGk is either  or 
 1. For
the part of A(qt) with sGt+1 > sGt (storing in G), we have aGk =  1, while aAk and aBk have 9
combinations, as shown in Figure 2.16(a). The other part of A(qt) with sGt+1 < sGt consists of
faces with aGk = . Note that the lower-left area cannot be part of A(qt) because sGt+1 < sGt
and sAt+1 < (s
A
t   dAt =) implies that sBt+1  sBt + jdBt j due to (2.38).
Next, we identify that directions in which Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing and show local
optimality for each case of the Theorem.
Applying similar logic as Lemma II.27, we make the following observations to the di-
rections referenced in Figure 2.16: For given state (st;dt), consider any st+1 2 A(qt), we
have:
(i) Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along the edges e550 ; e440 ; e880 ; e330 from Lemma II.5(i) and
Lemma II.4.
(ii) Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along the edges, e12; e18; e23; e34; e0010 ; e0050 ; e4050 ; e7080 from
Lemma II.5(ii).
(iii) Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along the edges e45; e56; e67; e78; e1020 ; e1080 ; e2030 ; e3040 from
Lemma II.5(ii) and Lemma II.4.
(iv) If   , then Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along the edges e01; e05; e110 ; e0030 from Lemma
II.5 and Lemma II.4. Further, if   2, then Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along the edge
e000 .
(v) If st+1 = b(s
A
t+1 + s
B
t+1; s
G
t+1;dt+1), then Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) increases along the edges,
e220 ;  e220 .
Part (i): Case when   .
The proof for qt 2 [qt; qt] remains same as Theorem II.9 as all the equivalent directions
in Figure 2.16 (cf. Figure 2.13) discussed are increasing for the case with dBt < 0.
For qt 2 (qt; qt), per theorem, sGt+1 < sGt and sBt+1 = sBt+1; sAt+1 = 0 implying st+1 is on the
intersection of faces 00; 50. st+1 is locally optimal because, Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing along,
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e550 ; e4050 ; e0030 . For q = qt, we note that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is additionally increasing along
e56. Notice that although the equivalent edges between Figures 2.13 and 2.16 are not always
equal, the same arguments apply. It can be conrmed that similar arguments as Theorem
II.9 apply for qt 2 (qot ; qt].
It remains to show the case when qt 2 (qt; qot ]. Here, sGt+1 = sGt and the set LAB(qt) follows
the dashed line in Figure 2.14(c) and (d). Note that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing along the
directions: e03; e07; e01; e05; e0070 ; e0030 ; e0010 ; e0050 ; e56; e78, e110 ; e330 ; e440 ; e550 ; e770 ; e880 .
Further, when  < 2, we observe that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing along, e000 . Hence, when
  2, for qt 2 (qt; eqt], st+1 is at the intersection of faces 0; 00; 5; 50 and for qt 2 (eqt; qot ], st+1
is at the intersection of faces 0; 00; 3; 30. However, for 2 <   , the solution can be on any
point on the set LAB(qt).
Part (ii): Case when  <   1.
The proof for qt 2 [qt; qt] remains same as Theorem II.11 as the equivalent directions
discussed are still increasing.
For qt 2 (qt; qt), per Theorem, sAt+1 = 0 , sGt+1  sGt+1, sBt+1 2 [sBt ; sBt ]. Hence, st+1 is on
the edge of face 00 and Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing along edges e0050 , e4050 ; e0010 ; and e1020 (or
e1080). Hence, deviating to any point on face 0
0 or 10 increases Vt+1(st+1;dt+1). Further, for
qt = qt, we note that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is additionally increasing along e550 , as the prescribed
st+1 is at the intersection of faces 0; 5; 5
0.
For qt 2 (qt; qt], we additionally consider the directions e05; e03 as the prescribed st+1
may be on the edge intersecting faces 0; 00 (LAB(qt)) (See Figure 2.17(a)).
For qt 2 (qt; qt), st+1 may be on a set of up to three contiguous line segments directions
on A(qt). Figure 2.17(b),(c) conrm that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing along the feasible
directions to all other points on faces 0; 00; 1; 10; 3; 30; 8. Further, if qt = qot , we note that
Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing additionally along, e1020 ; e2030 , as prescribed s

t+1 intersects with
face 2.
For qt 2 (qt; qt), st+1 may be on the set E0, as shown in Figure 2.17(d). We note that
Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is increasing along directions e12; e23; e330 .
Proof of Lemma II.12: For given S, we use st+1 as short for the optimal decision rule
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st+1(st;dt;S), and let fst : t 2 T g be the optimal policy. For any eS  S, we can construct a
feasible policy: fest = st +eS S : t 2 T g. The two policies yield the same inventory changes,
est = st , and thus the same expected operating cost. Therefore, V (eS)  V (S).
Using similar inductive arguments as Lemma II.4, we can show that Vt(st;dt;S) is convex
in (st;S) for any t 2 T . In particular, V1(s1;d1;S) is convex in (s1;S). Hence, V (S) =
E0V1(S;d1;S) is convex in S. The concavity of B(S) follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma II.13: (i) Under investment S, let fst : t 2 T g be the optimal inventory
policy, and uit = d
i
t+ (s
i
t ), i = A;B, be the corresponding transmission ows according
to (2.3).
Under investment Sg =
 
0; 0; SG +  1(SA + SB)

, we construct an operating policy
fest : t 2 T g:
esAt = esBt = 0; esGt = sGt + gt; 8 t 2 T : (2.41)
g1 = 
 1(SA + SB); (2.42)
gt+1 = min

 1(SA + SB); gt +  1(sAt +s
B
t ) +
    1

minfuAt ; uBt ; 0g
	
: (2.43)
Since s1 = S, we have es1 = Sg. The denition in (2.43) implies gt 2  1(sAt +sBt );  1(SA+
SB)

for all t 2 T .6 Hence, 0  est  Sg, thus the constructed policy fest : t 2 T g is feasible
under Sg. We do not require the non-negative production constraint as in (2.6), because for
any inventory decision that results in qt < 0, there exists another inventory decision that
results in qt  0 and the same objective value, which is shown in the proof of Lemma II.4.
We now prove that under Sg and fest : t 2 T g, the production eqt =  (esGt )+ 1(dAt +dBt )
does not exceed the optimal production under S: qt =  (s
G
t ) +
P
i=A;B
 (u
i
t ). Consider
three cases:
1) uAt  0 and uBt  0. In this case, (2.43) implies gt = gt+1   gt   1(sAt +sBt ).
6We can inductively show gt   1(sAt +sBt ). This is true for t = 1. Suppose gt   1(sAt +sBt ). Then,
gt+
 1(sAt +s
B
t )+
  1
 minfuAt ; uBt ; 0g   1(sAt +sBt )+ 1(sAt +sBt ) =  1(sAt+1+sBt+1).
This, together with  1(SA + SB)   1(sAt+1 + sBt+1), implies that gt+1   1(sAt+1 + sBt+1).
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Then,
qt =  (s
G
t ) +
P
i=A;B
 1(dit +  (s
i
t )) =  (s
G
t ) +
P
i=A;B
 1dit +  (
 1sit )
  (sGt +  1sAt +  1sBt ) +  1(dAt + dBt )
  (sGt +gt) +  1(dAt + dBt ) = eqt;
where the rst inequality utilizes the subadditivity of  (), i.e.,  (x)+ (y)   (x+
y).
2) uAt < 0 and u
B
t  0, i.e., some energy is transmitted from A to B. The condition
uAt < 0 implies s
A
t < 0, which in turn implies s
G
t  0 and sBt  0, because
Lemma II.5 suggests that energy should not be withdrawn from one node only to store
it in another node. These conditions, together with dAt  0, imply that gt = sAt +
 1sBt +
    1

dAt < 0.
7 Then,
eqt = (sGt +gt) +  1(dAt + dBt ) = sGt + (sAt + dAt ) +  1(sBt + dBt ) = qt :
3) uAt  0 and uBt < 0. This case is parallel to case 2.
The case of uAt < 0 and u
B
t < 0 does not exist, because the corresponding inventory
changes are suboptimal by Lemma II.5. Therefore, in all cases, we have eqt  qt , implying
that the policy fest : t 2 T g achieves an operating cost no higher than V (S). Therefore,
V (Sg)  V (S).
(ii) Let fst : t 2 T g be the optimal policy under S. Under Sl = (SA + SG; SB + SG; 0),
7To see this, note that the last two terms in (2.43) are  1(sAt +s
B
t ) +
  1
 minfuAt ; uBt ; 0g =
 1(sAt +s
B
t ) +
  1
 (d
A
t + s
A
t ) = s
A
t + 
 1sBt +
  1
 d
A
t < 0:
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we construct an operating policy fbst : t 2 T g as follows:
bsAt = sAt + gAt ; bsBt = sBt + gBt ; bsGt = 0; 8 t 2 T ; (2.44)
gA1 = S
G; (2.45)
gAt = g
A
t+1   gAt =
8<: max

sGt ;  (uAt )+=
	
; if sGt < 0;
min

sGt ; S
G   gAt
	
; if sGt  0;
t 2 T ; (2.46)
gBt = (s
G
t + S
G)  gAt ; t 2 T : (2.47)
We rst show the following properties for gAt and g
B
t : (P1) g
i
t 2

sGt ; S
G

, i = A;B;
(P2) gAt +g
B
t = s
G
t ; (P3) g
A
t g
B
t  0.
It can be shown by induction that gAt 2

sGt ; S
G

and the details are omitted. This
range for gAt , together with (2.47), implies that g
B
t 2 [sGt ; SG] for all t 2 T . This proves
(P1) and thus fbst : t 2 T g is a feasible policy. Property (P2) follows directly from (2.47).
From (2.46), if sGt  0, then gAt 2 [0; sGt ]; if sGt < 0, then gAt 2 [ sGt ; 0].
These ranges for gAt , together with property (P2), imply that g
A
t and g
B
t have the same
sign, hence property (P3).
We now prove that under Sl and fbst : t 2 T g, the production bqt = P
i=A;B
 (buit) does not
exceed the optimal production under S: qt =  (s
G
t ) +
P
i=A;B
 (u
i
t ). The subadditivity
of  () leads to
buit  dit +  (sit +git)  dit +  (sit ) +  (git) = uit +  (git): (2.48)
If sGt  0, then git  0 due to properties (P2) and (P3). Using (2.48), the subadditivity
of  (), and property (P2), we have
bqt  P
i=A;B
 (u
i
t +  (g
i
t)) 
P
i=A;B

 (u
i
t ) + g
i
t=()

=
P
i=A;B
 (u
i
t ) + s
G
t = = q

t :
If sGt < 0, then g
i
t  0, i = A;B, and we consider three cases:
1) uAt  0 and uBt  0. Because Lemma II.5 suggests that energy should not be withdrawn
from G only to store it in another node, we have sit  0, i = A;B. Thus, buAt =
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dAt + (s
A
t + g
A
t ) = u
A
t + g
A
t  0, where the inequality is due to (2.46). It can
be shown that buBt  0.8 Hence,
bqt =  1(buAt + buBt ) =  1(uAt + uBt + gAt + gBt ) =  1(uAt + uBt ) + sGt = qt :
2) uAt < 0 and u
B
t  0. Denition (2.46) suggests gAt = 0. Hence, buAt = uAt < 0 and
gBt = s
G
t . We must have buBt > 0 to balance the ows at node G. Thus, using
(2.48), we have
bqt = uAt +  1buBt  uAt +  1uBt +  1gBt = uAt +  1uBt + sGt = qt :
3) uBt < 0 and u
A
t  0. Since qt = sGt + 1uA+uBt  0, we have sGt   uA=.
Thus, using (2.46), we have gAt = s
G
t , which in turn implies that g
B
t = 0 due to
property (P2). Then, a similar logic as in case 2 gives bqt  qt .
The case of uAt < 0 and u
B
t < 0 does not exist. Hence, in all cases, we have bqt  qt ,
implying that the policy fbst : t 2 T g achieves an operating cost no higher than V (S).
Therefore, V (Sl)  V (S).
Proof of Theorem II.14: For any given S  0 and the associated optimal operating policy
fst : t 2 T g, we construct a two-node system with node G and a single demand node with
demand dLt = d
A
t +d
B
t . The demand node has storage capacity S
L = SA+SB with operating
policy sLt = s
A
t + s
B
t . The storage capacity and operations at node G remain the same.
The subadditivity of   and   implies
 
 
dLt +  (s
L
t )
    dLt +  (sAt ) +  (sBt )  P
i=A;B
 
 
dit +  (s
i
t )

; t 2 T ;
which in turn implies that the two-node system produces no more than the three-node
system. Thus,
eB(SA+ SB; SG)  B(SA; SB; SG); (2.49)
8If buAt = 0, then the ow balance at node G requires buBt  0. If buAt = uAt + gAt > 0, then
gAt >  uAt =. Consequently, (2.46) gives gAt = sGt . Thus, gBt = 0. Hence, buBt = uBt  0.
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where eB(SL; SG) is the net benet of investment (SL; SG) for the two-node system.
Furthermore, (2.49) holds with equality if dAt = k d
B
t and S
A = k SB. This can be shown
by using the optimal policy for the two-node system to construct a feasible operating policy
for the three-node system that yield the same operating cost. The construction maintains
the leaf storage at the constant ratio k; the details are omitted. Therefore, under dAt = k d
B
t ,
we have
B
k SL
k + 1
;
SL
k + 1
; 0

= eB(SL; 0)  eB(SA+ SB; SG)  B(SA; SB; SG); (2.50)
where the rst inequality claims that for the two-node system, localized investment is opti-
mal (SL is the optimal localized investment), which follows from the discussion after Theo-
rem II.14. Noting that S is arbitrary, we conclude from (2.50) that the localized investment 
k SL
k+1
; S
L
k+1
; 0

is optimal.
The proof of Lemma II.15 requires some properties of the optimal operating policy and
the value function when dAmin > 0, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma II.28. Suppose dAmin > 0. For given storage capacity S = (S
A; SB; SG) with SA <
 1dAmin, (i) There exists an optimal policy satisfying s
A
t sGt  0 for all t 2 T ;
(ii) If st;est 2 A and est  st = (; 0;  ) for some  > 0, then Vt(st;dt) = Vt(est;dt) for any
dt.
Proof of Lemma II.28: The condition SA < dAmin means that the demand at node A
cannot be met solely by storage A in a period. Thus, energy is transmitted from G to A in
every period.
Suppose part (ii) holds for period t+1 (it clearly holds for period T +1). In period t, we
consider any given state (s;d) and any decision st+1 with with inventory change s
A < 0
and sG > 0. We now show that a strictly better decision is bst+1 = st+1+(; 0;  ), where
 = minf  1sA; sGg. This new decision satises bsA bsG = 0, bsA = sA+  0,
and bsG = sG     0. To show the superiority of bst+1, note that Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) =
Vt+1(bst+1;dt+1) by the induction hypothesis and
q(bs;d)  q(s;d) =  1(dA+ bsA) +  1bsG    1(dA+ sA)   1sG =     1 < 0:
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Similarly, any decision st+1 with s
A > 0 and sG < 0 can also be improved. Thus, part
(i) holds for period t. We next prove part (ii) for period t.
Consider states (s;d) and (es;d) in period t, with es = s + (; 0;  ) for some  > 0.
Lemma II.5 implies that Vt(s;d)  Vt(es;d). Thus, we only need to show Vt(es;d)  Vt(s;d).
Let st+1 be the optimal decision for (s;d) and denote s
 = st+1   s. For state (es;d), we
construct a decision est+1 = st+1+ (e; 0;  e), where e = min; sGt+1;  1(SA  sAt+1)	. We
next show that est+1 for (es;d) gives the same operating cost as st+1 for (s;d). First, by the
induction hypothesis, Vt+1(s

t+1;dt+1) = Vt+1(est+1;dt+1). Second, we show the production
quantities are the same. Let es = est+1   es = s   ("; 0;  "), where " =    e. Consider
two cases:
 Case 1: sA  0 and sG  0. We have sGt+1  sG = esG+  . Thus, either e =  ore =  1(SA   sAt+1). In either case, we can verify that esA  0. Also, esG  0. Hence,
q(es;d)  q(s;d) =  1(dA +  1esA) +  1esG    1(dA +  1sA)   1sG
(2.51)
=   1 1"+  1" = 0:
 Case 2: sA  0 and sG  0. Using similar logic, we can show esA  0 and
esG  0, and q(es;d) = q(s;d).
These are the only cases we need to consider, as indicated by part (i). Equal production and
equal future expected cost together imply that Vt(es;d)  Vt(s;d), completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma II.15: Under investment S, let fst : t 2 T g be an optimal policy
satisfying sAt  sGt  0, which follows from Lemma II.28(i). Under investment eS, we
construct a policy est = st + (t; 0;  t), where t = minf; sGt g, for all t 2 T . The policy
fest : t 2 T g is feasible under eS because esAt  0, esAt  sAt +   eSA, and esGt = sGt   t =
maxfsGt   ; 0g 2 [0; eSG].
We next show that the two policies yields the same production quantities. If sAt  0
and sGt  0, we have t+1   t 2 [0;sGt ], which implies esAt = sAt + (t+1   t)  0
and esGt = sGt   (t+1   t)  0. Then, following exactly the same logic in (2.51),
q(est;dt) = q(st ;dt). If sAt  0 and sGt  0, similar logic applies. Therefore,
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q(est;dt) = q(st ;dt) for all t 2 T , and consequently the total operating costs are the
same for both policies, which implies V (eS)  V (S). The opposite inequality V (eS)  V (S)
can be proved similarly.
The proof of part (ii) follows similar logic, but note that V (eS)  V (S) may not be true
because the condition for dBmin is not given.
Proof of Theorem II.16: Because B(S) is concave in S (Lemma II.12), it suces to
show that Sl achieves a local maximum. Consider deviating from S

l by (
A; B; G), where
i 2   Sil ; ( 1dimin   Sil )=2 , for i = A;B, and G 2 0; ( 1dAmin   SAl )=2 . We have
B(Sl ) B(SAl + A; SBl + B; G) = V (SAl + A; SBl + B; G)  V (Sl ) + p(A + B + G)
 V (SAl + A + G; SBl + B; 0)  V (Sl ) + p(A + B + G)
= B(Sl ) B(SAl + A + G; SBl + B; 0)  0;
where the rst inequality follows from Lemma II.15(i) and G  G, and the last inequality
follows from optimality of Sl for the constrained investment problem (2.20). This proves
the optimality of Sl . Furthermore, if 
G > 0, then the rst inequality holds strictly, which
implies that investing in SG > 0 is strictly dominated by investing Sl .
Proof of Lemma II.20: The proof for part (i) is straightforward and omitted. To
prove part (ii), consider any p1 and p2 with p1 < p2. The optimality of S
(p1) suggests
p1 jS(p1)j + V (S(p1))  p1 jS(p2)j + V (S(p2)). Similarly, p2 jS(p2)j + V (S(p2)) 
p2 jS(p1)j+ V (S(p1)). Combining these two inequalities, we have
p1(jS(p1)j   jS(p2)j)  V (S(p2))  V (S(p1))  p2(jS(p1)j   jS(p2)j);
which implies (p1 p2)(jS(p1)j jS(p2)j)  0: Because p1 < p2, we have jS(p1)j  jS(p2)j.
Lemma II.29. For n = 1; 2; : : : , suppose an  0, bn > 0, bn  bn+1, lim
n!1
bn = 0, and
1P
n=1
anbn <1. Then, lim
n!1

bn
nP
i=1
ai

= 0.
Proof of Lemma II.29: First, anbn  0 and
1P
n=1
anbn < 1 imply
1P
n=1
anbn exists. Let
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1P
n=1
anbn = M . For any " > 0, there exists N1 such that
1P
n=N1
anbn <
"
2
. Because bn > 0
decreases in n and converges to zero, there exists N2 > N1 such that
bN2
bN1
<
"
2M
. Then, for
any N > N2, we have
bN
NP
n=1
an = bN

N1P
n=1
an +
NP
n=N1+1
an

<
bN
bN1
N1P
n=1
anbn +
NP
n=N1+1
anbn <
"
2M
M +
"
2
= ": (2.52)
Hence the limiting result holds.
Proof of Theorem II.21: To prove this theorem, we rst show
lim
p!0
p jS(p)j = 0: (2.53)
Let fpng be a sequence of positive prices such that pn decreases in n and converges to
zero. For simplicity, let Sn  S(pn). Lemma II.20(ii) implies that jSnj   jSn 1j  0.
By optimality of Sn, we have pnjSnj+ V (Sn)  pnjSn 1j+ V (Sn 1) or
pn(jSnj   jSn 1j)  V (Sn 1)  V (Sn):
Summing over n, we have
1P
n=1
pn(jSnj   jSn 1j)  V (S0)  lim
n!1
V (Sn) <1:
Applying Lemma II.29, we have lim
n!1
pn(jSnj   jS0j) = 0. Since lim
n!1
pnjS0j = 0, we have
lim
n!1
pnjSnj = 0. Because fpng is chosen arbitrarily, we have lim
p!0
p jS(p)j = 0.
(i) Given an optimal investment S = (SA; SB; SG), consider a localized investment eS =
(SA + SG; SB + SG; 0). Lemma II.13(ii) suggests that V (eS)  V (S). In addition, as
the optimal localized investment is Sl , we have B(eS)  B(Sl ). Utilizing these inequalities,
69
we have
0  B(S) B(Sl )  B(S) B(eS) = V (eS) + pjeSj   V (S)  pjSj
 pjeSj   pjSj = p(SA + SG + SB + SG)  p(SA + SB + SG)
= (2   1)p SG:
Note that SG is a function of p, and lim
p!0
p SG(p) = 0 due to (2.53). Hence,
lim
p!0
B(S(p)) B(Sl (p)) = 0:
(ii) Consider a pooled investment bS =  0; 0; SG+ 1(SA+SB). Using similar logic and
the result in Lemma II.13(i) (which requires non-negative demand), we have
0  B(S) B(Sg)  B(S) B(bS) = V (bS) + pjbSj   V (S)  pjSj
 pjbSj   pjSj = p(SG +  1(SA + SB))  p(SA + SB + SG)
= ( 1   1)p (SA + SB):
Because lim
p!0
p (SA(p) + SB(p)) = 0 due to (2.53), we have
lim
p!0
B(S(p)) B(Sg(p)) = 0:
Proof of Theorem II.23: For part (i), it suces to prove, V (S) is decreasing with .
Clearly, any policy feasible for  is feasible when the storage eciency is 1 >  and has
lower production costs, hence, V (S) cannot increase for 1.
For part (ii), similar to part (i), suppose st ; t 2 T is the optimal policy for system with
transmission eciency . Note that st is feasible for system with transmission eciency
1 >  and the equivalent production quantity is lesser in each period. This and Theorem
II.25 together imply part (ii).
For part (iii), suppose S is an optimal solution and SG > 0. We consider an alternative
feasible policy with investment S0 = (SA + SG; SB + SG; 0). Lemma II.13(ii) implies
V (S0)  V (S). Further, as  < 0:5, pjS0j < pjSj. These two inequalities together imply,
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B(S) < B(S0) which contradicts the optimality of S for (2.7).
Proof of Theorem II.25: We prove the theorem jointly with the property that Vt(st;dt)
decreases in st. The property holds trivially for t = T , as VT (; ) = 0. Consider the function
minimized in (2.24):
U(st+1)
def
= c(q(st+1  st;dt)) + Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

: (2.54)
(i) When q(S  st;dt)  0, if s0t+1 minimizes U(st+1) but q(s0t+1  st;dt) < 0, then using the
intermediate value theorem, there exists s00t+1 such that s
0
t+1  s00t+1  S, and q(s00t+1 st;dt) =
0. Because U(s00t+1)  U(s0t+1) by the induction hypothesis, s00t+1 must also minimize U(st+1).
Hence, there exists st+1 satisfying q(s

t+1  st;dt)  0 and minimizing (2.54), (i) holds and
equation (2.24) minimizes total cost.
(ii) If q(S  st;dt) < 0, then
U(S) = Et

Vt+1(S;dt+1)
  EtVt+1(st+1;dt+1)  U(st+1); for all st+1 2 A:
Hence, st+1 = S and produce nothing at G is optimal. These actions involve zero production
cost in period t and minimum expected cost from period t + 1 onward. Therefore, the
minimum of (2.54) is indeed Vt(st;dt), leading to equation (2.24).
Finally, we nd the amount of curtailment. The maximum curtailment at leaf node
i is the excess energy that cannot be stored locally, i.e., ( dit   (Si sit)=)+. Let wit 2
0; ( dit   (Si sit)=)+

be the distributed generation curtailed at node i. If wit > 0, then
clearly, dit + w
i
t + (S
i sit)=  0. The curtailment wit must be such that the total ows at
G sum up to zero: (SG sGt )=+
P
i=A;B
 
 
dit + w
i
t + (S
i sit)=

= 0: Thus,
(SG sGt )=+
P
i=A;B

 
 
dit + (S
i sit)=

+ wit

= 0;
which is equivalent to wAt + w
B
t =  q(S  st;dt)=, as stated in part (ii) of the theorem.
To complete the induction, we show Vt(st;dt) decreases in st for any dt. Let s

t+1 be an
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optimal decision for state (st;dt). For any est  st, we have
Vt(est;dt)  c(q(st+1  est;dt)) + EtVt+1(st+1;dt+1)
 c(q(st+1   st;dt)) + Et

Vt+1(s

t+1;dt+1)

= Vt(st;dt):
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Figure 2.13: Contours of A(qt), faces, and edges
(a) sGt+1 > s
G
t : store energy in G
(b) sGt+1 < s
G
t : release energy from G
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Figure 2.14: Iso-production surface A(qt) for Theorem II.9
(a) qt < qt < qt (b) qt < qt < qt
e55’
e4’5’
e55’
e45
e4’5’
e0’5’
e0’7’
(c) qt < qt < minfdAt ; dBt g= (d) maxfdAt ; dBt g= < qt < qot
e05
e0’5’e55’
e07
e0’7’
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e11’
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e0’1’
e0’3’
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Figure 2.15: Iso-production surface A(qt) for Theorem II.11
(a) qt < qt  qt (b) qt < qt < qt, case 1
e05
e07 e01
e03
(c) qt < qt < qt, case 2 (d) qt  qt < qt
e01
e03
e33’
e11’
e33’
e11’
e12
e23
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Figure 2.16: Contours of A(qt), faces, and edges (under Theorem II.26 only)
(a) sGt+1 > s
G
t : store energy in G
(b) sGt+1 < s
G
t : release energy from G
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Figure 2.17: Iso-production surface A(qt) for Theorem II.26 (ii) and (iii).
(a) qt < qt  qt (b) qt < qt  qt, case 1
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(c) qt < qt  qt, case 2 (d) qt < qt  qt
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CHAPTER III
Choice of Storage Technology for an Electrical System
3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter considers the operation and investment of storage units across the
grid. It assumes, however, the same storage technology at all locations on the grid. In reality,
there is a multitude of storage technologies available and energy companies are often deciding
on the technologies they choose to invest in. Each of these technologies have dierent cost
and operational parameters. Some of the parameters to compare storage technologies include
power output, energy storage capacity, cost per unit capacity, conversion eciency, system
power ratings, lifetime charge-discharge cycles, weight energy density, volume energy density,
maintenance and operational costs. Depending on these parameters, dierent storage tech-
nologies are better suited for dierent grid services (San Martin et al. 2011). Interestingly,
in order to increase revenues, storage owners have begun to simultaneously provide multiple
services to the grid, such as frequency regulation and arbitrage (Hobby 2012). We observe,
interestingly, that there may be some synergies in using multiple technologies simultaneously
to provide the same service.
Through out this dissertation, we consider the storage service of production smoothing,
or `arbitrage'. Arbitrage (or load shifting) is one of the key roles of storage in the grid today,
(Sreedharan et al. 2012). Storage technology can prevent the usage of expensive natural gas
power plants, by shifting peak load during high demand periods, to low demand periods
when traditional coal power plants are under utilized. Providing this service, results in
arbitrage revenues to storage owners. In this chapter, we aim to understand how technology
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parameters of cost per unity capacity and conversion eciency aect the technology choice
for this service. In particular, we question whether it is benecial to use multiple technologies
to provide the same service in tandem. We consider this question from both a centralized
decision maker and a decentralized storage investor perspective.
The centralized decision maker perspective serves as a benchmark to provide investment
insights to policy makers on the types of technologies that are better suited for a grid with
given system parameters, while the decentralized perspective allows us to provide insights
to storage investors on the types of storage technologies to choose.
We classify technologies based on two signicant operational metrics, the cost per unit
capacity and eciency.1 While storage technology dier on several parameters, their con-
version eciency and cost per unit capacities are major dierentiating factors, deciding the
economic viability of these technologies (Divya and stergaard 2009). Hence, we consider
the trade-o of choosing between expensive and ecient technology, like ywheels, as op-
posed to cheaper but inecient technology like Pumped Storage. We address the questions
related to optimization of a portfolio of storage technologies, providing arbitrage service to
the grid. This is analogous to the investment in multiple technologies in manufacturing and
eet optimization (Wang et al. 2013).
Our work provides several insights for both the centralized and decentralized perspectives:
Under the centralized perspective, we investigate situations where it may be benecial
to invest in and operate multiple technologies (or `mix' investment), as illustrated by the
example later in this section. However, while it is benecial to invest in multiple technologies,
we show evidence that the marginal benet of the exibility of being able to invest in
and operate multiple technologies (or `mixing' technologies) is decreasing in the number
of technologies, both numerically and analytically. As decision makers are often making
trade-os on the purchase of storage technologies, and there are operational overheads of
purchasing, building expertise on and operating multiple technologies; our result oers some
insights for decision makers while choosing the portfolio of technologies to invest in. We show
various properties of the optimal storage portfolio of technologies, allowing us to improve the
1We assume the technology life cycles are long enough that they do not aect the costs in our horizon.
We do not consider other technology parameters in our model. This is a limitation of this model.
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algorithmic eciency of choosing technologies. In particular, we identify the `convex hull'
property of the optimal set of technologies, which allows us to neglect any technology that is
in the convex hull formed by plotting the remaining technologies on a cost per unit capacity
vs. loss rate plot. Here, loss rate refers to the inverse of round trip eciency.
Next, we also study the impact of various system parameters on the optimal technology
choice selection problem using a series of examples and numerical study. Specically, we
observe that the cheaper technology is invested more when renewable penetration increases.
Interestingly, some counter intuitive messages also arise. We observe that, for instance, under
xed investment budget scenarios, in some technology portfolios, if one technology gets better
(i.e., greater eciency or cheaper cost/capacity due to research and development), we may
invest less in that technology.
Further, in order to understand the investment problem, we also attempt the operation
problem. We identify the structure of the optimal policy of operating multiple storage units
in tandem using a stochastic dynamic program framework, reduce the dimensionality of the
operational problem.
Under the decentralized scenario, we consider the reality of the industry today, and
observe that most companies choose to invest in not more than one technology for a given
service, and for load shifting applications in particular. We observe that while there may be
synergies of `mixing' storage technologies from the central planner perspective, an individual
storage owner may not be persuaded because of their beliefs on the price path of energy
that is traded in the system. This is also the predominant modeling in most academic
literature today. We consider two of the most common assumptions in the literature: small
storage (inelastic prices) and large storage (myopic markets). We show that it is always
optimal to invest in a single technology under the `inelastic prices' assumption (i.e., storage
owners actions don't aect the price of energy) and the benet of mixing is substantially
reduced under the `myopic markets assumption' (i.e., the price of energy is the current period
marginal cost of energy production). This leads to one explanation why companies may
choose not to invest in a portfolio of storage technologies, even though it may be benecial
to `mix' from a central planner perspective.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: We end this section with a simple mo-
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tivating example demonstrating the synergies of simultaneously investing and operating in
multiple technologies. Section 4.2 comprises a survey of the relevant literature, Section 3.3
describes the model, Section 3.4 considers the analysis from the perspective of the central
decision maker, providing several insights on the benets of operating a portfolio of storage
facilities. Section 3.5 describes the analysis under the small storage and large storage as-
sumptions. We conclude this chapter in Section 4.6 with a brief summary of our learnings
and some discussion on future research.
3.1.1 Motivating Example
Consider a simple 2-period system representing low-demand night and the high-demand
day scenario. We consider total cost function of producing Q units of energy, in a format of
a simple quadratic function C(Q;K) = 10K+19Q+6Q2=K, dened for Q  K, where K =
1000 MWh represents the total production capacity of the aggregate coal-red intermediate
gas plants. The natural gas peaking power plant is used to supplement demand in excess
of K during any period at a rate of 50$/MWh. Given a limited budget B of $ 180 million,
the objective is to invest in a subset of the available storage technologies: ywheels or lead-
acid batteries so as to minimize the net operating cost. The basic attributes of the storage
technologies are as follows (ES-Select 2012):
 Flywheels: Investment Cost= 1.6 Million $/MWh, eciency= 86%
 Lead Acid Batteries: Investment Cost= 0.56 Million $/MWh , eciency= 65%
Consider three potential investment choices: either invest in only ywheels or only in
lead acid batteries or invest half the capital in each; in order to run the system for 2 periods.
Period 1 (Night) demand: 500 MWh
Period 2 (Day) demand: 1500 MWh
Table 3.1 summarizes the costs in each of three scenarios as well as the default case with
no storage investment.
In this simplest deterministic two period scenario, with linear investment and convex
generating costs. We observe an 8.57% cost decrease due to use of both types of storage.
This example demonstrates the benets of both the technologies: for the same budget,
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No Storage Case Only Flywheels
Only Lead
Acid Battery
Using both
Period 1
Production (MWh)
500.0 630.8 994.5 812.7
Period 2
Production (MWh)
1500.0 1387.5 1178.6 1283.0
Total Cost (M $) 81.0 78.7 78.8 78.6
Table 3.1: This table illustrates the benet of investing in multiple storage technologies.
using solely the more ecient technology results in minimal conversion losses, while using
solely the cheaper technology provides greater smoothing due to higher storage capacity.
However, while mixing, initially, it appears that the inecient technology has higher value
per dollar (= value per capacity * capacity per dollar) and as the capacity invested increases,
the ecient technology will have higher value for dollar. This is because, even though the
ecient technology always has higher benet per unit capacity, the relative dierence in the
benets per unit capacity between the two technologies increases as more storage capacity is
invested (due to the convexity of the value function), making the more ecient technology
have higher value per dollar as storage capacity increases.
3.2. Literature Survey
This paper deals with capacity investment and operation of multiple storage technologies.
Two streams of literature are relevant: the literature on energy storage and the traditional
OM literature on capacity investment in multiple technologies.
3.2.1 Energy storage
In this subsection, we rst discuss the various literature on energy storage services, and
specically, the arbitrage service that we study in our paper. Then, we discuss the problem
of `mixing' storage technologies and related literature.
Energy storage is gaining increasing attention due to its applications to several grid ser-
vices. The grid services include frequency regulation (Oudalov et al. 2007), system stability
(Mercier et al. 2009), load shifting (Even et al. 1993) and spinning reserve (Kottick et al.
1993). Interestingly, each of these services is historically served by signicantly dierent
storage technologies (Denholm et al. 2010), with dierent parameters for cost per unit ca-
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pacity, conversion eciency, charging and discharging rates etc. A review of the dierent
technologies best suited for each of these dierent services is in Hadjipaschalis et al. (2009).
Further, Schoenung and Hassenzahl (2003) consider an extensive comparison of the dierent
storage technologies in terms of capital cost, operation and maintenance, eciency, parasitic
cost, replacement costs to perform a life-cycle cost of this analysis. Recently, Xi et al. (2011)
consider using the same technology to provide multiple services in tandem, since each of
these services is relevant to the grid at dierent times of the day. Of the several services of
storage, the use of load shifting is increasing because of growing use of intermittent renew-
ables to provide energy to the grid (Zeng et al. 2006, Arulampalam et al. 2006, Teleke et al.
2010). Such renewable generation systems are typically built in conjunction with a storage
unit in order to smooth the output ow. This service is typically provided by Compressed
Air Energy Systems (CAES), Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and Pumped Storage
Systems (PSS) technologies. While the current storage market is dominated by Pumped
Storage Systems, Dunn et al. (2011) suggest that battery technologies are beginning to oer
high value opportunities.
The problem of choosing technologies to provide arbitrage service is practically impor-
tant, especially because both the capital costs of storage and the potential benets can range
to the millions of dollars (Alt et al. 1997). Several papers consider the optimal technology
selection, sizing and operating of storage under dierent operating conditions (Lee and Chen
1993, Yoshimoto et al. 2006, Banos et al. 2006, Oudalov et al. 2006), but the focus is on
choosing a single best technology, while we investigate the possibility of investing and si-
multaneously operating storage facilities with multiple technologies or `mixing' technologies.
We are not aware of any other paper other than Kraning et al. (2011) that model the simul-
taneous operation of multiple technologies. They consider a similar model and demonstrate
numerically, that using multiple technologies is benecial using Receding Horizon Control
(RHC) methodology. We extend their work, by considering the features of the set of tech-
nologies and describe the `ecient frontier' of the technology set. We also provide analytical
structure to the optimal operating and investment policy to the grid.
Optimal operation and investment of storage technologies in the grid is a well studied
problem in the Energy Storage literature. See Mokrian and Stephen (2006) for a comprehen-
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sive review of methodology related to evaluation of the economic benet of energy storage
from arbitrage, operating in a market with exogenous prices. In contrast, our work focuses
on both the system perspective and the decentralized perspective. In order to understand
the system perspective, we consider one of the main reasons for the variation in energy prices
in markets: the variation in marginal cost of energy due to the use of expensive sources of
energy, such as natural gas power plants, during high demand periods. We model this as
convexity in the production cost function similar to Wu and Kapuscinski (2013). Several
other recent papers consider the perspective of revenue maximizing storage owner. These
papers also dier from our paper in the methodology. Korpaas et al. (2003), Castronuovo
and Lopes (2004), Brunetto and Tina (2007), attempt this problem as a deterministic opti-
mization problem given a particular sample path over a nite horizon and then averaging the
results over the sample paths. Bitar et al. (2010), Bitar et al. (2011), Kim and Powell (2011)
consider a stochastic generalization of this problem. They derive closed form expressions for
the value of storage under certain special cases of the energy price and wind distributions, to
help evaluate storage investments. We focus on deriving operational insights in more general
demand situations.
3.2.2 Inventory Control models
The electric energy storage optimization problem is similar to a classical multi-period
inventory problem with stochastic demand. While most of the inventory literature assumes
linear production costs, energy markets have convex production costs. A treatment of the
traditional inventory model with convex production costs can be found in Karlin (1960). An-
other signicant dierence between electric energy storage and traditional inventory models
is the upfront eciency loss incurred when inventory is added to a buer. Thus, storage
conversion losses act as a one time non-linear holding cost, which depends on the production
cost function as well as the production quantity during that period. In energy markets,
production is generally load-following and we cannot allow for unsatised demand, unlike
traditional inventory models where there's a lead time for production and stock outs are
permitted. We extend the inventory control literature by providing another model with
practical applications in Energy markets.
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3.2.3 Multiple Technologies in Operations Management
We are not aware of any paper in OM literature that considers inventory in multiple
storage technologies, but there are papers that consider multiple technologies in a variety of
other settings including manufacturing and eet control. All the papers we discuss in this
subsection deal with capacity adjustment in multiple technologies, similar to our work. How-
ever, we capacity of consider storage technologies where as these papers consider production
technology capacities.
In their seminal paper, Crew and Kleindorfer (1976) consider the problem of investing in
dierent plant types (technologies) when demand is stochastic and price dependent. They
describe the ecient technological frontier and the optimal production policy. They also
discuss the optimal pricing scheme from the perspective of a public utility maximizing the
welfare of society. Chao (1983) and Kleindorfer and Fernando (1993) extend this work to
include supply uncertainty. The production cost is linear in these papers. Drake et al.
(2010) consider capacity investment into two technologies with dierent emission intensities
and uncertainty in the emissions allowances of the future. In contrast, our model considers
a non-linear production cost with multiple technologies in an energy setting. We also model
multiple storage technologies with dierent cost structures from standard OR literature.
In a linear production cost setting, several papers consider capacity size adjustment. Dixit
(1997) and Eberly and Van Mieghem (1997) include capacity adjustment cost associated with
changing capacity during the horizon. They, however do not consider technology selection.
More recently, Kleindorfer et al. (2012) and Wang et al. (2013) consider the problem of
co-investing in more than one technology, with uncertainty in operating costs and dynamic
capacity adjustment and identify a control-limit policy structure for capacity adjustment.
In contrast, our work considers a static setting with multiple technologies but focus on
technology selection. Our application for the electric grid implies a dierent cost structure
with a non-linear production cost model. The trade-o between cost of investment in storage
and operating eciency, is dierent from the traditional xed cost-variable cost trade-o
considered in the papers above.
Our paper also considers the uncertainty in future demand and it's impact on the storage
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investment decision. Uncertain demand leading to uncertain operating cost in production
planning has been considered, in dierent settings, in Ding et al. (2007), Kazaz et al. (2005),
Plambeck and Taylor (2011). Several papers consider dynamic capacity adjustment of a
single technology under uncertainty settings (Chao et al. 2009). However, we consider ca-
pacity adjustment of multiple technologies under a static setting. Our paper also identies
the intuition of decreasing marginal benet of the exibility of being able to invest in, and
operate multiple technologies in tandem. Similar decreasing marginal benets of exibility
in queuing systems have been shown in Bassamboo et al. (2012). In contrast to all these
papers, our model considers a non-linear cost function. Hence, our trade-o of investing in
a portfolio of technologies applies under deterministic as well as under stochastic demand.
3.3. The Model
We consider a problem of investing in energy storage facilities built fromM( 2) available
technologies. The objective is to minimize the combined cost of investment and operations
of the system serving demands, that can use storage facility. We use t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Tg to
index time periods. Storage facilities are built prior to t = 1, and once built, the storage
size is xed throughout the horizon. First, we describe the setting of storing and releasing
energy. In the subsections that follow, we consider the objective function. Both the system
operator and storage investor perspectives will be considered.
Assumption III.1 (Storage). (i) The storage size is a continuous decision variable and the
cost of storage facility is linear in its size. (ii) Storage can be lled up or emptied within one
period. (iii) Energy loss takes place when injecting energy to storage. The loss is linear in
the amount of energy injected.
In this paper, \storage level" or \inventory level" refer to the amount of energy that
a storage facility can release until empty. We denote a storage investment decision by
S = (Sj)Mj=1, where S
j  0 is the storage size (i.e. maximum storage level) of the facility
with technology j. Note that Sj = 0 implies we choose not to invest in technology j.
The round-trip eciency of technology j is the product of the charging and discharging
eciencies of that technology. We denote the loss factor j as the inverse of the eciency.
Thus, storing j(> 1) units of energy into storage facility of technology j accounts for
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an inventory level increase of 1 unit.  = (j)Mj=1 represents the vector of loss factors.
The energy ow into storage corresponding to change of storage by  (positive for storing,
negative for releasing), is:2
 j()
def
=
8<: j; if   0;; if  < 0: (3.1)
We denote cost of storage technology by c = (cj)Mj=1, where investing in technology j
with facility size Sj costs cjSj. Each technology j is represented by the parameters (j; cj).
We dene 
 = f(j; cj) : 1  j  Mg as the set of available technologies. Without loss of
generality, we assume 1 < 2 <    < M and c1 > c2 > : : : > cM (i.e., more expensive and
less ecient technology can be eliminated from consideration).
The storage level at the beginning of period t is denoted as st = (s
j
t)
M
j=1. The feasible
storage levels are in the set A def= fs : 0  s  Sg.
We consider an electrical system with stochastic demand. Let dt denote the total de-
mand across the grid in period t. We assume dt is a deterministic function of a vector of
Markovian states, dt, which include the factors driving the demand. We assume there are
no transmission losses or transmission constraints in the grid.
3.3.1 Central Decision Maker Perspective
We rst formulate storage investment problem from the perspective of a central decision
maker who considers given set of technologies 
 and invests in storage capacity Sj for
j = 1; : : : ;M and then operates the system across multiple periods. We consider this as
a benchmark model, to help understand the perspective of the rst best for the system.
The storage investment decision is made prior to period 1 and no additional investment
or divestment can be made over the planning horizon. When operating the system, the
sequence of events in each period is as follows; at the beginning of period t, the system
operator observes the period-starting storage level st and the state dt. The corresponding
demand dt(> 0) must be satised in period t. The system operator decides the period-
ending storage level st+1 = (s
j
t+1)
M
j=1 2 A. Energy balance during period t implies the total
2Note that the storage eciency is accounted for dierently in this chapter, as compared to the previous
chapters.
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power plant generation, denoted as qt, as a function of demand dt and inventory change
st = st+1   st:
qt = q(st;dt)
def
= dt +
MX
j=1
 j(sjt) (3.2)
Let C(qt) denote the production cost during period t, for qt  0.
Assumption III.2 (Production). (i) C(q) is strictly convex and increasing in q for q  0.
(ii) The total power plant generation, q, can be adjusted to any desired level at negligible
cost;
The convexity holds in practice and is typically assumed in the literature, e.g., Bessem-
binder and Lemmon (2006), Madrigal and Quintana (2000), Dominguez-Garcia et al. (2012),
Alvarez Lopez et al. (2010). The seminal reference for power generation and operation in
the industry, Wood and Wollenberg (1996), use a convex approximation for costs of power
generation in thermal plants.
We aim to decide an energy storage investment strategy and corresponding operating
policy that satises the demand at minimum cost. To evaluate a storage investment decision
S, we dene V ot (st;dt) as the minimum expected discounted operating costs of the system
from period t onward when the initial state is (st;dt).  2 (0; 1] is the discount factor. The
optimal operating policy is determined by the following stochastic dynamic program:
V ot (st;dt) = min
st+12A
n
C(q(st+1   st;dt)) + Et[V ot+1(st+1;dt+1)]
o
; t = 1; : : : ; T; (3.3)
s:t: q(st+1   st;dt)  0; (3.4)
where Et denotes the expectation conditioning with respect to dt. The terminal condition is
V oT+1(; ) = 0. We dene U o(S;) = E0[V o1 (0;d1jS;)], as the minimum expected operating
cost at the time storage investment is made, for given storage size S, whose loss factor is
given by . The storage investment decision trades o between the upfront investment cost
c  S =
MP
j=1
cjSj and the ongoing operating cost U o(S;). To capture the liquidity issues
faced by decision makers, we set a budget constraint B for the storage investment. Thus,
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the investment is decided by solving
V
o
(B) =min
S0

c  S+ U o(S;)	; (3.5)
s:t: c  S  B; (3.6)
The objective is to make storage portfolio decision taking into account storage investment
costs, operating costs, and storage eciencies, within a limited budget constraint.
3.3.2 Storage Investor Perspective
The perspective of the independent storage investor is dierent from the central decision
maker. Since storage investor invests and operates the storage, we refer to them as storage
operator. In a decentralized system, the storage operator invests in storage capacity with
the objective of maximizing his prot from buying and selling energy (arbitrage). However,
a dierent entity, the system operator, generates the energy and satises the demand, while
also buying and selling energy from the storage investor.
The investment decisions S for the M technologies are made up front. Then, at the
beginning of each period, after observing the current storage level st and demand factor dt,
the storage operator decides the nal storage level st+1 2 A. Note that storage decisions
imply the power plant generation qt per (3.2) for the system and the resulting market price
for energy. The net energy traded by the storage operator is given by
MP
j=1
 j(sj) (positive
for energy purchased, negative for energy sold).
We convert the maximization problem to the equivalent minimization for ease of com-
parison of the central decision maker and storage investor perspectives. For given storage
investment decision S, we dene V It (st;dt) to be the storage operator's minimum expected
discounted operating costs less revenues from period t onward when the state is (st;dt). The
optimal operating policy is determined by the following stochastic dynamic program:
V It (st;dt) = min
st+12A

pt(st+1   st;dt)
MP
j=1
 j(sj) + Et[V
I
t+1(st+1;dt+1)]
	
; t = 1; : : : ; T;
(3.7)
s:t: q(st+1   st;dt)  0: (3.8)
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where pt(st;dt) is the unit price of energy to be stored or released in period t. The
terminal condition is V IT+1(; ) = 0. Note that the storage operator's current period cost is
given by
 
pt(st;dt)
MP
j=1
 j(sj)

, and also V It (:; :) may be negative. Similar to the previous
section, the net out-ow of cash, for given storage capacity investment decision S, is given
by, U I(S;) = E0[V
I
1 (0;d1jS;)]. The investment cost c  S, is bounded by budget B and
storage operator's objective is:
V
I
(B;
) =min
S0

c  S+ U I(S;)	; (3.9)
s:t: c  S  B: (3.10)
3.4. Optimal Investment under Central Decision Maker Perspec-
tive
We consider here the perspective of the central decision maker trying to minimize total
costs of the entire system. We rst discuss the structure of the optimal operating policy.
The result will help in selecting technologies optimally. We also provide a canonical example
to demonstrate the insights and conclude the section with numerical evaluations.
3.4.1 Optimal Operating Policy for given Storage Investment
The constraint in (3.4) denes a non-convex feasible region for st+1, which complicates
the analysis. Below we show that the problem in (3.3)-(3.4) is equivalent to a problem
without constraint (3.4).
Lemma III.3. (i) For xed S, if fst+1g is an optimal policy for (3.3)-(3.4), then it is also
optimal for the following problem:
V rt (st;dt) = min
st+12A

C(q(st+1   st;dt)) + Et[V rt+1(st+1;dt+1)]
	
; t = 1; : : : ; T; (3.11)
where C(q)  0 for q < 0, and the terminal condition is V rT+1(; ) = 0.
(ii) V ot (st;dt) = V
r
t (st;dt) for any (st;dt) and t = 1; : : : ; T .
(iii) V ot (st;dt) is jointly convex and decreasing in st, for any xed dt, and any t = 1; : : : ; T .
The proof of this Lemma mimics proof of Lemma 1 from Chapter II. The above lemma
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shows that relaxing the constraint (3.4) has no eect on the value function and optimality
of policies. Thus, from this point onward, we focus on problem (3.11). We next prove
additional properties of the value function, which are useful in deriving the optimal policy.
Lemma III.4. Let st;est 2 A satisfy one of the two conditions below,
(i) esit = sit+ "=i, esjt = sjt   "=j for some 1  i < j M , "  0 and eskt = skt for all k 6= i; j,
(ii) esit = sit   ", esjt = sjt + " for some 1  i < j M , "  0 and eskt = skt for all k 6= i; j,
Then, we have, V ot (est)  V ot (st), for any dt and t = 1; : : : ; T .
Lemma III.4 shows the relative change in the value function for changes in the storage
level in each of the facilities 1 through M . Part (i) says that, for i < j, storing energy at
technology i is more economical than storing at technology j. Part (ii) shows that withdraw-
ing from storage i is preferred compared to storage j. Using these properties, the structure
of the optimal policy follows.
Theorem III.5. For each period t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , for given dt, st 2 A, optimal policy st+1
for state (st;dt) satises,
(i) If sjt+1 > s
j
t for any given 1 < j M , then sit+1 = Si for all i < j,
(ii) If sjt+1 < s
j
t for any given 1 < j M , then sit+1 = 0 for all i < j,
(iii) For M = 2, for any bst 2 A, if bst  st, then corresponding optimal policy bst+1 satises,
q(st+1   st;dt)  q(bst+1   bst;dt), i.e., optimal production quantity is monotonically
decreasing and V (st;dt) is supermodular in st for given dt.
Part (i)-(ii) describes a structure in storage operations for given production quantity. If
production exceeds demand, part (i) implies excess energy is stored in the most ecient
facility rst until it is full or we run out of excess energy. If more excess energy remains
to be stored, the next most ecient storage facility is used. Similarly, if demand exceeds
production, excess demand is satised using stored energy in the most ecient facility.
Energy from a less ecient technology is used only when all storage facilities with greater
eciency are empty. This also implies that either st+1  st or st+1  st. Clearly, ending
states may be non monotonic and thus, the optimal policy is not monotonic. For example,bst = (0; 0), st = (0; 10) may have an optimal policy bst+1 = (1; 0), st+1 = (0; 10) resulting in
st+1 6 bst+1 even though st  bst.
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This simple form of optimal policy for storage operations reduces the computational
complexity of the problem to one-dimensional decision of production quantity. Furthermore,
the monotonicity in optimal production quantity and supermodularity of the value function
with respect to st, means that the benet of increasing storage level in one facility decreases
as the storage level in another facility increases.
3.4.2 Selection of Technologies and Capacity Investment
Given a set of available technologies, it may be sub-optimal to invest non-zero amounts
in all the technologies. In this section, we discuss the properties of the technologies that
may be excluded for investment, given a set of technologies. 
 = f(j; cj) : 1  j  Mg;
V
o
(B;
) is the total operating and investment cost, dened in (3.6), for given 
 and B.
From this section on, we do not impose the assumption that 1 < 2 <    < M for a given

.
For given budget B and set of technologies 
, let 
oE(B;
) be the set of technologies
that should not be considered for co-investment with the set of technologies 
. These are
the technologies, (M+1; cM+1), that do not decrease the cost. Formally,

oE(B;
)
def
=
n
(M+1; cM+1) : V
o 
B; 
 [ f(M+1; cM+1)g  V o(B;
)o: (3.12)
Obviously, V
o 
B; 
 [ f(M+1; cM+1)g  V o(B;
) implies, V o B; 
 [ f(M+1; cM+1)g =
V
o
(B;
) as adding another technology can not increase the costs. Clearly (j; cj) 2 
 im-
plies (j; cj) 2 
oE(B;
) for all B. Note that in the optimal investment that gives V
o
(B;
),
not all technologies in 
, may be invested. We discuss some useful properties of the set

oE(B;
) and V
o
(B;
) in the following theorem.
Theorem III.6. Let 
1;
2 be two nite sets of technologies. The following statements are
equivalent:
a. V
o 
B; 
 [ 
1
  V o(B;
) and V o B; 
 [ 
2  V o(B;
)
b. V
o 
B; 
 [ 
1 [ 
2
  V o(B;
).
c. 
1 [ 
2  
oE(B;
)
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The basic idea of the benet of mixing is that, when using multiple technologies, one
can achieve costs lower than when using the technologies individually. The above theorem
describes that if one set of technologies 
1 is dominated by a set 
 of technologies, and
another set 
2 is dominated by the same set 
, the combined set 
1 [
2 cannot be used to
achieve better costs i.e., if two sets individually do not improve costs, then their combined
benet, still does not improve costs. This theorem allows us to consider one technology at a
time, with 
 and exclude it entirely from consideration, if it does not help individually.
Now, using the above properties, we describe a useful property of the set, 
oE(B;
).
Lemma III.7. Let (; c) = (1; c1) + (1  )(2; c2) for some 0    1, then, V o(B;
 [
f(; c)g)  V o(B;
 [ f(1; c1); (2; c2)g).
Note that the above lemma holds for  but would not hold for 1=. Thus, our denition
of parameters was imposed for choosing from the given set of technologies.
From Lemma III.7, we have,
Theorem III.8. 
oE(B;
) is convex for budget B  0 and any given set of technologies 
.
Theorem III.8 helps to identify dominated technologies, independent of demand distribu-
tions. Consider a graph with  on horizontal axis and c on vertical axis. Each coordinate in
the rst quadrant with   1 represents a feasible storage technology. The Theorem implies
a non-trivial way to eliminate technologies from consideration prior to taking into account
the demand and budget information. Lemma III.7 suggests that any technology that is
dominated by a technology on the straight line connecting any two technologies of the set

 may be neglected from consideration. Consequently, any technology in the \convex hull"
of the given technologies 
 under consideration and the points ( min
1jM
j;1); (1; min
1jM
cj)
may be neglected, as shown in Figure 3.1.
We observe that the `convex hull' dened in Theorem III.8 provides a tight bound as
illustrated in the following example.
Example III.9. Consider, 
 = f(1; c1); (2; c2)g and T = 2. Let d1 = 0 and d2 > 0 and
C(q) = q2=2.
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σ
Region always part of 
Figure 3.1: The dotted region (\convex hull" of 
) is always part of 
oE(B;
) for all B  0.
For this example, note that, 
E(1; fc1; f 1g) = f(c; f)jc > 0; f > 1; c1 + 1(d2   c1)(1  
)=(1 + (1)2)  cg. Hence, it can be shown that there exist d2 > 0 such that, 
E(1;
) =
f(c; f)jc > 0; f > 1; c1   (   1)(c1   c2)=(2   1)  cg. In other words, for any given
point below the line connecting (1; c1) and (2; c2), we can always nd a demand scenario,
which does not belong to 
E(B;
).
We now show decreasing marginal benet from increasing number of technologies. That
is, for given a set of two technologies, the benet of investing in at most one technology,
exceeds the incremental benet of using both technologies instead of one.
Lemma III.10. For given set of technologies 
, with cost vector c and loss factors , we
have that,
(i) V ot (st;dtjS;) is convex in S for t = 1; : : : ; T and therefore, U o(S;) is convex in S.
Consider 
 = f(1; c1); (2; c2)g, we have the following:
(ii) For all t = 0; 1; : : : ; T+1, given S = (S1; S2), we have, V ot ((s
1
t ; s
2
t );dtjS)+V ot ((0; 0);dtj0) 
V ot ((s
1
t ; 0);dtj(S1; 0)) + V ot ((0; s2t );dtj(0; S2)).
(iii) Given S = (S1; S2), we have that, U o(0;)+U o(S;)  U o((S1; 0);)+U o((0; S2);)
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Lemma III.10 shows convexity with respect to S and supermodularity when M = 2.
In other words, the benet of adding one unit of S1 is decreasing with S2 and vice versa.
This intuitive property is used to show the marginal decreasing benet of mixing, which we
discuss below.
Theorem III.11. Given a set of technologies, 
 = f(1; c1); (2; c2)g and any B > 0, then,
V
o
(B; ) + V
o
(B;
)  2minfV o(B; f(1; c1)g); V o(B; f(2; c2)g)g.
Note that Theorem III.11 means that the benet of having one technology over no tech-
nology is greater than the benet of having two technologies over one technology, when
choosing the best possible of the two available technologies. This shows decreasing marginal
benet of including more exibility in choosing technologies for two technologies. Operating
multiple technologies requires certain costs of operation, maintenance, as well as building the
required technological expertise. These additional costs would further reinforce decreasing
benet of multiple technologies.
Further, we show a useful property of the optimal investment decision S and it's sensi-
tivity to the price per unit capacity of storage technologies.
Lemma III.12. Let S be the optimal investment decision of (3.5) for a set of technologies

 = (c;), when budget B is not binding. Then the optimal investment decision of technology
j, Sj is decreasing in cj for all 1  j M .
Proof of Lemma III.12. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that cj2 > c
j
1
and ck1 = c
k
2 for all k 6= j. Let S1, S2 be the optimal decision for capacity per unit costs c1
and c2 respectively. Because of their respective optimalities, we have,
U o(S1;) + c1:S1  U o(S2;) + c1:S2;
U o(S2;) + c2:S2  U o(S1;) + c2:S1:
Adding the two inequalities gives, that (cj1   cj2)(Sj1   Sj2)  0. This implies, Sj1  Sj2.
Interestingly, for given budget B, while it is tempting to believe that the optimal in-
vestment decision S(B) is monotonically increasing, the example in the next section will
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demonstrate otherwise.
3.4.3 Canonical example
In order to demonstrate the nature of the trade-os aecting the decision to invest in
multiple storage units, we consider a two-period deterministic demand setting with two
technologies, i.e., M = 2, i = 1, j = 2.3 This example, shows how changing parameters
aects the storage investment decision and leads to some counter intuitive insights. This
example also allows us to revisit (from the motivating example in Section 3.1.1) the trade-o
of `mixing' under deterministic demand, because of non-linear costs.
Let T = 2 and d1 = dl and d2 = dh be the low and high demands of this horizon (dl <<
dj). Hence, (3.5) reduces to min
S0

ciSi+cjSj+C(q1)+C(q2)
	
where q1 = dl+S
ii+Sjj and
q2 = dh Si Sj. The optimal allocation must also satisfy the constraint ciSi+cjSj  B. As
is standard in the literature (Lu and Shahidehpour 2004), we assume that the cost function
C(q) = Xq2 + Y q + Z is quadratic. Without loss of generality, we assume, ci  cj and
i  j.
Note that in a 2 period deterministic setting, it can be shown that it is optimal to invest
in at most 2 technologies, from any portfolio of available technologies. We consider two cases
in the solution to the problem: when budget B is binding and when budget B is not binding.
3.4.3.1 Case 1: Budget is Binding
We assume that the budget B is binding, i.e., ciSi + cjSj = B. In this case, the optimal
fraction of capital invested in technology i, i = ciSi=B, given by (assuming  = 1),
i =
 
ci(ci   cj) + cij(cij   cji)  cicj
B
((dh +
Y
X
)(ci   cj)  (dl + YX )(cij   cji))
+
(ci   cj)2 + (cij   cji)2
(3.13)
and j = 1  i.
ci  cj represents the marginal benet of choosing the cheaper technology j over the more
ecient technology i during the withdrawal period. cij   icj represents the benet of
choosing the more ecient technology over the cheaper one during the storage period. The
3We use i; j instead of 1; 2 in order to avoid confusion between the power square x2 and index j repre-
senting technology j.
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capital allocation ratio i, depends on the ratio of these benets. The higher the dh, the
more the benet during the withdrawal period and hence more capital is invested in the
cheaper storage. Similarly, from the above expressions, we observe the following:
 As invested capital B increases, i increases.
 As high period demand dh increases, i decreases.
 As low period demand dl increases, i increases.
 As convexity of generation cost, X increases, i decreases.
 As base cost of generation, Y increases, i increases.
It seems that the two attributes of storage technologies, price per unit capacity and
eciency provide cost benet to grid operation under dierent circumstances. We notice
that the cheaper less ecient storage is preferred when there is a greater need for storage
(i.e., high dh, low dl, high X, low B), by focusing on volume of energy stored rather than
the ecacy of storage. Similarly, as the more ecient storage is preferred when the need for
storage is lesser, focusing on capturing the benet more eciently.
This example succinctly captures the primary trade-o in mixing. We observe, through
robust numerical analysis, that these lessons continue to hold for more general demand
scenarios.
Counter-intuitive situations
For this example, a number of counter intuitive situations arise:
 We observe for cases with high i values, increasing i (making technology i less
ecient), counter intuitively increases the amount of money invested in technology i.
This is because, increasing i in this range, substantially increases q1 and decreases
q2. Under such a situation, the inecient technology becomes less useful. As the gap
between q1 and q2 is quite small, eciency becomes more important and we invest
more in the ecient technology.
A numerical example where it can be seen that d
i
di
is positive is: dh = 1, 
i = 1:047,
j = 1:25, ci = 0:625 and cj = 0:5, B = 0:174.
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 We observe in cases with moderate i(> 0:5) values and low i (very ecient technol-
ogy), increasing j (making technology 2 more inecient), counter intuitively increases
the amount of money invested in technology 2. This is because, increasing j in this
range, substantially reduces the smoothing achieved by the portfolio of technologies,
while increasing q1 and reducing q2, but not to a large extent. Under such a situation,
the cheaper technology becomes relatively more benecial, as it is more valuable to
achieve greater smoothing.
A numerical example where it can be seen that d
i
dj
is negative is: dh = 1, 
i = 1:004,
j = 1:625, ci = 0:5, cj = 0:25 and B = 0:125.
 As another example, we observe, counter intuitively, that as ci increases, it is possible
that i may increase. In other words, we invest more in the expensive technology when
it becomes more expensive. This idea is quite similar to xed budget optimization
decisions in economics. As ci becomes more expensive, when 1 is close to 1, the
greater need for ecacy causes greater investment in c1.
A numerical example where it can be seen that d
i
dci
is negative is: dh = 1, 
i = 1:004,
j = 1:17, ci = 0:3755, cj = 0:375 and B = 0:25.
It is interesting to note that such counter intuitive insights may arise under limited budget
investment decisions, analogous to the concept of a Gien good in economics (Spiegel 1994).
3.4.3.2 Case 2: Budget is not Binding
Here, we assume the budget is sucient, i.e., ciSi+cjSj < B. We have that, the solution
may be one of four cases (for simplicity, we assume Y = dl = 0),
 Invest in no storage at all, i.e., S = 0
 Invest only in technology 1, i.e., S =

2dh ci
2X(1+(i)2)
; 0

 Invest only in technology 2, i.e., S =

0; 2dh c
j
2X(1+(j)2)

 Invest non zero capital in both technologies, i.e.,
S =
2dhjX(j   i)  (ci   cj)  j(cij   cji)
2X(j   i)2 ;
(ci   cj) + i(cij   cji)  2dhiX(i   j)
2X(j   i)2

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The intuition of the sensitivities with respect to dh; X etc. from the above results remains
similar to Case 1. However, we do not nd any counter intuitive relationships when the
budget is not binding. In fact, Lemma III.12 shows that increasing the cost of a technology
decreases the capacity invested in that technology. The investment in a technology may
decrease as  increases.
3.4.4 Numerical Example of the Benets of Mixing Multiple Technologies
In this subsection, we discuss a series of numerical examples, where it is optimal to
invest in several technologies (> 2). Through these examples, we also observe a pattern of
decreasing marginal benet in the exibility of using a number of technologies, consistent
with Theorem III.11.
Consider the following four period example, which shows the benet of mixing four
technologies.
Example III.13. Consider, 
 = f(1; c1); (2; c2); (3; c3); (4; c4)g and T = 4,  = 1. Let
d1 = 0; d2 = 100, d3 = 0; d4 = 10 and C(q) = q
2 and the technology parameters per the
table below.
Technology j 1 2 3 4
Cost/Unit Capacity cj 99 89 39.2 27
Loss Rate j 1 1.134 1.818 2
We consider optimally investing in a storage portfolio from this set of technologies 

restricting the number of technologies with non-zero investment. Let W (n) be the minimum
operating and investment cost of investing in at most n technologies from the set 
. Further,
let MB(n) = W (n 1) W (n)
W (0) W (1) represent the relative marginal benet of the additional exibility
of using the nth technology, compared to the benet of adding the rst technology.
For Example III.13, applying the structure of the optimal policy discussed in Section
3.4.1, we consider the optimal policy and investments for n = 0 to 4.
By Theorem III.11, we have that MB(2)  MB(1) = 1. For this particular example,
it is interesting to note that the initial benets of mixing are decreasing very quickly after
M = 2 technologies.
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Table 3.2: Marginal Benet of multiple technologies
n W (n) W (n  1) W (n) MB(n)% Technologies Used
0 10100 - - None
1 8575.502 1524.49781 100 3
2 8569.709 5.79355578 0.38003 2, 3
3 8569.536 0.17238215 0.011307 1, 3, 4
4 8569.532 0.00458542 0.000301 1, 2, 3, 4
This example provides a methodology to construct similar examples that show non-
zero (but tiny) benet of mixing multiple technologies (n > 4). For example, in order to
show an example that allows optimally mixing 5 or 6 technologies, we may consider a six
period deterministic example, with three cycles of low and high demands. Each consecutive
cycle has decreasing average demand. Hence, the most ecient technologies may be used
in all three cycles, while the least ecient technology is only used in the rst cycle. This
presents a set of simultaneous equations for the investment quantities and there always exist
a set of technologies and demand distributions satisfying that it is optimal to mix multiple
technologies. Interestingly, the canonical example in Section 3.4.3 suggests that in a two
period deterministic case, only two technologies can be mixed. This subsection and the
following section together provide insights that the marginal benet of mixing is decreasing.
3.4.5 Numerical analysis
In this subsection, we consider a numerical example of realistic demand to evaluate the
benet of using multiple technologies. The goal of this section is to investigate the impact of
demand distribution parameters on the storage technology choice problem. Theorem III.5
provides an explicit solution for st+1 given qt, allowing for ecient computational study.
3.4.6 Model Parameters and Simulation Details
We consider, specically, the choice of mixing under two technologies. The two tech-
nologies we consider have the parameters: c1 = 2:96; 1 = 1:004016 and c2 = 0:931; 2 =
1:041666667. Aggregate production cost of the grid is often approximated as quadratic in
the total energy produced in a given period (Bessembinder and Lemmon 2006). We assume
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the cost function as follows, satisfying Assumption III.2:
c(q) = a q2 + 10q (3.14)
where a is the co-ecient of the quadratic term, indicating the convexity.
The evolutions of load exhibit predictable patterns and random uctuations. Let Lt be
the predictable load at time t and lt be the unpredictable load variations. The net demand
is given by:
dt = Lt + lt
The predictable component fLtg is a deterministic processes whose values are known prior
to time zero. The stochastic processes fltg represents the deviations from the deterministic
levels and evolve according to preset probability distributions. We model lt to be inuenced
by the wind variations, caused by the penetration of wind energy; hence lt can be negative.
We consider a cycle of T periods. For given investment in storage capacities, denoted
by S, we employ an innite-horizon average-cost model assuming every cycle faces the same
distribution of demands. In the second stage of the optimization, we search for optimal
investment capacity S that minimizes the total investment and operating costs.
The following demand model, while stylized, illustrates the trade-os in a more realistic
system. Consider 8 periods per day (of 3 hrs each), with each period representing 3 hours.
Predictable components of load and wind are cyclic over these 8 periods.
Table 3.3: Predictable Components of Load
Time (hour of the day) 0-3 3-6 6-9 9-12 12-15 15-18 18-21 21-24 Average
Predictable load Lt (MWh) 12 14 25 36 38 36 25 14 25
The unpredictable variations in each period is given by, lt = l
0
t , where  is a measure of
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the variability in the demand, here  changes from 1 to 5.
lt =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 2 p = 0:015618765;
 1:33 p = 0:093747594;
 0:66 p = 0:234379485;
0 p = 0:312508313;
0:66 p = 0:234379485;
1:33 p = 0:093747594;
2 p = 0:015618764:
(3.15)
Our objective is to study the impact of changes in the demand parameters on the optimal
investment decisions in this scenario. We plot the following metrics against change in 
in Figure 3.2. Observe that l0t suggests huge swings in the variability of demand, where
as Lt presents smaller periodic variations in the variability of demand. As expected, the
investment in the cheaper technology 2 increases as  increases, and for these parameters,
the benet of mixing is also increasing. This conrms an important intuition of the benet
of mixing. Investing in the cheaper technology allows to smooth large variations in demand,
that happen occasionally, while the more ecient expensive technology can smooth tiny
variations, especially when frequent.
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Figure 3.2: Impact of change in  for a = 0:1.
We also choose to study the impact of variation in quadratic co-ecient a. We observe
that the impact of changes in a are non-linear.
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3.5. Decentralized Storage Owner Perspective under Inelastic Prices
Assumption
For the decentralized storage owner perspective discussed in Section 3.3.2, we consider
two possibilities: (a) Small Storage Investor, (b) Large Storage Investor. For each case, we
estimate the value function and optimal decisions of the storage investor (See Chapter 6 of
Carlton and Perlo (2010)).
3.5.1 Small Storage Investor
Consider the case where the storage facility is considered to be small compared to the size
of the market, as typically assumed in the literature (Zhou et al. 2011, Kim and Powell 2011,
Denholm and Sioshansi 2009), and pt(st;dt) = pt(dt) for all st for all t in f1; 2; 3; : : : ; Tg
through out this subsection. Here, the price of energy transfer is independent of the actions
of the storage owner. Under this case, the constraint of q(st;dt)  0 may be neglected.
Storage investment decisions are made by independent prot maximizing players under
their individual beliefs about the price path. The objective of this section is to yield analytical
evidence to justify the dynamics observed in the market today, and understand how storage
investment decisions are aected by the nature of the price paths.
We rst observe some properties of the function V It (st;dtjS;), per (3.7).
Lemma III.14. For all t = 1; : : : ; T , we have the following properties:
(i) V It (st;dtjS;) is jointly convex and decreasing in st.
(ii) V It (st;dtjS;) is jointly concave in .
Proof of Lemma III.14. The proof of part (i) is similar to the proof of Lemma III.3(iii).
We now show part (ii) by induction on t. It can be seen that V IT+1(st;dtjS;) is concave
in . Now we prove the hypothesis for period t, assuming it is true for period t + 1. Note
further that the term pt
MP
j=1
 j(st) is linear in  for any st. Hence, the term inside the
minimization of (3.7) is concave in  in small storage investor case. Since the minimization
of a concave function is always concave, we have that the V It (st;dtjS;) is concave in .
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Because the price is independent of the actions of the storage operator, we have that
the optimal operating revenue of a portfolio of facilities is the sum of the optimal operating
revenues of each of the individual facilities. Further, for given technology, each unit of
capacity can garner the same revenue. This gives us some simplifying properties of the value
function.
Lemma III.15. For all t = 1; : : : ; n; n+ 1, st 2 A we have the following:
(i) V It (st;dtjS;) =
MX
j=1
V It (s
j
t ;dtjSj; j).
(ii) V It (st;dtjS;) = kV It (st=k;dtjS=k;) for all k > 0.
Proof of Lemma III.15. Part (i) follows by construction. We prove part (ii) by induction.
It can be seen that both statements are true for t = T +1 as V IT+1(:; :) = 0. We now assume
the lemma is true for period t+ 1. Applying (3.7), for period t, we have:
V It (st;dtjS;) =min
n
Et[V
I
t+1(st+1;dtjS;)]  pt
  MP
j=1
 j(sjt)
o
=min
n
Et[kV
I
t+1(st+1=k;dt;S=k;)]  kpt
  MP
j=1
 j(sjt=k)
o
=kmin
n
Et[V
I
t+1(st+1=k;dt;S=k;)]  pt
  MP
j=1
 j(sjt=k)
o
=kV It (st=k;dt;S=k;)
where the second equality follows from the induction and the linearity of the  j() function,
and the third equality follows from the fact that the action st+1=k is feasible per (3.7). This
proves part (ii).
Because the size of the storage does not directly aect the prices in this model, each
dollar that is invested in storage garners the highest revenue per dollar invested independent
of the other investments. Hence, one does not observe any synergy of mixing, the total
capital is invested in the technology that gives the highest expected net present value of the
prots per dollar invested.
Lemma III.16. For given investment B and set of technologies 
 = f(j; cj) : j =
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1; : : : ;Mg, there exists an optimal solution to (3.9) such that Sj > 0 for at most one of
the M technologies.
3.5.1.1 Technology Choice
While at most one technology will be chosen, it is still a non-trivial decision to make the
choice. Given capacity cost per unit investment c and conversion loss factor , if a technology
is worse in both parameters, it may directly be eliminated from the choice set. Consider a
set of non-dominated technologies 
; similar to (3.12), we dene,

IE(B;
)
def
=
n
(M+1; cM+1) : V
I 
B; 
 [ (M+1; cM+1)  V I(B;
)o: (3.16)
Theorem III.17. For any set of technologies, 
, and budget B  0, we have that the set,

IE(B;
) is convex.
Proof. From Lemma III.14(ii) and separability of investment and operations, we have
that, V
I
(B;
) is jointly concave in (; c). Hence, V
I 
B; 
 [ (M+1; cM+1) is concave in
(M+1; cM+1). If we consider this to be a function on (M+1; cM+1), then 
IE is a set of the
form f(x; y)jf(x; y)  0g. Hence, Lemma III.20 implies the set is convex. 
Similar to the discussion in Section 3.4, this allows to eliminate any technologies in 

that are in the convex hull of a subset of technologies (See Figure 3.1).
3.5.1.2 Canonical Example
In order to gain further insights into the type of technology that may be chosen based
on the system metrics, we consider a cyclic price scenario with periodicity two, where the
storage operator acts as a price taker in the market. We also assume that the distribution
of prices for each cycle is stationary, hence, our analysis on a 2 period model will extend to
the entire horizon. Let p1 = pl and p2 = ph, with pl << ph. The objective of the storage
operator is to invest a given amount of capital B (often, decided by other constraints, such
as company budgets, Public Relations eorts and government grants and bills etc.) in order
to maximize the net present value of the investment. We address the question of which
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technology to choose based on the prices. Note that s1 = S; s

2 = 0, hence,
V
I
(1; f(; c)g) = minf1  E[(ph   pl)] 1  
T
c(1  2) ; 0g (3.17)
We assume the distribution of prices is such that the random variable ph pl is always
positive, hence ensuring that is optimal to buy and sell during each cycle of the horizon.
Hence choosing the optimal technology from a set 
, depends on the particular expression
for each technology, ( )=c, where  = E[ph]=[pl]. Specically, when  is high, suggesting
huge disparity between the high and low price periods, we prefer the cheaper storage to
capitalize on the arbitrage as much as possible. If  is low, we choose the more ecient
technology, preferring to make more ecient use of the price dierences.
In summary, this section considers a simplistic but common assumption about price
paths, showing that `mixing' is in fact not benecial under this assumption. Further, using
a simplistic canonical example, we learn that higher the variation of prices, we choose the
cheaper technology and vice versa.
3.5.2 Large Storage Owner Perspective
If the amount of storage invested inuences market prices, price should inuence quantity
produced. In this subsection, we assume that there is only one storage investor in the market,
and that his actions determine qt. Thus pt = C
0(q(st+1   st;dt)), price of energy traded is
equal to the marginal cost of energy in the system during that period. This assumption is
also common in the literature (Lynch and Law 2004). We begin this section by considering
the properties of the value function, V It (st;dtjS;) under this price path assumption.
Lemma III.18. Suppose C(q) is quadratic in q, For all t = 1; : : : ; T , we have the following
properties,
(i) V It (st;dtjS;) is jointly convex and decreasing in (st;S).
(ii) U I(S;) is jointly convex in S.
Proof of Lemma III.18. We prove part (i) by induction. V IT+1(s;djS;) is convex and
decreasing in (s;S) by assumption. We now prove convexity for period t assuming that part
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(i) is true for period t+ 1. Suppose C(q) = Xq2 + Y q + Z, then C 0(qt) = 2Xqt + Y . Hence,
the current period cost in (3.7), is given by (2X(
MP
j=1
 j(sj) + dt) + Y )(
MP
j=1
 j(sj)). It can
be seen that this expression is jointly convex in st; st+1;S. Hence, the expression inside the
minimization in (3.7) is convex in both the state and the decision variables. By the theorem
on convexity preservation under minimization Heyman and Sobel (1984, p. 525), we conclude
that V It (st;dtjS;) is convex in st;S.
Suppose that the optimal solution for st;dt is s

t+1. To prove that V
I
t (st;dtjS;) is de-
creasing in st, the intermediate value theorem gives the existence of action s
0
t+1 2 [st+1;S]
for given storage level s0t  st such that 0  q(s0t;dt)  q(st;dt). This and the induc-
tive hypothesis prove that V It (st;dtjS;) is decreasing in st. Further, it can be seen that
V It (st;dtjS;) is decreasing in S as any feasible action under S would be feasible for given
S0  S.
Part (ii) follows from applying part (i) to the denition of U I(S;).
Note that V It (:; :) under a general convex cost function C(q) is not necessarily convex
in s. Further still, U I(S;) may not also be convex in S. For example, in the two period
deterministic problem with d1 = 0 and d2 = dh, and C(q) = e
q, it can be veried that the
U I(S; ) is not convex in S.
While it is useful to note that convexity is guaranteed only under quadratic generation
cost function, we observe that, in two period deterministic setting with multiple technologies,
the optimal investment under the decentralized is always less than the optimal investment
under centralized perspective.
Example III.19. For a given set of technologies 
, and T = 2, with deterministic demands
d1 << d2, let S
o be the optimal solution to (3.5) and SI be an optimal solution (3.9). We
have that SI  So, when B is not binding.
It can be seen that the optimal operating policy, for given investment S (assuming it is
optimal) is to produce to ll up storage in period 1, i.e., q1 = d1 +
MP
j=1
 j(Sj) and empty
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storage in period 2, i.e., q2 = d2  
MP
j=1
Sj. Further, we have,
dV
I
(S;
)
dSk
= (C 00(q1)k(
MP
j=1
 j(Sj)) + C 00(q2)(
MP
j=1
Sj))(
MP
j=1
 j(Sj)) + C 0(q1)k   C 0(q2) + ck
(3.18)
dV
o
(S;
)
dSk
= C 0(q1)k   C 0(q2) + ck (3.19)
Due to the convexity of C() per Assumption III.2, we have that dV
I
(S;
)
dSk
  dV
o
(S;
)
dSk
 0.
Further, since, V o(S;
) is convex in S per Lemma III.10(i), we have that if So is a solution
to the problem in (3.5); dV
I
(S;
)
dSk
 0 for all S > So, hence SI  So, where SI is optimal
solution to (3.9). Note that this discussion does not assume convexity of V
I
(S;
) with
respect to S.
Note that, when B is binding, the total investment is the same in both centralized and
decentralized scenarios, so this result cannot be extended to the case when B is binding. For
each dollar of capacity invested, the benet gained under the centralized case is the dierence
between the marginal cost in the high demand period and the low demand period (adjusted
for eciency). However, under the decentralized case, this dierence is further decreased,
proportionate to the rate of change of marginal cost, as the price of all the energy purchased
by the storage unit increases at the rate of C 00(q1) and the price of all energy sold by the
storage unit decreases at the rate of C 00(q2). Figure 3.3 demonstrates this result.
Notice that Example III.19 describes an elegant intuition. If the optimal investment
under SI is vested in more than one technology, then so is So. In other words, if we `mix'
technologies under the decentralized case, then we mix technologies under the centralized
case. This suggests that we mix more under the centralized decision maker perspective than
the decentralized perspectives.
3.5.2.1 Canonical Example
We now consider the system with demands and costs described in Section 3.4.3. We
further assume X = 1, Y = 0, dl = 0 and  = 1. Again, here, since M = 2, we have that
i = 1 and j = 2. For this system, we again consider the problem under two cases, with the
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
Figure 3.3: The marginal benet of each innitesimal unit of storage capacity in a two pe-
riod deterministic demand system under the decentralized case is less than the
marginal benet under the centralized system by the area of the light blue rect-
angles.
`myopic markets' assumption about the price paths:
Case 1: Budget B is binding, here, the total investment is the entire available budget B and we
similarly measure the optimal investment in the more ecient technology as follows,
i =
(ci(ci   cj) + cij(cij   cji)  cicj
2B
((dh)(c
i   cj)))+
(ci   cj)2 + (cij   cji)2 (3.20)
Note that the i described above is higher than the i that is described in (3.13),
explaining a preference for the more ecient technology. We observe that the de-
centralized system inherently prefers the more ecient storage under binding budget
because there is an additional penalty due to the ineciency under the `myopic mar-
kets' assumption. For each additional unit of storage capacity, we pay not only the
additional increase in marginal cost for that unit but also the rate of increase of c0(q) is
felt on the entire purchased energy, so, the eect of ineciency  is felt twice, eecting
a double taxation.
Case 2: In this case, we assume that the budget B is not binding. Here, the optimal investment
when investing in both technologies, given by,
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S =
2dhjX(j   i)  (ci   cj)  j(cij   cji)
4X(j   i)2 ;
(ci   cj) + i(cij   cji)  2dhiX(i   j)
4X(j   i)2

(3.21)
Compared to the centralized example in Section 3.4.3, notice that while the ratio of
investments in the two technologies remains the same, the absolute capacity invested
is halved. This result is consistent with Example III.19.
In this section, we demonstrate that having more generic price path assumptions can
create non-convex optimizations, making them harder to solve. However, for a deterministic
two period setting, we provide intuition that the storage investment under decentralized case
is substantially smaller than under the centralized case and that we invest smaller amounts.
However, (3.21) suggests that the ratio of mixing remains the same.
3.6. Conclusion and Future Research
In summary, this chapter demonstrates the benet of using multiple storage technologies
in tandem. While the traditional xed cost/variable cost trade-o presents synergies in
`mixing' of technologies in a variety of settings, we further observe that the convexity of the
cost function allows for synergies of `mixing' even in a two period deterministic setting, for
our problem. Apart from Kraning et al. (2011), to the best of our knowledge, we are the only
other work to consider using multiple technologies simultaneously to provide a single service
to the grid. While their focus is on computational methodologies for evaluating the optimal
operating policies and investment decision, we focus on providing structural insights by
identifying the structure of the optimal operating policy and establish identiable properties
of the optimal investment portfolio.4 We further demonstrate that the marginal benet of
this exibility of `mixing' is decreasing in the number of technologies available. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the rst to extend such insights from other settings to the non-linear
setting of energy markets.
This chapter also identies some situations where investment decisions under limited bud-
get can be counter-intuitive, when technologies in the portfolio under consideration change.
4They additionally consider the discharge rate of storage units.
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In particular, when a technology becomes worse (either in the cost or eciency metric), it
may be optimal to invest more in that technology because of the increased relative scarcity of
the budget. Finally, our work oers a nascent explanation to the lack of `mixing' in the grid
today. We posit that the incentives of individual storage operators maximizing their own
prots does not present synergies to invest in multiple technologies in tandem. Specically,
we observe no benets of mixing under the `small storage' assumption, which is common in
the literature.
For future research, it may be apt to consider a storage model where we compare technolo-
gies diering in their power ratings and number of life cycles as well. It would be a stronger
analytical result if we can conclude that the marginal benet of `mixing' is decreasing for
M > 2 as well, extending Theorem III.11.
3.7. Appendix: Denitions and Proofs
In this section, we dene some functions and discuss their properties in order to prove
the theorems in the paper. We rst discuss some preliminary results.
Lemma III.20. Let f(x; y) be a function that is jointly concave in x; y, then the set described
by  = f(x; y)jf(x; y)  0g is convex.
Proof of Lemma III.20. Suppose (x1; y1); (x2; y2) 2 , Consider (ex; ey) = (x1; y1) + (1 
)(x2; y2) for some  2 [0; 1]. Observe that f(ex; ey)  f(x1; y1) + (1   )f(x2; y2)  0,
where the rst inequality follows from concavity and the second inequality follows from the
assumption. Hence, (ex; ey) 2 .
Lemma III.21. Let f(x; y) be a non-negative function that is jointly convex and decreasing
in x; y, then the lim
m!1
lim
n!1
f(x+ 1=n; y + 1=m)
1=n
= lim
n!1
lim
m!1
f(x+ 1=n; y + 1=m)
1=n
.
Proof of Lemma III.21. Let amn =
f(x+1=n;y+1=m)
1=n
for m;n 2 N and cmn = am(n+1)  amn.
Suppose further that cmn  0 for all m;n and that cmn is increasing in n. Then, by the
monotone convergence theorem, we have, lim
m!1
1X
j=1
cmj =
1X
j=1
lim
m!1
cmj, which simplies to,
lim
m!1
lim
n!1
amn = lim
n!1
lim
m!1
amn.
Hence, it suces to show that cmn  0, and cmn is increasing with n. Because f(:; :)
is convex, it can be seen that f(x+;y) f(x;y)

is increasing with respect to . Hence, if
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n = 1=n is decreasing with increasing n, we have that amn is decreasing with respect to n,
giving cmn  0.
Further, we have that f(x + 1=; y)=5 is convex in  when   0, hence, we observe
that cm(n+1) cmn = (n+2)f(x+1=(n+2); y)+nf(x+1=n; y) 2(n+1)f(x+1=(n+1); y)  0.
We dene the function   as follows to represent the marginal increase in total costs by
adding innitesimal capacities across the M technologies along the vector v. For given set
of technologies 
 = f(j; cj) : 1  j  Mg, let j
j = M be the cardinality of the set of
technologies, we have,
 (v;S;
) = lim
r!0+
c  v + U
o(S+ rv;)  U o(S;)
r
(3.22)
where S 2 (<+)M , and v 2 <M , such that, there exists " > 0 satisfying, S+ rv 2 (<+)M
for all 0 < r < ". Similarly, for all 1  j M , we dene,
 +j (S;
) =  (1j;S;
);  
 
j (S;
) =  ( 1j;S;
)
where, 1j is the unit vector along the axis of S
j. Note that it can be shown that  +j (S;
) =
  j (S;
) when C(:) is dierentiable.
We now show the properties of these functions, in order to help us understand the prop-
erties of the set 
E dened in (3.12).
Lemma III.22. Given 
 and that C() is continuous and twice dierentiable in q and C 0(0) =
0, we have that V ot (s;djS) as in (3.3) is convex and semi-dierentiable in each variable of
(s;S) for all t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n; n+ 1g, S > 0 and s 2 (0;S).
Proof of Lemma III.22. Since V ot (:; :) is convex (Lemma III.3) and on the open interval I
of each variable of (s;S) as per Lemma statement. Hence, the left and right derivatives with
respect to s and S exist and are continuous in all but countably many points (set D, say) on
the open interval, per Theorem 25.3 in Rockafellar (1997). In each point of set D, the left
5Check double derivative with respect to 
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and right derivatives exist because of continuity and existence of V 0 on the set I  D. This
proves that it is semi-dierentiable in the entire open set described by the Lemma.
Lemma III.23. The function  (:; :; :) dened per (3.22) satises the following properties:
(i)   exists for given 
;v for all feasible S, and for all 1  i; j M , lim
h!0+
 +i (S+h1j;
) =
 +i (S;
), lim
h!0+
  i (S+ h1j;
) =  
 
i (S;
).
(ii)  (v;S;
) =
MX
j=1
jvjj 1fvj>0g +j (S;
) + 1fvj<0g  j (S;
).
(iii) Suppose e
  
 , ev 2 <je
j; eS 2 (<+)j
j and v = (ev;0j
j je
j);S = (eS;0j
j je
j) are the
extensions of ev; eS respectively in the extended space of 
 technologies and that (ev; eS; e
)
is in the domain of the function  , then,  (ev; eS; e
) =  (v;S;
).
Proof of Lemma III.23. First, we prove part (i). Existence is implied from Lemma III.22
and (3.5). Consider,
lim
h!0+
 +i (S+ h1j;
) = c
i + lim
h!0+
lim
r!0+
U o(S+ r1i + h1j;)  U o(S+ h1j;)
r
= ci + lim
r!0+
lim
h!0+
U o(S+ r1i + h1j;)  U o(S+ h1j;)
r
=  +i (S;
): (3.23)
where the rst equality follows from the denition and the second equality follows from
Lemma III.21. The proof is similar for   i (S;
).
Now, to prove part (ii), consider, v = a1i + b1j.
 (v;S;
) = (aci + bcj) + lim
r!0+
U o(S+ r(a1i + b1j);)  U o(S;)
r
= aci + a lim
r!0+
U o(S+ r(a1i + b1j);)  U o(S+ r(b1j);)
ar
+ bcj + b lim
r!0+
U o(S+ r(b1j);)  U o(S;)
br
= lim
r!0+
a +i (S+ br;
) + b 
+
j (S;
)
= a +i (S;
) + b 
+
j (S;
); (3.24)
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where the rst two equalities follow from the denition and the last equality follows from
part (i). The proof is similar for all other v.
Now, to prove part (iii), note that c v = ec  ev, U o(S;) = U o(eS; e) and U o(S+ rv;) =
U o(eS+ rev; e). This implies part (iii).
Proof of Theorem III.6.
We rst show (a) =) (b). Let S be the optimal solution to (3.5) using the set of
technologies 
. Let S1 be a projection of S
 on the set of technologies 
[
1, i.e., Sj1 = Sj
for 1  j M and Sj1 = 0 for M + 1  j  j
 [ 
1j. Similarly, let S2, eS be the projections
of S on the sets 
 [ 
2 and 
 [ 
1 [ 
2 respectively. Given the optimality of S in the
space of 
, V
o 
B; 
[
1
  V o(B;
) and V o B; 
[
2  V o(B;
) together imply (from
the equivalence of local minimality with global minimality in a convex optimization),
 (v1;S1;
 [ 
1)  0;  (v2;S2;
 [ 
2)  0;  (v0;S;
)  0 (3.25)
for all v1 in the space of 
 [ 
1 whose projection on the space of 
 is 0, v2 in the space of

[
2 whose projection of 
 is 0, and all v in the space of 
, while still part of the domain
of   (per (3.22)). Hence, we have,
0   (v1;S1;
 [ 
1) +  (v2;S2;
 [ 
2) +  (v0;S;
)
=  (ev0; eS;
 [ 
1 [ 
2) +  (ev1; eS;
 [ 
1 [ 
2) +  (ev2; eS;
 [ 
1 [ 
2)
=  (ev0 + ev1 + ev2; eS;
 [ 
1 [ 
2); (3.26)
where the rst equality follows from Lemma III.23 (iii) and the second equality follows
from Lemma III.23(ii). Note that any vector in the space of 
[
1[
2 which has a projection
0 on the space of 
 can be expressed as a sum of the vectors ev1; ev2 which are the projections
of v1;v2 on the space of 
1 and 
2 respectively extended to the entire set 
[
1[
2. Hence
(3.35) implies part (b). Hence, (a) =) (b). Part (b) trivially implies (c).
Now we show (c) =) (a), completing the equivalence. (c) implies that for every technol-
ogy (j; cj) 2 
1 [
2, V o(B;
 [ (j; cj))  V o(B;
). Since (a) =) (b) is true for any two
subsets of 
, this implies (b).
114
Proof of Lemma II.4: The statement of the lemma holds for period T because VT (; ) = 0.
Suppose Vt+1(st+1;dt+1) is decreasing and convex in st+1 for any dt+1.
For any dt, the objective function in (2.5) is dened on a non-convex set f(st; st+1) 2
A  A : q(st+1   st;dt)  0g. We introduce the following auxiliary function, which is an
extension of the objective function in (2.5) to a larger convex set:
ft(st+1; st;dt)
def
= c
 
[q(st+1   st;dt)]+

+ Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

; for (st+1; st) 2 AA:
For state (st;dt), let s

t+1 be an optimal decision found by (2.5)-(2.6). Consider anyest  st. If st+1 is feasible for state (est;dt), i.e., q(st+1 est;dt)  0, then
Vt(est;dt)  ft(st+1;est;dt)  ft(st+1; st;dt) = Vt(st;dt):
If q(st+1 est;dt) < 0 (infeasible), then using q(S est;dt)  0 and applying the intermediate
value theorem, we can nd a feasible decision est+1 with st+1  est+1  S and q(est+1 est;dt) =
0. Thus,
Vt(est;dt)  EtVt+1(est+1;dt+1)  EtVt+1(st+1;dt+1)  ft(st+1; st;dt) = Vt(st;dt);
where the second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and est+1  st+1. Using
the intermediate value theorem, we can also show that min
st+12A
ft(st+1; st;dt) = Vt(st;dt).
Note that c
 
[q(s;dt)]
+

is a composition of convex increasing functions, and thus it is
convex in s. From the induction hypothesis, Et

Vt+1(st+1;dt+1)

is convex in st+1. There-
fore, ft(st+1; st;dt) is jointly convex in (st+1; st) on closed convex set A  A. Then, using
the theorem on convexity preservation under minimization from Heyman and Sobel (1984,
p. 525), we conclude that Vt(st;dt) = min
st+12A
ft(st+1; st;dt) is convex in st.
Proof of Lemma III.4. Part (i) holds trivially for T + 1 since V oT+1(:; :) = 0. Suppose the
statement of the Lemma holds for t+1. For period t, we consider states (st;dt) and (est;dt),
with est; st satisfying part (i) of the Lemma for some "  0. Let st+1 be the optimal action
for state (st;dt), and denote st = s

t+1  st and q = qt(st;dt). For state (est;dt), consider
action est+1 2 A and denote est = est+1   est and eqt = qt(est;dt). Consider for some e"  0
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such that esit+1 = sit+1+ e"=i; esjt+1 = sjt+1  e"=j; eskt+1 = skt+1 for all k 6= i; j, and eqt  qt , then
the feasibility of the action est+1 and the induction hypothesis leads to the intended result:
V ot (est;dt)  C(eqt) + Et[V ot+1(est+1;dt+1)]  C(qt ) + Et[V ot+1(st+1;dt+1)] = V ot (st;dt): (3.27)
Below, we identify such e". Consider two cases:
Case 1: If sit+1+"=
i  Si and sjt+1 "=j  0, we set e" = ". We have st+1 st = est+1 est;
hence, eqt = qt .
Case 2: If sit+1 + "=
i > Si or sjt+1   "=j < 0 or both inequalities hold, we set e" =
min

(Si   sit+1)i; sjt+1j
	
. Note that est+1 2 @A (the boundary of A), i.e., esit+1 = Si oresjt+1 = 0. This implies
esit = esit+1   esit  0 or esjt = esjt+1   esjt  0: (3.28)
Let  = "  e". Note that e" < ", hence  > 0. Then, by denitions, we have
st  est = st+1  est+1   st +est (3.29)
That is, sit = esit + =i, sjt = esjt   =j and skt = eskt for k 6= i; j. Applying (3.2),
we have
qt   eqt =  i(sit)   i(esit)   j(esjt)   j(sjt)   ;
Now consider the two conditions derived in (3.28):
 If esit  0, then   =     j(esjt)   j(sjt)     j=j = 0:
 If esjt  0, then   =  i(sit)   i(esit)  =j  =i   =j  0:
Hence, qt  eqt and the result in (3.27) holds.
For part (ii) of the lemma, the proof follows similar lines as above. However, we choosee" = minsit+1; (Sj   sjt+1)	 for case 2, and esit+1 = 0 or esjt+1 = Si implies esit  0 or esjt  0,
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and (sit;s
j
t)  (esit;esjt) = ( ; ). The corresponding inequalities become
qt   eqt =  j(sjt)   j(esjt)   i(esit)   i(sit);

8<:     = 0; if esit  0;j   i  0; if esjt  0:
Proof of Theorem III.5.
Parts (i) and (ii) follow directly from Lemma III.4. For part (iii), sinceM = 2, we assume
i = 1, j = 2. We prove part (iii) by induction. We assume that V ot+1(:; :) is supermodular in
st (true for T + 1 since VT+1(:; :) = 0). Let qt = q(st+1   st;dt); bqt = q(bst+1  bst;dt).
We prove, qt  bqt by contradiction. Suppose that qt > bqt; for optimal actions satisfying
part (i)-(ii), we have three cases:
 If sit+1 < bsit+1, then sit < bsit and (3.2) imply sjt > bsjt , hence sjt > 0 or bsjt < 0;
part (i)-(ii) implies either sit+1 = S
i or bsit+1 = 0, hence, sit+1  bsit+1, which gives a
contradiction.
 If sjt+1 < bsjt+1, then sjt < bsjt , hence, sjt < 0 or bsjt > 0; part (i)-(ii) implies,
sit+1 = 0 or bsit+1 = Si; hence, sit+1  bsit+1. This gives qt < bqt from (3.2), which is a
contradiction.
 Else if, st+1  bst+1, note that st+1 6= bst+1 as qt > bqt per our assumption and st bst. We nd a st+1; st+1 s.t. st+1  st+1  st+1  bst+1, st+1   st+1 = st+1   bst+1,
qt   q(st+1   st)  q(st+1  bst)  bqt and qt  q(st+1   st); q(st+1  bst)  bqt, which when
combined with the strict convexity of C(:) implies,
C(q(st+1   st;dt))  C(q(st+1   st;dt)) > C(q(st+1  bst;dt))  C(q(bst+1  bst;dt)):
(3.30)
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Consider,
C(q(st+1   st;dt))  C(q(st+1   st;dt))  Et[V ot+1(st+1;dt+1)]  Et[V ot+1(st+1;dt+1)]
Et[V ot+1(bst+1;dt+1)]  Et[V ot+1(st+1;dt+1)]  C(q(st+1  bst;dt))  C(q(bst+1  bst;dt));
(3.31)
where the rst inequality is from the optimality of st+1 for state (st;dt), the second
inequality follows from the supermodularity and convexity of Vt+1(st+1;dt) w.r.t st+1
(inductive hypothesis), and the third inequality follows from the optimality of bst+1 for
state (bst;dt). (3.30) and (3.31) together imply a contradiction. Now we propose such
st+1; st+1 in two cases:
{ If sit+1 > bsit+1, we choose a  2 (0; (qt   bqt)=(2i)) which is small enough s.t,
 i(sit+1   sit)   i(sit+1      sit)   i(bsit+1   bsit)   i(bsit+1      bsit). Such  exists
as bqt < qt.6 We choose st+1 = (sit+1   ; sjt+1) and st+1 = (bsit+1 + ; bsjt+1). This
implies qt  q(st+1  st)  q(st+1 bst)  bqt and qt  q(st+1  st); q(st+1 bst)  bqt.
{ Else, it means sit+1 = bsit+1 = 0 or sit+1 = bsit+1 = Si (due to part (i)-(ii)). In
either case, we choose a  2 (0; (qt   bqt)=(2j)) which is small enough such that,
 j(sjt+1   sjt)    i(sjt+1      sjt)   j(bsjt+1   bsjt)    j(bsjt+1      bsjt) and set
st+1 = (s
i
t+1; s
j
t+1   ) and st+1 = (bsit+1; bsjt+1 + ). Again, such  exists and this
satises the above conditions establishing the contradiction.
Now, we prove supermodularity of V o(st;dt) in st. Consider any, st > bst. Let st =
(sit; bsjt); st = (bsit; sjt). It suces to prove, V ot (st;dt) + V ot (bst;dt)  V ot (st;dt) + V ot (st;dt) for
any dt. It is sucient to nd feasible policies st+1 for state (st;dt) and st+1 for state (st;dt)
satisfying:
C(qt) + C(bqt)  C(q(st+1   st;dt)) + C(q(st+1   st;dt)); (3.32)
V ot+1(st+1;dt+1) + V
o
t+1(bst+1;dt+1)  V ot+1(st+1;dt+1) + V ot+1(st+1;dt+1); (3.33)
6If sit+1 > s
i
t, then we choose  < s
i
t, implying,  
i(sit+1   sit)    i(sit+1      sit) = i   i(bsit+1  bsit)    i(bsit+1      bsit). Else, bqt < qt implies bsit+1 < bsit, giving,  i(sit+1   sit)    i(sit+1      sit)   =
 i(sit+1   sit)   i(sit+1      sit)   =  i(bsit+1   bsit)   i(bsit+1      bsit).
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for any dt+1. We nd such st+1; st+1 in three cases:
Case 1: If sjt+1 bsjt+1 > sjt bsjt , then part (i) implies, sit+1  bsit+1; hence, we choose st+1 =
(sit+1; s
j
t+1 (sjt bsjt)) and st+1 = (bsit+1; bsjt+1+(sjt bsjt)). The assumptions ensure st+1; st+1 2 A,
q(st+1 st;dt) = q(st+1 st;dt) and q(st+1 st;dt) = q(st+1 s;dt). Hence, this policy satises
(3.32). Further, V ot+1(bst+1;dt+1) V ot+1(st+1;dt+1)  V ot+1((sit+1; bsjt+1);dt+1) V ot+1((sit+1; bsjt+1+
(sjt   bsjt));dt+1)  V ot+1(st+1;dt+1)  V ot+1(st+1;dt+1), where the rst inequality follows from
supermodularity and the second inequality follows from convexity of V ot+1(st+1;dt) w.r.t st+1
which veries (3.33).
Case 2: Else if sjt+1   bsjt+1 < sjt   bsjt , part (i) implies sit+1 = 0 or bsit+1 = Si, giving
sit+1  bsit+1; We choose st+1 = bst+1 and st+1 = st+1. By applying (3.2), we have: have:
qt =  
i(sit+1   sit) +  j(sjt+1   sjt); bqt =  i(bsit+1   bsit) +  j(bsjt+1   bsjt); q(st+1   st;dt) =
 i(bsit+1   sit) +  j(bsjt+1   bsjt); q(st+1   st;dt) =  i(sit+1   bsit) +  j(sjt+1   sjt). From our
assumptions, it can be veried that, qt + bqt  q(st+1   st;dt) + q(st+1   st;dt) and bqt 
q(st+1  st;dt); q(st+1  st;dt)  qt. Hence, convexity of C(:) w.r.t qt implies (3.32). Further,
(3.33) reduces to equality, proving supermodularity.
Case 3: Else if sjt+1   bsjt+1 = sjt   bsjt , we consider two subcases:
 If sit+1  bsit+1, we choose st+1; st+1 similar to Case 1.
 Else if, sit+1 < bsit+1, we choose st+1; st+1 similar to Case 2.
Proof of Theorem III.6.
We rst show (a) =) (b). Let S be the optimal solution to (3.5) using the set of
technologies 
. Let S1 be a projection of S
 on the set of technologies 
[
1, i.e., Sj1 = Sj
for 1  j M and Sj1 = for M +1  j M + j
1j. Similarly, let S2, eS be the projections of
S on the sets 
 [
2 and 
 [
1 [
2 respectively. Given the optimality of S in the space
of 
, V
o 
B; 
 [ 
1
  V o(B;
) and V o B; 
 [ 
2  V o(B;
) together imply (from the
equivalence of local minimality with global minimality in a convex optimization),
 (v1;S1;
 [ 
1)  0;  (v2;S2;
 [ 
2)  0 (3.34)
for all v1 in the space of 
 [ 
1 whose projection on the space of 
 is 0, while still part of
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the domain of   (per (3.22)) and for all v2 in the space of 
 [ 
2, feasible in the domain of
  (per (3.22)) whose projection in the space of 
 is 0. Hence, we have,
0   (v1;S1;
 [ 
1) +  (v2;S2;
 [ 
2) =  (ev1; eS;
 [ 
1 [ 
2) +  (ev2; eS;
 [ 
1 [ 
2)
=  (ev1 + ev2; eS;
 [ 
1 [ 
2); (3.35)
where the rst equality follows from Lemma III.23 (iii) and the second equality follows
from Lemma III.23(ii). Note that any vector in the space of 
[
1[
2 which has a projection
0 on the space of 
 can be expressed as a sum of the vectors ev1; ev2 which are the projections
of v1;v2 on the space of 
1 and 
2 respectively extended to the entire set 
[
1[
2. Hence
(3.35) implies part (b). Hence, (a) =) (b).
Now, if (c) is not true, there exists at least one technology (j; cj) 2 
1 [ 
2 which
satises V
o
(B;
 [ (j; cj)) < V o(B;
). By using the same storage size that achieves the
value in V
o
(B;
[ (j; cj)), and investing 0 in the remaining storage technologies of 
1[
2,
we have a solution to (3.5) using the set of technologies 
 [ 
1 [ 
2. This contradicts (b).
Hence (b) =) (c).
Now we show (c) =) (a), completing the equivalence. (c) implies that for every technol-
ogy (j; cj) 2 
1 [
2, V o(B;
 [ (j; cj))  V o(B;
). Since (a) =) (b) is true for any two
subsets of 
, this implies (b).
Proof of Lemma III.7.
For given optimal solution S to (3.5) with the set of technologies 
 [ f(; c)g, consider
solution to (3.5) with the set of technologies 
 [ f(1; c1); (2; c2)g, with eS, where eSj = Sj
for 1  j  j
j, and eSj
j+1 = Sj
j+1 and eSj
j+2 = (1   )Sj
j+1. The investment costs
under both investments are the same, i.e., ec  eS = c  S.
Further, we also claim that: V ot (st;dtjS;
[f(; c)g)  V ot (est;dtjeS;
[f(1; c1); (2; c2)g).
The proof follows by induction. It can be veried that the statement is true for period T +1.
If in period t, the optimal policy under for state (st;dt) is st+1 for investment S with, set
of technologies, 
 [ f(; c)g, consider the equivalent policy, est+1 such that, esjt+1 = sjt+1 for
1  j  j
j and esj
j+1t+1 = sj
j+1t+1 and esj
j+2t+1 = (1 )sj
j+1t+1 . Note that, this and (3.2) implies,
q(st;dt) = q(est;dt), which is sucient for the induction hypothesis for period t to hold.
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Proof of Lemma III.10.
The proof of part (i) is similar to the proof of Lemma III.3(iii) applied on the relaxed
problem. We further have that U o(S;) is convex by applying the denition.
We prove part (ii) by induction. Clearly, the statement is true for period T +1. Assume
that the statement is true for period t + 1. Let st+1 = (s
1
t+1; s
2
t+1) be the optimal solution
for state (st;dt) for the system with storage capacity S. Clearly, the optimal policy for the
system with capacity 0 is (0; 0). Consider the following inequalities,
Et[V
o
t+1(s

t+1;dt+1jS) + V ot+1(0;dt+1j0)]  Et[V ot+1((s1t+1; 0);dtj(S1; 0)) + V ot+1((0; s2t+1);dtj(0; S2))]
C(q(st+1   st;dt)) + C(dt)  C(dt +  1(s1t+1   s1t )) + C(dt +  2(s2t+1   s2t ))
where the rst inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the second inequality
follows from the property that sit s
j
t  0 for all 1  i; j  M for an optimal policy
(consequence of Theorem III.5 parts (i),(ii) ) and convexity of C(:).
Adding these two inequalities and (3.3) together implies the inductive hypothesis on
part (i), because (s1t+1; 0) is a feasible policy for state
 
(s1t ; 0); dt

with investment (S1; 0)
(similarly for state (0; s2t );dt).
Part (iii) follows directly from applying part (ii) to the denition of U o(S;).
Proof of Theorem III.11.
Let (S1; S2) be optimal investments from the set 
. From part (iii) of Lemma III.10,
U o(S
1
; S
2
) + U o(0; 0)  U o(S1; 0) + U o(0; S2)
Adding the above 3 inequalities, we get,
U o(S1; 0) + c1S1 + U o(0; S2) + c2S2  U o(S1; S2) + c1S1 + c2S2 + U o(0; 0)
This implies, V
o
(B; ) + V
o
(B;
)  V o(B; f1; c1g) + V o(B; f2; c2g), which proves the
result.
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3.8. Appendix: Alternative Investment Problem formulation
In this section, we consider the investment decision in order to minimize operating costs
given a xed budget for initial investment B.
V (B) = min
0cI SB

E0[V
o
1 (0;d1)jS]
	
; (3.36)
where S is the storage size that denes the action space A in (3.3) and V1(:; :) is the value
function per (3.3). Note that investment portfolio that solves min
B0
V (B) will also solve
(3.5). In that sense, the two models are equivalent when B is large enough. Let S(B) be
the optimal storage investment that solves (3.36).
We dene ecj = j@E0[V1(0;d1)]
@Sj
jS=S(B) (Lagrangian of (3.36)) for all j = 1; : : : ;M . It can be
veried that the solution to (3.5) with the investment cost vector c = ec is S(B). Hence,
the two formulations are structurally equivalent.
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CHAPTER IV
Enhancing the eect of Social Comparisons in Energy
markets
4.1. Introduction
The previous two chapters focused on reducing the cost of Electric Energy Supply. In
this chapter, we shift our focus to the demand side of the supply chain and consider the
potential methods to reduce the cost of satisfying consumer preferences. Reducing `demand'
or reducing the cost of serving consumers, known as `behavioral energy eciency,' may be
accomplished in primarily two ways: motivating consumers to upgrade to energy-ecient
equipment and/or motivating consumers to modify their consumption behaviors.
Upgrading to energy-ecient equipment may include simple changes such as upgrading
to programmable thermostats or CFL light bulbs as well as more extensive projects such as
winterizing homes. These are recognized as one time actions with a cost associated with the
upgrade. Motivating consumers to manage their consumption behaviors, include sending
variety of messages, e.g. patriotic messages to reduce energy dependence of the nation, mes-
sages describing economic benets to consumers of consuming less, `Go Green' messages to
incite saving the environment or peer-consumption information intended to trigger a healthy
competition on being energy ecient. Cialdini and Schlutz (2004) describe a study in San
Marcos, California where it was found that peer comparisons was the most eective motiva-
tor. In fact, Opower, an Arlington based company, involved in data mining of energy usage of
households, combines both these methods in their monthly Home Energy Reports (HER) to
consumers, providing upgrade information and peer-comparison information. Several stud-
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ies have shown these reports have decreased average energy consumption by as much as 3%
(Todd et al. 2014).
The objective of our work is to model and study each of the two above methods (modi-
fying behaviors and upgrading equipment) and the interaction between them. In particular,
we characterize the situation where these two outcomes are synergetic. We provide a parsi-
monious model to evaluate the eects of both these methods and also extend the literature
on modelling the impact of social comparisons from the perspective of the population with
continuous consumer types. Finally, we provide one additional reason explaining the eec-
tiveness of Opower's HER program: its combination of economic (i.e., upgrades) and social
information (i.e., peer comparisons) can reinforce each other justifying the joint use of both
of them.
Through the rest of this chapter, Section 4.2 reviews the current literature, Section 4.3
discusses the model combining both social and economic incentives, Section 4.4 derives the
outcomes under the various incentives, Section 4.5 discusses the numerical results and the
chapter concludes in Section 4.6.
4.2. Literature Review
Our work considers the interaction of economic and social incentives provided to con-
sumers under the Opower HER program. Hence, it is related to three streams of literature:
the empirical research on the impact of Opower's HER program, the modelling of social
comparisons (as an incentive), and the literature on the impact of economic incentives for
Energy consumers. We discuss each of these streams in detail below.
4.2.1 Opower's HER program
There are a few recent empirical research papers analyzing the eects of Opower's HER
program. Cialdini and Schlutz (2004) show that normative messages coupled with appeals
to reduce consumption of energy can have a signicant impact on energy consumption. In
particular, peer consumption information was found to be the most eective. Applying
this concept, Opower began sending monthly energy reports to consumers comparing their
consumption with that of similar households. Several papers report that Opower HER
program has reduced energy consumption by around 2% (Allcott 2011, Ayres et al. 2013).
124
The longevity of these eects have been questioned in Ferraro and Price (2013), with the
eects depending on the political inclinations of the consumer (Costa and Kahn 2013).
HER program, however, has been widely accepted as eective in helping to achieve the
state and federal energy eciency requirements, to the extent that many of the nations
largest utilities (like PG&E, ComEd, AEP) have begun to ramp up their behavioural energy
eciency portfolios (Opower 2012). While the above papers study the eects of Opower's
HER program empirically, we model these eects analytically.
4.2.2 Utility from Social Comparisons
In general, there are several papers that consider the outcome of social comparisons as a
part of utility of consumers. Similar to our work, a majority of the literature assumes that
such utility is linear and proportional to the dierence between the individual's outcome and
the reference point. The main types of social comparison models are as follows,
 Status seeking (Frank 1985): The original hypothesis was that individuals are generally
spiteful or envious of others and derive utility from being ahead of others performance,
in order to seek status relative to other individuals. Frank (1985) proposed that indi-
viduals seek small `ponds' in which they are relatively big sh rather than big ponds,
in which they are relatively small sh. The paper models the utility as linear func-
tion of the dierence between performance of an individual and the reference point x0
in that `pond'. If xi is the performance of an individual, then individuals are either
ahead-seeking, where their utility from being ahead of a reference point is given by,
(xi   x0)+ or behind-averse where they experience disutility from being below the
reference point, contributing to utility as:  (x0   xi)+.
 Inequity averse (Fehr and Schmidt 1999): In this model, individuals are generally
averse to all kinds of inequity, whether they are ahead or behind compared to other
individuals in the pool.1 The standard form of utility of an individual i is given by,
Ui(fxi; xjg) = xi   
n  1
X
(xj   xi)+   
n  1
X
(xi   xj)+; (4.1)
1There is often the assumption that individuals are more averse to being behind than being ahead.
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where   . This model is often considered the gold standard for social comparisons
and its variations are used frequently in the literature (Charness and Rabin 2002,
Bolton and Ockenfels 2006).
 Risk aversion models (Linde and Sonnemans 2012, Bolton and Ockenfels 2010): These
models extend the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model by including uncertainty in the
outcome of an individual's action due to a state of nature or the actions of other
individuals. Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) argue that consumers would rather take a
higher risk due to a state of the nature than risk of being `betrayed' by another indi-
vidual (in a teamwork setting). Linde and Sonnemans (2012) consider the implications
of Prospect theory and risk aversion when utility derived from social comparisons is
uncertain because of uncertain outcomes.
 General Utility function (Levitt and List 2007): Some authors consider a general utility
function where each individual's utility depends on the performance of all individuals
in the economy and may be increasing or decreasing non linearly in the parameters
associated with other individuals.
Roels and Su (2013) belongs to the rst group and is methodologically closest to our
paper, while asking dierent research questions. Motivated by Opower, Roels and Su (2013)
study how social comparisons may aect performance of consumers when consumer popula-
tion consists of two types. Their research assumes that consumers are either ahead-seeking
or behind-averse. The focus of their work is to consider the most eective reference system
to provide the consumer population, in order to achieve the social planner's objectives. We
extend their model to consider continuous population types and analyze the combined eect
of the social comparisons (that they consider) and economic incentives (that they do not
consider). Like Roels and Su (2013), we restrict our attention to the \ahead-seeking" and
\behind-averse" social utility models. The current empirical research on social comparisons
is often based on decisions of players in ultimatum games, responder games and such similar
set ups where players make a decision to up-hold/allocate pay-os (Fehr and Schmidt 2006).
In these contexts, we observe that the \behind-averse" utility may be applicable (Bolton
and Ockenfels 2006). Our context is to evaluate the eort levels of the players in relation to
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the social motivation they receive from comparison to a reference, akin to students eorts
when provided reference information of other student's performances (Stevenson et al. 1990).
Here, in some cultural contexts, students strive to be at the top of their class, i.e., we observe
`ahead-seeking' behavior. A similar behavior is observed in income distribution preferences
of German citizens (Schwarze and Harpfer 2003). We hypothesize that a population may
consist of both `ahead-seeking' and `behind-averse' consumers.
There are two other social utility models that are related: inequity averse and concave
utility functions. However, inequity aversion is not applicable in our context as it is unlikely
that customers feel a penalty by consuming far less than the average. While concave utility
is a likely option, we do not consider it in this chapter, for the sake of analytical tractability.2
4.2.3 Energy Eciency Incentives to Energy Consumers
One of key decisions consumers in power markets can make is to invest in more energy-
ecient equipment. The energy savings constitute an economic incentive for investment. The
Opower HER program provides consumers with necessary information about investments in
energy savings and upgrades. This subsection discusses the stream of literature that models
energy eciency upgrades.
To entice consumers to be energy ecient, utilities and government agencies have been
providing Energy Eciency (EE) or Demand Side Management (DSM) programs for decades.
These programs include Appliance recycling, HVAC upgrade initiations, Energy Star cam-
paigns, Green lights programs etc, which result in signicant reductions in energy consump-
tion (Geller et al. 2006, Eto et al. 1994). These programs typically cost between 3.9-5 cents
per KWh of Energy reduction (Arimura et al. 2011), and are estimated as being overall
protable (Friedrich et al. 2009). Additionally, energy eciency programs have other tan-
gential benets including improved health and comfort for the consumer and generation of
jobs (Clinch and Healy 2000, Mills and Rosenfeld 1996).
Interestingly, while these programs have been eective, the eectiveness observed is gen-
erally much lower than their predicted eectiveness. This is known as the `energy eciency'
gap (Jae and Stavins 1994). The empirical evidence for this gap is well established, showing
2Concave social utility makes the consumption decision maximizing a non-concave function
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that consumers make decisions based on an implied discount rate of 25-100%, which is far
above the market discount rate (Sanstad et al. 2006, Train 1985). There are a wide vari-
ety of explanations for this gap, such as hidden costs of switching (Jae et al. 2004), other
product attributes (e.g., lower lighting quality), heterogeneity of consumers (Hausman and
Joskow 1982), and future uncertainties (Sutherland 1991). Reddy (1991) suggest that these
barriers may be because of liquidity constraints with the consumers, indierence, bounded
rationality, legacy issues, and imperfect information (Howarth and Andersson 1993). See
Gillingham et al. (2009) for a complete survey of potential behavioral and market failures to
explain this energy eciency gap.
Our paper attempts to model the barriers that cause this gap analytically. Due to the
higher discount rate, adoption rates of EE programs are higher for programs with faster
payback and greater annual savings (Anderson and Newell 2004). The initial investment
costs may be signicant and include, for example, transactions costs associated with making
the switch to low-carbon technologies (Mundaca et al. 2013), search costs, deciding from
the array of available options and making life style changes etc. B Howarth et al. (2000)
argue that EPA programs such as `Green Lights' and `Energy Star Oce Products' have
been successful because their campaigns address the imperfect information and bounded
rationality issues (i.e., huge costs of decision making) well. Note that Opower's HER program
provides this benet with the information sent in the reports. We explicitly model these
transaction costs in the context of making the decision to switch and the additional costs of
the new technology. We capture these costs as a one time xed cost of making the switch
and a linear cost with increase in energy eciency ability. Related to our work, Gillingham
et al. (2009) model consumers' Energy Eciency decisions as a trade-o between capital
costs of making the switch and cost of energy, while providing the same level of energy
service. In contrast, we assume a concave utility function for the service provided by energy
consumption and assign the energy eciency ability as a parameter that aects the utility
from energy consumption. Additionally, we also consider the eects of social comparisons
while they focus on the design of energy eciency programs.
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4.3. The Model
In this section we describe the model, which we use to compare the eects of dierent
incentives.
We consider a population of consumers with a continuous distribution of their types,
indexed by . Intuitively,  stands for the energy eciency. Each player chooses a demand
quantity to consume x 2 [0; X], where minimum demand is normalized to 0 and X is the
maximum possible demand. From the system perspective, lower net demand is environmen-
tally friendly and more desirable. However, consumer of type  receives a utility from their
consumption, given by V(x), with decreasing marginal benet. We assume V(x) is strictly
increasing and strictly concave. Also, each player incurs a nancial cost of consuming de-
mand x, given by x. Thus each player has a unique demand consumption that maximizes
the net utility V(x)  x.
The customer types arise from their inherent dierences in consumption utility from given
demand. We consider a continuum of player types , per an atomless distribution, given by
the Probability Distribution Function (PDF), f() : [0; max] ! <+, and the dierentiable
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) given by F (). We assume that a player of higher
type- requires to put a lesser amount of eort to achieve the same utility as a player of
lower type. Specically, we assume that the consumption utility for type- player is given
by, V(x) = V (x + ) where V (:) = V0(:) is the utility function of player of type 0. Note
that players with higher  value are predisposed to have lower demand consumption, as their
marginal utility of consuming x units is the same as the marginal utility of consuming x+ 
for player of type 0. This allows us to consider the well-dened function v1(y) = (V
0) 1(y)
on [ 1; V 0(0)], which represents the inverse of V 0(x).3 We further assume X is large enough
to be not binding.
The social planner has two potential methods of incentivizing consumers to consume less
demand. We label them as economic and social incentives.
 Under economic incentives, the social planner provides information to consumers about
investments that improve energy eciency, may be in the form of making investments to
3We assume  < V 0(0), else the optimal consumption is 0 for all cases.
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caulk windows, improve insulation, upgrade to more energy ecient equipment etc. The
HER reports radically simplify the process by providing relevant information. Given this
information, these decisions would typically involve signicant transactions costs making the
choice to upgrade. Once the consumers have acquired the information, they may upgrade
to any level, i.e., up to max, with a xed cost c, and a cost of  per unit improvement in
. Let the binary decision variable, i, reect consumers' investment decision, with the net
utility given by,
U(x; i) =
8<: maxmaxfV (x+ 
)  x  c  (   )g; if i = 1;
V (x+ )  x; else;
(4.2)
 Under social incentives, the social planner may choose to provide a reference consumption
bx, which typically is the average consumption of the consumers. A consumer may derive
utility from social comparisons with the outputs of other consumers in the economy and thus,
the reference consumption provided to the consumers, may inuence consumers' decision.
In our model, the utility gains/losses from social comparisons are brought in addition to
the economic value achieved from consumption, V(x)   x. The reference consumption
provided to the consumers, may inuence consumers' decision. We consider two types of
social comparison utilities. First, the player may face disutility (or guilty feeling) from
higher consumption compared to other players. Hence, the utility of a player of type ,
similar to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), is given by,
U(x; bx) = V(x)  x   x  bx+; (4.3)
where, 
 
x  bx+ is called \behind loss" of this particular player and players in such model
are \behind-averse." Alternatively, a player may receive additional utility from consuming
less than other players. We label these players as \ahead-seeking" and their utility function
is given by,
U(x; bx) = V(x)  x+  bx  x+: (4.4)
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The optimal consumption decision function for each player of type , depends on other
players' decisions and the reference point, i.e., x() 2 argmax
i2f0;1g
U(x; bx; i), where bx =R max
=0
f()x()d. The equilibrium characterizes the consumption of all players in the pop-
ulation. We assume that all players have the same parameters  and . When the players
receive both social and economic incentives, their utility depends on the investment , con-
sumption x and the benchmark consumption bx,
U(x; i; bx) =
8<: maxmaxfV (x+ 
)  x  c+ g(x; bx)  (   )g; if i = 1;
V (x+ )  x+ g(x; bx); else; (4.5)
where g(x; bx) = (bx  x)+ or  (x  bx)+, in the ahead-seeking and behind-averse cases
respectively.
We compare the impact of providing social (in both ahead-seeking and behind-averse
environments) or economic incentives, separately or together. That is, we compare the
equilibrium consumption proles under 4 cases: case without economic or social incentives,
case with only economic incentives, case with only social incentives and case with both
economic and social incentives. Among social incentives, we consider both ahead-seeking and
behind-averse cases. Additionally, let 0 = minfv1( + ); maxg and 00 = minfv1(); maxg
represent two thresholds of customer types. If 0 < max or 00 < max, then we will describe
in the next section that it may be optimal to consume 0 units (the lower limit). We also
assume that ; ; ; c > 0.
4.4. Equilibria characterization
In this section, we characterize the equilibria under the various scenarios. First, we
consider the benchmark case of no incentives and compare it to the case with economic
incentives.
Proposition IV.1. (i) Under no social or economic incentives, the optimal decision func-
tion is, x() = (v1()  )+, with average consumption bx = R 00 (v1()  )f()d.
131
(ii) Under economic incentives, the optimal decision function is,
(x(); ()) =
8<: (v1()  0; 0); if   e;((v1()  )+; ); else; (4.6)
where e = (0   c=(   ))+ if  < , else e = 0.
No Incentives Investment Only
x*(θ) x*(θ)
θ θθ
~
Figure 4.1: Pattern of optimal consumption function under the vanilla case and the case
with only economic incentives.
Clearly, when we have economic incentives, the average consumption decreases. There
exists a threshold e, below which all consumers choose to invest. However, consumers who
have reasonably high ability choose to not invest. Those that upgrade, choose their technol-
ogy level  = 0 if  < .
Now, we consider the optimal policies under only social incentives, in both ahead-seeking
and behind-averse scenarios:
Proposition IV.2. The equilibrium under social incentives is given by,
(i) Under ahead-seeking scenario, the optimal decision function is given by,
x() =
8<: v1()  ; if 0    b;(v1( + )  )+; if b <  < max;
where b = v1( + )  bx + k, where k = (V (v1())  V (v1( + )) + (v1( + ) 
v1()))= for some unique bx.
(ii) Under behind-averse scenario, the optimal decision function is as follows,
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If v1()  0  v1( + ),
x() =
8>>><>>>:
v1( + )  ; if 0   < ;bx if     ;
(v1()  )+; if  <   max;
where  = v1( + )  bx,  = v1()  bx, for some unique bx 2 (v1()  0; v1( + )).
Else, x() = bx for all  2 [0; max] is optimal for all bx 2 [v1( + )+; v1()  0].
θ
Behind averse
x*(θ)
θ
Ahead seeking
x*(θ)
θ θ θ
^
_
_
Figure 4.2: Pattern of optimal consumption function under the case with only social incen-
tives.
In both ahead-seeking and behind-averse scenarios, unique equilibria exist and are as
described above. The average consumption, in each case is smaller than the case with no
incentives. However, the relative ordering of the average consumption under economic only
incentive and social only incentive depends on the value of the parameters c and .
Now, we consider the case when both incentives are applied.
Proposition IV.3. Given  < , the optimal decision function under social and economic
incentives is as follows:
(i) Under ahead-seeking scenario,
(x(); ()) =
8>>><>>>:
(v1( + )  00; 00); if 0    e;
(v1()  ; ); if e <   b;
(v1( + )  ; ); if b <   max;
where b = minfv1( + )   bx + k; maxg, and e = (00   c=(   ) + (00   (v1( +
)  bx+k))=(  ))+, and k = (V (v1()) V (v1(+)))+(v1(+)  v1()))=
for some unique bx.
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(ii) Under behind-averse scenario, if v1()  0  v1( + ),
(x(); ()) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(v1()  0; 0); if 0   < e;
(v1( + )  ; 0); if e   < maxf; eg;
(bx; 0); if maxf; eg    ;
(v1()  ; 0); if  <   max;
where  = (v1( + )  bx)+,  = v1()  bx, e =  (   )0 + (v1( + )  bx) + k  
c
+
=( +    ) , and k = (V (v1())   V (v1( + )) + (v1( + )   v1()))= for
some unique bx 2 [v1() 0; v1(+)]. Else, x() = bx = v1() 0 for all  2 [0; max]
is optimal.
θ
Behind averse
x*(θ)
θ
Ahead seeking
x*(θ)
θ
θ θ^
_
θ
~
θ
~ _
Figure 4.3: Pattern of optimal consumption function under the case with both economic and
social incentives.
The above case is more involved and contains more intricacies than the previous two
propositions. However, we observe that there ends up being a social pressure for \investing"
in more energy ecient equipment, hence the threshold of investment e, goes up dramatically,
especially in the ahead-seeking scenario. Applying Propositions IV.1-IV.3, we have the
following result about the relative values of the average consumptions under the various
incentive schemes.
Proposition IV.4. Assume population with uniform probability distribution function f() =
1=max for all  2 [0; max], c >p22maxk + ((v1()  v1( + )))2 (v1() v1(+))
and v1( + )  max and the value function V (:) quadratic. In ahead-seeking scenarios,
the reduction in average consumption due to the combined social and economic incentives is
higher than the sum of the reductions due to each of the incentives individually.
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Proposition IV.4 states that the two types of incentives, when combined provide larger
reduction in the average consumption of the population, as compared to the sum of reductions
under the individual incentives, under ahead-seeking scenarios. This behavior is illustrated
in Figure 4.4. Observe the relatively large decrease in the average consumption under both
incentives. The grayed region and the tiled region under both incentives is larger then the
respective regions under social and economic incentives respectively.
No Incentives Social Only
Investment Only Both incentives
xavg = 41.5 xavg = 40.25
x*(θ) x
*(θ)
x*(θ)x*(θ)
θ
θ
xavg = 34.59xavg = 39.21
θ
θ
Figure 4.4: Output consumptions under all four incentive schemes for an example with  
U [0; 15], V (x) = 100x   x2,  = 5,  = 2, c = 25, max = 15. The tiled region
represents the magnitude of the decrease in consumption because of consumers
who upgrade. The gray region denotes the decrease in consumption due to social
utility achieved by consumers who are below the reference point.
Interestingly, under behind-averse scenarios, we discuss in the following section that
depending on the relative values of  and c, the benet of both methods can be sub-additive
or super-additive.
We note that Proposition IV.4 requires the additional constraint that v1(+) max > 0.
This constraint implies that conditional on making the decision to invest, consumers upgrade
to the highest ability level max. Indeed, the varying level of investment for dierent customer
types is a more realistic reection of the markets, i.e., only some consumers may choose to
upgrade and their upgrade levels would depend on their starting level . We observe that
under these relaxed constraints, the proposition no longer holds. This is because, for high
enough  and low enough c, it may be that each of the incentives individually may be
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sucient to motivate all consumers to consume the lower limit 0. Hence, introducing both
incentives provides no additional benet compared to introducing a single incentive, as in
the following example.
Example IV.5. Consider the case when V (x) = 20x   x2, c = 5,  = 1,  = 10,  = 10,
max = 15 and f() = 1=15 for  2 [0; max].
For this example, observe that the optimal consumption function under the vanilla case
is given by, x() = (5   )+, i.e., 0 = 5. Interestingly, given that  = 10, it can be shown
that x() = 0 for all  2 [0; max] for the case with social incentives only. However, for the
case with economic incentives, the optimal consumption function is given by x() = (5  )
if  2 [40=9; 5] and x() = 0 otherwise. Observe that in the case with both incentives the
optimal consumption function is still x() = 0 for all  2 [0; max]. Hence, the net reduction
in average consumption under both incentives is  0:823 less than the sum of reductions
under the individual incentives, contradicting the superadditivity hypothesis.
4.5. Impact of Parameters on superadditivity
In this section, we consider the eect of varying the parameters, c; ; ; (= ) and the
PDF f(:) on the superadditivity of the two incentive schemes. We measure the superadditiv-
ity in terms of the dierence between the sums of the outcomes:  = (bxi+ bx)  (bx0+ bx;i),
in other words, this describes the additional decrease in the average consumption under pro-
viding both incentives when compared to the sum of the benets under both incentives. We
rst describe the intuition behind the superadditivity under the ahead-seeking social utili-
ties. Similarly, we describe why superadditivity may not be true under the behind-averse
scenario. Then, we compare the changes in the output  and the benet of the incentives
to changes in the parameters.
4.5.1 Mechanism of superadditivity
We rst discuss the intuition behind the superadditivity in the ahead-seeking case. Ob-
serve that under economic incentives, several consumers of lower type  switch to the higher
type, where-as under the social incentives, the broad upper range of types  under ahead-
seeking are willing to consume less, for the benet of increasing how much they are ahead.
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This can be seen in Figure 4.4. Under both incentives combined, the social incentives moti-
vates more consumers to make the upgrade, hence, the threshold e up to which consumers
upgrade increases (i.e., the size of the tiled region in the Figure increases). Interestingly not
only do the lower types decide to upgrade, but they also consume less because they have
the additional incentive of being ahead of the average (i.e., the size of the shaded region in
Figure 4.4 increases). We identify these as the two sources of superadditivity. Through the
rest of this section, we explain the changes in the superadditivity to changes in parameters
by attributing to the change in size of these areas.
Under the behind-averse scenario, applying social incentives benets the low types of
consumers, as these customers decrease their consumption to get closer to the average.
Similarly, the economic incentives also provides the low type consumers possibility to upgrade
to a higher technology. However, under both incentives, consumers either upgrade to the
highest level or work extra hard to consume less (to reduce the behind loss), in other words,
they choose one of the two incentives to motivate them as once they upgrade to the highest
level, they do not have any motivation to consume even less. Hence, we observe in our
extensive numerical study that often,  < 0, i.e., the two benets are sub-additive. However,
when c is quite high or  is quite low, providing both benets presents the additional nudge
for more consumers to upgrade further or pushing down the average causing the `guilty
feeling' on more consumers. In these cases, the benets may be super-additive.
4.5.2 Explanation of numerical study
To illustrate the interaction of incentives, we consider a simple quadratic model with
V (x) = 100x   x2 and a range for the values of parameters c; ; ; . We assume that the
distribution of consumer types is triangular and follows the PDF f(:) given by,
f() =
g
max
+
8<:
4(1 g)
(max)2
if  < 
max
2
4(max )(1 g)
(max)2
else
(4.7)
where g 2 [0; 2] is an index of variance of the distribution, while the mean remains the
same.
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4.5.3 Impact of c and 
First consider the impact of the xed cost of upgrading, c. Recall that superadditivity in
ahead-seeking scenarios stems from the increase in the areas of the tiled and shaded regions,
as seen in Figure 4.4. Superadditivity is high for very low c and very high c. This is because,
at very low c, the increase in the area of the shaded region is high, because the threshold e
is high. At very high c, the relative increase in the area of the tiled region is high because
of the increase in the threshold e from the case with economic incentives to the case with
combined incentives.
In behind-averse scenario, as c increases, fewer consumers react to economic incentives.
Recall that in behind-averse scenarios sub-additivity arises because the ones who upgrade
lose the motivation due to social incentives as they are ahead of the average (due to economic
incentives). However, as c increases, more consumers have insucient incentives to upgrade
and combining it with social incentives helps. Thus, we observe superadditivity increases.
Interestingly, as  represents the unit cost of upgrading while c represents the xed cost
of upgrading, the eect on the output parameters to changes in  follows similar patterns as
c, providing the same insights.
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Figure 4.5: Impact of xed cost of investment when  = 1;  = 6; g = 1; (= ) = 5.
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4.5.4 Impact of 
As  increases, the threshold e up to which consumers upgrade increases.4 Hence, the
area of the shaded region is increasing, i.e., superadditivity, which captures the additional
decrease in consumption of those who upgrade due to social incentives, is increasing. In con-
trast, under behind-averse scenario, increasing the threshold up to which consumers upgrade,
implies more consumers (who upgrade) lose out on the social sensitivity benets. Hence, the
superadditivity factor  decreases with increase in .
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Figure 4.6: Impact of cost of consumption  when  = 1:1; c = 20; g = 1; (= ) = 5.
4.5.5 Impact of PDF f(:)
In this subsection, we measure the impact of the variance in the distribution f(:) of the
consumer types.
Observe that the value of the threshold e up to which consumers upgrade does not change
with g. We rst consider the case when e is larger than the median of the distribution. In
this case, observe that larger g implies that a smaller proportion of the population is less
than the threshold. Hence, the weighted area of the shaded region (i.e., the amount by which
consumers who upgrade reduce their consumption) decreases as g increases for the ahead-
seeking scenario. Hence, we observe that superadditivity is decreasing when g increases. In
contrast, for the behind-averse scenario, as g increases, the number of consumers upgrading
decreases. Hence, in line with the arguments in section 4.5.1, the super additivity benet is
4All consumers who upgrade choose the same nal ability level.
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increasing as fewer consumers are missing out on the double benets.
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Figure 4.7: Impact of Distribution parameter g when the threshold of upgrading e is higher
than the median, and  = 1:1;  = 50; c = 30; (= ) = 5.
For the behind-averse scenario, when the threshold e is below the median, increasing g
increases the proportion of the population who upgrade when subject to economic incentives.
Hence, using the same arguments as above, the superadditivity benet is decreasing. How-
ever, for the ahead-seeking scenario, when g increases, while the proportion of population
who upgrade is increasing the proportion of the population in the higher distribution of types
who are above the average is also increasing, neutralizing the eects of the change in area
of the shaded region. More interestingly, increasing g reduces the impact of the increase in
the area of the tiled region. Hence, superadditivity decreases when g increases in this case.
4.5.6 Impact of (= )
For ahead-seeking case, as  increases, the relative increase in the upgrade threshold due
to applying both incentives increases, because there's more motivation to upgrade, as up-
grading allows the consumer to be ahead of the average. Hence superadditivity is increasing,
until  becomes high enough that the constraint x  0 becomes binding. At this point, the
two benets become redundant as one benet is already beginning to achieve the maximum
possible reduction in the consumption. Hence,  starts to decrease at higher .
In contrast, under the behind-averse scenario, the sub additivity comes from low ability
consumers who either upgrade or reduce behind loss by consuming less. As  increases,
consumers who upgrade lose relatively more to the social case when they would consume
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(a) Ahead seeking case (b) Behind averse case
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Figure 4.8: Impact of Distribution parameter g when the threshold of upgrading e is less
than the median, and  = 1:1;  = 5; c = 50; (= ) = 5.
lesser for being closer to the average. Hence, the sub-additivity increases, as  increases.
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Figure 4.9: Impact of social comparison factor (= ) when  = 1:1;  = 50; g = 0; c = 5.
4.6. Conclusion and Extensions
The Home Energy Reports (HER) program of Opower have proved very eective in
reducing the average demand consumption of the energy customer population. This work
attempts to provide one explanation as to why the combination of actionable information
(ideas for upgrading to energy ecient equipment etc) and appropriate social comparisons
can be motivating to consumers rather than the individual eects of these two `incentive'
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schemes, within the framework of the literature on social comparisons.
We consider a stylized model which compares the impact of economic and social incen-
tives on the consumption levels of energy consumers. We prove the structure of the optimal
consumption functions for consumers as a function of their type . Proposition IV.4 ana-
lytically veries the observation that the net reduction under both incentives is higher than
the sum of the separate reductions under the individual incentive schemes, for ahead-seeking
social comparisons, under some constraints.
Further, we conduct an extensive numerical study to measure the eect of changes in
parameters on the `superadditivity' of the two eects, in both ahead-seeking scenarios. In
general, we note that often when a change of parameters increases superadditivity for ahead-
seeking, it is likely to reduce superadditivity for the behind-averse scenario. Specically, we
nd that as , the cost of consumption increases, the threshold level up to which consumers
upgrade increases, hence the superadditivity increases under ahead-seeking and decreases
under behind-averse.
Finally, when the consumption level begins to hit the lower bound, the super additivity
may not be true in ahead-seeking scenarios. In behind-averse scenarios, superadditivity is
not generally true.
There are several interesting extensions to strengthen the results. One may consider
generalizations of Proposition IV.4 to more general distributions of consumer types. One
may consider a concave utility from social comparisons rather than linear in the dierence.
One may also consider the case when there are customer types associated with the social
sensitivity parameter  or . This work will benet from these extensions to provide further
insights on the eectiveness of social comparisons in energy markets.
There is some evidence to believe that certain energy eciency improvements are easier
and often more fruitful than other energy eciency improvements, i.e., the cost of increasing
ability  may be convex instead of concave. This kind of extensions may also be considered.
4.7. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition IV.1. Part (i) follows directly from the fact that U(x) = V(x) x
is strictly concave in x, for given , giving a unique maximizer, x() = (v1()   )+ and
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bx = R max
=0
f()x()d, per the denition.
The proof of part (ii) is similar. Observe rst that U(x; 1) = V (x+
0) c x (0 )
as long as  < , else U(x; 1) = V (x + )   c   x. Further, note that U(x; 1) and
U(x; 0) are both strictly concave in x respectively per (4.2). Further, x

1() = v1()  max
and x0() = v1()    maximizes U(x; 1) and U(x; 0) respectively. Finally, we note that,
U(x

1(); 1)   U(x2(); 0) = (0   )   c is greater than 0 when  < e and less than 0,
when  > e. Hence, we have the optimal policy per (ii). Further, the expression of bx follows
directly from the expression for the average.
Proof of Proposition IV.2.
First, we prove part (i). Observe that concavity of V (:), implies, (V (v1())   V (v1( +
))=(v1()  v1(+))  V 0(v1()) = , hence, we have, k  0. For given mean bx, in order
to satisfy rationality, the utility function, given by U(x; bx) = V (x + ) + (bx   x)+ must
be maximized. This function is clearly concave. Hence, if x < bx, then the optimal decision
satises, x1() = (v1( + )   )+ and if x > bx, then x2() = v1()  . Note further that,
x() 6= bx for any , as such a value cannot be optimal (except when bx = 0). For each bx,
there exists b = (v1(+) bx)+k at which the optimal solutions from both x1() and x2()
yields the same value. This shows optimality. Now, we show the existence of a unique bx,
which achieves optimality. Consider,
 bx+ bZ
0
f()x2()d +
maxZ
b
f()x1()d = 0 (4.8)
For 00 = max, observe that the rst derivative of the LHS of (4.8) is  1 f(b)(v1() v1(+
)), which is strictly negative. Further the LHS of (4.8) is positive at bx = v1(+) max+k,
and negative at bx = v1( +) + k. If bx > 0, then stability requires that x1(b) < bx < x2(b),
i.e., there does not exist  for which x() = bx. We observe that this is true due to the strict
concavity of V (:).
Proof of part (ii) is similar to the proof of part (i). Note that the utility function is
concave in x even in the behind-averse scenario.
Proof of Proposition IV.3. Observe, similar to the proof in Proposition IV.2, that
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k; k > 0. First, we prove part (i) for the case when c > (v1() v1(+)). Note that the
function remains concave in the decision variable x, for both i = 0; 1. Hence, the expressions
for x() are similar to the proofs of Proposition IV.1 and IV.2. Further, substituting the
expressions gives b e  0 for all bx 2 v1(+) max+k; v1(+) max+c=(+)+k.
Clearly, bx solves,
 x+
eZ
0
f()x1(
00)d +
bZ
e
f()x2()d +
maxZ
b
f()x1()d = 0 (4.9)
where x1(); x

2() are as dened in the proof of Proposition IV.2. Uniqueness is established
because the rst derivative of the LHS of the above expression is negative, similar to (4.8).
The proofs for the other cases is similar.
The proof of part (ii) is similar.
Proof of Proposition IV.4. Firstly, for the given range of c, it can be seen that b =
v1( + )  bx+ k. We consider the proof in three cases:
 If   , in this case, the variable cost per unit of increasing ability is lower than the
benet received from higher ability. Hence, if a consumer decides to invest, they will
invest to increase their ability to the maximum level. So, the structure of equilibria will
remain the same, however, the expression for e for cases under Proposition IV.1(ii) and
IV.3(i) become max c=( ) and max c=( )+(max b)=( ), while the rest
of the expressions remain exactly the same. Substituting these changes into the expres-
sion for, bx0+bx;i (bxi+bx) is a positive factor of, 2 (  (c2r   max(   )3))+maxr( 
)2

22max   4max  
q
( )2(+2maxr)(3+22( )+(( )2+4cr)+2maxr( )2)
r2
+ 22max

+
max( )2 ((   )2 + 2cr), where r is the negative of the co-ecient for the quadratic
term in V (:). It can be shown that this term is always negative, for the given conditions,
proving the result.
 Else if  <    + , then bxi = bx0, proving the result trivially.
 Else if  >  +, in this case, the variable cost per unit of  is higher than the benet
received from higher ability, giving, bxi = bx0 and bx = bx;i. Hence, in this case, the
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reduction due to providing both incentives is exactly the same as the reduction due to
providing only social incentives.
4.8. Appendix: Model Extension from Roels and Su (2013)
In this section, we extend the model in Roels and Su (2013) to show that their insights
continue to hold for more general distributions of consumer types. While most of the notation
remains similar to the original model in section 4.3, we apply the notation in Roels and Su
(2013) in order to be consistent.
We attempt to use the same notation as Roels and Su (2013) as much as possible in
order to facilitate comparison. Each player chooses an output x 2 [0; X], where X is the
maximum possible out. Higher outputs are more valuable but come at a cost, for example,
students prefer to receive higher grades, but will require to put more eort. We summarize
all costs and benets using a strictly concave (net) value function V(x), so each player has
a unique utility maximizing output.
The customer types arise from their inherent costs of achieving a given output. We
assume that a player of type  requires to put an additional amount of eort to achieve the
same output as a player of type 0. Hence, the utility to a type  player for an output x
is given by, V(x) = V (x + ) where V (:) is the utility function of player of type 0. Note
that players with higher  value are predisposed to have lower outputs, as their marginal
utility of achieving output x is the same as the marginal utility of achieving output x+  for
player of type 0. We also assume that V 00(x) <  1 for all x and V 0(0) > 0. Note that strict
concavity anyway implies, V 00(x) < 0 for all x. Further, this allows us to consider the well
dened function v1(y) = (V
0) 1(y) on [ 1; V 0(0)], which represents the inverse of V 0(x).
Each player also derives utility from social comparisons with the outputs of other players
in the economy, which is evaluated based on the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
G(x) : [0; X] ! [0; 1] of outputs of the other players in the system, where G(X) = 1
and G(:) is non-negative, increasing and upper semi-continuous. For the sake of analytical
convenience, we further assume that 0; X are not binding solutions.
We consider two models of social comparisons. First, the player may face disutility from
achieving a lower output compared to other players. Hence, the utility of a player of type ,
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similar to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), is given by,
U(x;G(:)) = V(x)   lim
h!0+
nX
i=1
(x  xi)+(G(xi) G((xi 1)) (4.10)
where n = bX
h
c, xi = ih, and x+ def= maxfx; 0g and  represents the parameter associated
with the social sensitivity of the population. Note that we use Reimann integrals to describe
the social comparison utility in order to succinctly capture the possibility of distributions
with atoms. If G() were dierentiable, we have, that U(x;G(:)) = V(x) 
R X
x
(~x x)g(~x)d~x,
where g(x) = dG(x)=dx. We refer to the term as 
R X
x
(~x   x)g(~x)d~x as the behind loss of
this particular player and say that the player is behind-averse.
Alternatively, a player may receive additional utility from being ahead of other players
in the population. We label these players as ahead-seeking and their utility function (for
continuous G(:), the denition would be equivalent for a distribution with atoms) is given
by,
U(x;G(:)) = V(x) + 
XZ
0
(x  ~x)+g(~x)d~x = V(x) + 
xZ
0
(x  ~x)g(~x)d~x (4.11)
We refer to these players as ahead-seeking and the term, 
R x
0
(x   ~x)g(~x)d~x as the ahead
gain of this particular player for output x.
In our model, the utility gains/losses are brought about from social comparisons on top of
the value achieved from the outputs, V(x). Further, the social planner can actively inuence
the outputs of players by providing the appropriate reference structure. We consider two
possible reference structures that may be provided to the consumers: the average output
of population bx = R X
0
(1   G(x))dx5 or the entire distribution of the population (i.e. the
distribution G(x)). We label these as the aggregate reference point or the full reference
distribution cases.
The utilities under the full reference distributions are described above. Similarly, the
utilities under the aggregate reference point for the behind-averse and ahead-seeking type 
5Fubini's theorem shows that this is an expression for the mean of a random variable, as long as the
CDF G(x) is integrable.
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players respectively can be written as,
U(x; bx) = V(x)   bx  x+; (4.12)
U(x; bx) = V(x) +  x  bx+: (4.13)
Our analysis hopes to compare the impact of the reference structures through the two extreme
cases ( average point vs. entire distribution ), in both ahead-seeking and behind-averse
environments. Hence, we consider a total of four possible cases. We consider a continuum of
player types , per an atomless distribution, given by the Probability Distribution Function
(PDF), f() : [0; max] ! <+, and the dierentiable Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) given by F (). We assume that all players have the same parameters  and .
4.8.1 Denition of Nash Equilibrium
Using simplied notation, we describe the notion of an equilibrium for a game with
innite players. See Housman (1988) for a rigorous analytical treatment of the same. In
the game derived from our model, we describe the equilibrium by means of the family of
CDFs H(:) : [0; X] ! [0; 1] for each  2 [0; max], which represents the distribution of the
outputs of the players of type . Since the players are nameless (Housman 1988), we are
only concerned with the distribution of their outputs. We label H(:) as the best response
distribution of players of type .
Equivalent to the constraints of an equilibrium strategy satisfying the principle of no
deviation in a Nash Equilibrium, we formulate the following three conditions that must be
true for any equilibrium that makes `sense'.
1. Rationality: Each player enters the game with a belief about the distribution of the
outputs of the other players, represented by the Cumulative Distribution Function
G(x) : [0; X] ! [0; 1]. This is equivalent to the strategy set of all players in a -
nite player game. Note here, that since there are an innite number of players, the
individual player's actions are assumed to not aect the distribution, hence this is a
non-atomic game (Khan and Papageorgiou 1987). However, the player will choose from
the set of actions that maximizes his utility. Hence, the if the CDF H has positive
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support at some ~x, then it maximizes U(x;G()), formally,
if lim
r!0+
(H(~x) H(~x  r))
r
> 0; then; ~x 2 argmax
x2[0;X]
U(x;G(:)); (4.14)
In Behind Averse environments, it can be seen that the term U(x;G()) is strictly
concave in x. In such a case, there is a unique maximum for U(x;G(:)). For these
cases, we express the optimal action simply as a function  and G(:), i.e., x(;G(:)),
the best response function, which corresponds to H() as follows,
H(x) =
8<: 0; if x < x(;G(:));1; else; (4.15)
We label an equilibrium whose `best response distribution' H satises the above ex-
pression as a `smooth equilibrium'.
2. Fairness: We posit that equilibriums that make sense also conform that the actions
taken by players must be concomitant with their ability. Hence players with higher 
(less ability) must have weakly lower output. More precisely, if 1 > 2, the highest
x with positive support in H2 must be weakly less than the lowest x with positive
support in H1 . Formally, let,
xmax() = max

~xj~x 2 [0; X] and lim
r!0+
(H(~x) H(~x  r))=r > 0
	
;
xmin() = min

~xj~x 2 [0; X] and lim
r!0+
(H(~x) H(~x  r))=r > 0
	
: (4.16)
We describe, by a sense of fairness that if 1 > 2, then x
max(1)  xmin(2). Hence, for
a smooth equilibrium, we require that x(;G(:)) is weakly decreasing in , for given
G(:).
3. Stability: The equilibrium is also required to satisfy a stability condition. In other
words, if all the players choose an output from their optimal set per H(), the out-
put distribution must be consistent with the original assumption G(x). Hence, the
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equilibrium output must also satisfy,
G(x) 
maxZ
=0
f()H(x)d = 0; for all x 2 [0; X]: (4.17)
Denition IV.6. Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE): A Rational Expectations Equi-
librium is a correspondence between from  2 [0; max] to a family of functions H() : [0; X]!
[0; 1] that satises the above the conditions of Rationality, Fairness and Stability.
Smoothness is also a useful property (per (4.15)), which implies a sense of equality among
all participants of equal ability. For the sake of ease of analysis, we restrict our initial results
to smooth REEs. Note that a smooth equilibrium can be represented by the function x(),
which we label as the `strategy prole'. We assume that X is suciently large, so that it
is never a binding solution. In this rest of this section, we characterize smooth REEs under
4 scenarios, arising from a combination of Full reference distribution or aggregate reference
point, either ahead-seeking or behind-averse scenarios. We observe dierences in the REEs
in each of the four scenarios. Note that we identify smooth equilibria in all four cases.
4.8.2 Equilibrium Characterization under full reference distribution
In order to better understand the implications of these results, we lead the discussion
with an example, with V (x) = 100x x2, with  =  = 5 and max = 15 and f() = 1=15 for
all  2 [0; 15] (i.e., uniformly distributed). Notice this in contrast to the example in Roels
and Su (2013), where they assume the two types with  = 0 and  = 15, with rest of the
numbers being the same.
Proposition IV.7. Suppose that players are ahead-seeking in an innite population with
type distribution given by the probability distribution function f() : [0; max]! [0;1), that
V (:) is quadratic and have the full reference distribution, then there exists a smooth REE
satisfying,
(i) The unique optimal action for every player of type  is given by the strictly decreasing
function, x() = v1(F ()  )  , dened on [0; max]! [0; X].
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(ii) The stable output distribution CDF is given by,
G(x) =
8>>><>>>:
0; if x < x(max);
1  F ( 1(x)) if x(max)  x  x(0);
1; else;
(4.18)
where  1(x) : [x(max); x(0)]! [0; max] is the inverse of x().
Proof of Proposition IV.7. As part of the proof, we show that the x() and the corre-
sponding output distribution G(x) satisfy, the three properties of Rationality, Fairness and
Stability.
First, part (i) implies,
V 0(x() + ) = (F ()  ) (4.19)
Dierentiating, both sides, we have,
dx()
d
=
f()
V 00(x() + )
  1: (4.20)
Hence, we observe that x() per part (i) is strictly decreasing in , satisfying Fairness.
Because of strict monotonicity, the distribution resulting from this strategy prole, can be
expressed using part (ii). Hence, it satises the Stability condition.
We observe that the CDF in part (ii) is dierentiable, giving
g(x) =
8>>><>>>:
0; if x < x(max);
 f( 1(x))d 1(x)
dx
; if x(max)  x  x(0);
0; else;
(4.21)
where  1(x) is the inverse of the function x() and d
 1(x)
dx
= 1=(dx
()
d
). Note that  1(x)
is a well dened function on the set [x(max); x(0)], hence g(x) is well dened on this set
as well. For the sake of convenience, we allow, for g(x) = 0 for x < x(max) and x > x(0).
Hence, U(:) can be expressed as U(x;G(:)) = V (x + ) + 
R x
0
(x   ~x)g(~x)d~x. Further,
150
we have, the derivatives of this function as follows,
dU(x;G(:))
dx
= V 0(x+ ) + G(x)
d2U(x;G(:))
dx2
= V 00(x+ ) + g(x) (4.22)
Since V () is quadratic, it can be shown that the second derivative is always negative by
substituting for g(:) in (4.22). Note that x() per part (i) satises the rst order condition
per (4.22). Note further that this is the only point at which the rst derivative is zero
including the ranges [0; x(max)] and [x(0); X] as the expression for the rst derivative is
the same across the entire domain [0; X]. This proves Rationality property of the equilibrium.
Observe that, for the introductory numerical example, the stable output distribution will
be uniformly distributed over the range of x 2 [35; 52:5], spread over a range of 17.5, with a
mean of 43.75.
We note that v1(:) is a well dened function on [ 1; V 0(0)] as V (x) is strictly concave,
implying that V 0(:) is monotonically decreasing. Because of strict monotonicity, the inverse
functions are generally well dened across the respective ranges for all the functions discussed
in this paper. Proposition IV.7 provides a smooth REE for the game in ahead-seeking
environments. Note that, in an ahead-seeking environment, the stable output distribution
cannot have any atoms. This is because, for a point x to be an optimal solution for a player
of type , we need,
lim
h!0+
U(x+ h;G())  U(x;G())
h
= V (x+ ) +  lim
h!0+
G(x+ h)  0
lim
h!0 
U(x+ h;G())  U(x;G())
h
= V (x+ ) +  lim
h!0 
G(x+ h)  0 (4.23)
However, if x0 is an atom, then lim
h!0+
G(x0 + h)  lim
h!0 
G(x0 + h) = P (x0) > 0, hence, x0 can
not be the optimal solution for any , contradicting the stability condition.
However, the setting described in Proposition IV.7 is a supermodular game. Hence, the
existence of a pure strategy `Nash Equilibrium', is guaranteed. Now, we discuss the behind-
averse environment, where in a submodular game, such an existence is not guaranteed.
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Proposition IV.8. Suppose that players are behind-averse in an innite population with type
distribution given by the probability distribution function f() : [0; max] ! [0;1) and have
the full reference distribution and the distribution also satises jV 00(v1( F ()))j > f()
for all () 2 [min; max], then there exists a unique REE satisfying,
(i) The unique optimal action for every player of type  is given by the strictly decreasing
function, x() = v1( F ())  
(ii) The stable output distribution CDF is given by,
G(x) =
8>>><>>>:
0; if x < x(max);
1  F ( 1(x)) if x(max)  x  x(0);
1; else;
(4.24)
where  1(x) : [x(max); x(0)]! [0; max] is the inverse of x().
Proof of Proposition IV.8. As part of the proof, we show that the x() and the corre-
sponding output distribution G(x) satisfy, the three properties of Rationality, Fairness and
Stability.
First, part (i) implies,
V 0(x() + ) = ( F ()) (4.25)
Dierentiating, both sides, we have,
dx()
d
=
 f()
V 00(x() + )
  1: (4.26)
Hence, we observe that x() per part (i) is strictly decreasing in , per assumption, sat-
isfying Fairness. Because of strict monotonicity, the distribution resulting from this strategy
prole, can be expressed using part (ii). Hence, it satises the Stability condition.
We observe that the CDF in part (ii) is dierentiable, giving g(x) =  f( 1(x))d 1(x)
dx
,
where  1(x) is the inverse of the function x() and d
 1(x)
dx
= 1=(dx
()
d
). Note that  1(x)
is a well dened function on the set [x(max); x(0)], hence g(x) is well dened on this set
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as well. For the sake of convenience, we allow, for g(x) = 0 for x < x(max) and x > x(0).
Hence, U(:) can be expressed as U(x;G(:)) = V (x+ )  
R X
x
(~x  x)g(~x)d~x. Further,
we have, the derivatives of this function as follows,
dU(x;G(:))
dx
= V 0(x+ ) + (1 G(x))
d2U(x;G(:))
dx2
= V 00(x+ )  g(x) (4.27)
Clearly, the utility function U(x;G(:)) is strictly concave. Hence, there is only one x
()
which maximizes the utility, satisfying the rst order of the condition. Note that x() per
part (i) satises the rst order condition for part (i). This proves Rationality property of
the equilibrium.
The uniqueness can be veried from the fact that the rst derivative of the utility, is
strictly decreasing in x for given , per (4.27), ensuring unique maximum. Hence, all REEs
must be smooth. Further, observe that x() which satises the rst order condition must
be strictly decreasing in . Hence, all REEs must satisfy part (ii) of the proposition.
Observe that, for the example being discussed, the stable output distribution will be
uniformly distributed over the range of x 2 [37:5; 50]. Compared to the ahead-seeking case,
the range has decreased to 12.5 units, while the average remains the same at 43.75. However,
we observe that, the eect of polarization vs. clustering that is discussed in Roels and Su
(2013) is not as profound in this example with Uniform distribution of customer types.
Note that Proposition IV.8 has a restriction of distributions of , for which these equilibira
may exist. Note that behind-averse scenarios represent submodular games in the nite player
setting, hence, in some sense, the existence of a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium is not
guaranteed.
4.8.3 Case Under Aggregate Reference Point
In this subsection, we consider a more generic reference system, where each player is
provided only with the aggregate reference point, bx. Note that the players operate under the
available information. In a sense, it is sucient to give information about the mean to all
the players, as the players are indierent to the distribution of G(x), if they have the same
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mean bx. Under these simplied settings, we are able to describe the structure of all the REE
that exist. We start with the ahead-seeking scenario.
Proposition IV.9. Suppose that players are ahead-seeking in an innite population with
type distribution given by the probability distribution function f() : [0; max] ! [0;1) and
an aggregate reference point, then there exist two smooth REE represented by the strategy
prole,
x() =
8<: v1( )  ; if 0   < b;v1(0)  ; if b <  < max;
and x(b) = v1( )   b or v1(0)   b, where6 b = (v1( )   bx)   k, k = (V (v1(0))  
V (v1( )))=, for some unique bx 2 v1( )  max   k; v1( )  k.7
Proof of Proposition IV.9. Note that the consumers are indierent between two output
distributions G1(:); G2(:) if
R X
0
(1 G1(x))dx =
R X
0
(1 G2(x))dx = bx.
Hence, for any distribution with xed mean bx, in order to satisfy rationality, the utility
function, given by U(x; bx) = V (x + ) + (x   bx)+ must be maximized. This function is
not necessarily concave. In fact, it has up to two maxima. Precisely, (from the rst order
conditions) if x < bx, then it satises, x1() = v1(0)  and if x > bx, then x2() = v1( ) .
Note further that, x() 6= bx for any , as such a value cannot be optimal. For each bx, there
exists b = (v1( )  bx)  k at which the optimal solutions from both x1() and x2() yields
the same value. Hence, the expression in the proposition satises the Rationality condition.
Fairness follows directly as the strategy prole is decreasing in . Now, we show the
existence of a unique bx, which achieves this stability. The stability condition is,
 bx+ bZ
0
f()x2()d +
maxZ
b
f()x1()d = 0 (4.28)
Observe that the rst derivative of the LHS of (4.28) is  1   f(b)(v1( )   v1(0)), which
6Note that any valid CDF H(:) with nite support at only these two values, would be a non-smooth
REE for this game. In fact, we are able to show that these are the only non-smooth REEs possible.
7We assume that [0; X] are not binding solutions, i.e., max < v1( )  k < X
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is strictly negative. Further the LHS of (4.28) is positive at bx = v1( )   max   k, and
negative at bx = v1( )  k. Stability requires that x1(b) < bx < x2(b). We observe that this
is true due to the strict concavity of V (:). This satises the stability condition.
Here, we observe that the canonical example gives a distribution that has equal support
through the range of [35; 52:5] with the exception of [42:5; 45], where it has zero support.
Notice that the range remains the same 17.5 units as in the continuous case, with a break
in the middle, while the average remains the same as 43.75. This represents remnants of the
polarization eect that was discussed by Roels and Su (2013).
Proposition IV.10. Suppose that players are behind-averse in an innite population with
type distribution given by the probability distribution function f() : [0; max] ! [0;1) and
an aggregate reference point,
 If v1( )  max  v1(0), then there exists a unique REE and this REE is smooth and
can be represented by the following strategy prole,
x() =
8>>><>>>:
v1(0)  ; if 0   < ;bx if     ;
v1( )  ; if  <   max;
where  = v1(0)  bx,  = v1( )  bx for some unique bx 2 [v1( )  max; v1(0)].
 Else, x() = bx for all  2 [0; max] is optimal for all bx 2 [v1(0); v1( )  max]
Proof of Proposition IV.10. Note that the consumers are indierent between two output
distributions G1(:); G2(:) if
R X
0
(1 G1(x))dx =
R X
0
(1 G2(x))dx = bx.
Hence, for any distribution with xed mean bx, in order to satisfy rationality, the utility
function, given by U(x; bx) = V (x + )   (bx   x)+ must be maximized. Clearly, it is
strictly concave, hence unique maximum exists. It can be observed that the expression in
the Proposition satises the rst order condition of this utility function. Hence, this is the
unique response for any strategy prole with mean bx, guaranteeing smoothness. Observe
further, that the expression also conrms fairness.
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Finally, we now show that there exists a unique bx satisfying stability, if v1( )  max 
v1(0). Else, we show that each bx is an REE as it is sub-optimal to deviate.
For the strategy prole described, the average response can be evaluated, based on the
distribution f(), and this must be equal to bx. Hence, any stable REE must have bx satisfying,
 bx+ Z
0
(v1(0)  )f()d + bx Z

f()d +
maxZ

(v1( )  )f()d = 0 (4.29)
Note that the expression on the right hand side has a derivative of,  1+F () F (), which
is strictly negative except if,  = max and  = 0, which happens only when bx = v1( )  
max = v1(0). Hence, either way, there can be at most one solution to (4.29). Further, it
can be seen that the expression on the LHS of (4.29) is positive for bx = v1( )   max
and negative for bx = v1(0). Hence, such bx exists for v1( )   max  v1(0). This conrms
stability.
Note that Propositions IV.9 and IV.10 both describe sucient information to nd the
stable output distribution. Interestingly, the introductory example gives an interesting out-
put distribution here, with an atom at x = 43:75, P (x = 43:75) = 1=6, and the rest of
the probabilities uniformly spread across the range [37:5; 50]   f43:75g. Clearly, the eect
of clustering is more pronounced in the aggregate reference point case, relative to the full
distribution reference (See Proposition IV.8).
The application of the above propositions on the introductory example are summarized
in Figure 4.10. The example, demonstrates the major learning from these propositions, i.e.,
the clustering and polarization eects in behind-averse and ahead-seeking environments re-
spectively, remain in the case with continuous distributions. However, their eect is less
pronounced. Further, their eect is substantially mitigated from providing the entire refer-
ence distribution (ensuring customers' anonymity), instead of the aggregate reference point.
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35 52.75
0
1
0.5
0
1
G(x)
G(x)
G(x)
G(x)
(a) Ahead seeking, aggregate 
reference point
(b) Behind Averse, aggregate 
reference point
(c) Ahead seeking, full reference 
distribution
(d) Behind Averse, full reference 
distribution
Variance: 29.68 Variance: 10.85
37.5 50
35 52.75
0
1
0
1
Variance: 25.52 Variance: 13.02
37.5 50
Figure 4.10: Equilibrium Output distributions under the four scenarios, for the introductory
example.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This dissertation contains three essays. The rst two deal with the investment and
operations of energy storage technologies, while the third essay deals with the mechanisms
to reduce consumption, by providing social and economic incentives to consumers.
In the storage investment problem, we consider a stylized model of the grid, to model the
localizing vs. centralizing trade-o in storage investments. We evaluate that the high cost
of storage capacity and high minimum demand, largely favors localizing of energy storage
capacity due to the increased ecacy of localizing. Our analytical conclusions are supported
by managerial decisions undertaken by American Electric Power (AEP) (Nourai 2007). We
manipulate this model to consider the question of energy storage technologies as well. We
consider a variation of the traditional xed cost/variable cost trade-o and present synergies
in `mixing' of technologies in a variety of settings. We provide structural insights by iden-
tifying the structure of the optimal operating policy and establish identiable properties of
the optimal investment portfolio. We further demonstrate that the marginal benet of this
exibility of `mixing' is decreasing in the number of technologies available. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the rst to extend such insights from other settings to the non-linear
setting of energy markets.
In the third essay, we investigate the eectiveness of Opower's HER program by apply-
ing a model to compare the potential benets of social incentives and economic incentives.
Opower's HER program provides both actionable investment information and social com-
parison information. Consumers react to both information and modify their consumption
behaviours to be more environmentally friendly. We show that the combined eect of both
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these sets of information can be dramatically higher than the sum of the individual eects
of providing separate pieces of information, in some circumstances.
Several extensions to the above essays are possible. For the second essay, the incentives of
individual storage operators maximizing their own prots to invest in multiple technologies
needs to be investigated. For future research, it may be apt to consider a storage model
where we compare technologies diering in their power ratings and number of life cycles as
well. For the third essay, we may consider varying utility functions which are non-linear in
the social comparisons. It is likely, that the benet of being ahead has decreasing marginal
benets to the consumer. Further, the social sensitivities may vary among dierent members
of the population. Our model is also able to consider the eects of varying the distribution
of the parameters, and how it aects the appropriate incentive schemes and comparison
benchmarks. Several analytical generalizations of the results in the dissertation may be
feasible and appropriate.
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